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SAILORS' CREEK  
TO  
Appomattox Court House;

OR,  
THE LAST HOURS OF SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY.

BY  
H. EDWIN TREMAIN.

LA ROYALE :

(Part VIII., Amended Edition.)

THE LAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF THE ARMY  
OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.


WITH MEMORANDA RELATING TO  
FARMVILLE, FORDING AND BRIDGING.

BY  
J. WATTS DE PEYSTER.

New York :

CHARLES H. LUDWIG, PRINTER, 10 & 12 READE STREET.

1885.



TAKEN IN HIS LATER YEARS, WHEN ABOUT 63

## Andrew Atkinson Humphreys.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,  
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. A., AND MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. V.  
CHIEF OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, 1862-3.  
COMMANDING PROVISIONAL DIVISION, AFTERWARDS 3D DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS.  
1862-3; AND 2D DIVISION, THIRD CORPS, 1863.  
CHIEF OF STAFF, 8TH JULY, 1863, TO 25TH NOVEMBER, 1864.  
COMMANDING COMBINED SECOND-THIRD CORPS, 1864-5.  
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.





Henry Louis Ferns



SAILORS' CREEK  
TO  
APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE,

7th, 8th, 9th April, 1865;

OR,

THE LAST HOURS OF SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY.

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WAR-MEMORANDA  
OF  
HENRY EDWIN TREMAIN,

MAJOR AND A. D. C., BREV. BRIG.-GEN., U. S. V.

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Edited, with Notes and Chapters on Farmville, Fording, &c.

BY



J. WATTS DE PEYSTER.




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## INTRODUCTORY.

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*"How entertaining Tremain's paper was; it brought everything to a focus."*

HUMPHREYS to DE PEYSTER, 1 Nov., 1872.

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This pamphlet constitutes the Second Part of a Series of Memoranda hastily thrown together by General Tremain, who was aide-de-camp to General Crook, and was an eye-witness and actor in the scenes which he undertakes to record; consequently they may be considered almost Notes of Occurrences, jotted down on the spot. General Tremain placed his manuscript—the majority written while in camp, about Washington, in the summer of 1865, on paper with superscription, "Headquarters District of Wilmington, N. C., 1865"—in my hands to revise, edit and publish, in 1871-2, and the first part, entitled; "The Closing Days About Richmond; or, the Last Days of Sheridan's Cavalry," was printed under my supervision in a pamphlet for private circulation (brevier type, 66 pages), in 1873. A copy of this pamphlet was sent out to the Clarendon Historical Society, of Edinburg, Scotland, of which I am an Honorary Member, and they deemed it of sufficient value to reprint it among their annual issues, in No. 13, January and February, and in No. 14, March and April, 1884.

To enhance the value of the work I have added some maps, which were prepared under the supervision of my dear deceased friend, Maj.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys (for over fifteen months Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, and from the 24th November, 1864, to the close of the operations of the Army of the Potomac, in command of the combined Second-Third Corps, which did the hardest work and fighting throughout the pursuit of Lee, and who, if he had been adequately supported and reinforced on the afternoon of 7th April, 1865, would have finished

the campaign at Cumberland Church, near Farmville; whereas, not being so, the labors and losses dragged on, to be terminated less gloriously two days afterwards at Appomattox Court House)—which maps were originally prepared for my own “La Royale; or, the Grand Hunt of the Army of the Potomac,” that appeared in eight numbers during the years 1872-73-74. I have also inserted a chapter on the battle of Cumberland Church or Heights of Farmville, and on Fording, together with some Notes, which have been added, chiefly in brackets ([ ]), on which great labor has been expended.

The original manuscript, written in great haste and amid difficulties, was so involved and nearly illegible in places that it had to be recopied before it could go into the hands of the printer. I not only read the copy with the original, but also compared the copy and proofs several times, in whole or in part, with the autograph. This labor of love was cheerfully undergone, because the Narrative contains facts which have never elsewhere been presented to the public.

As an Appendix will be added a biographical sketch of General Tremain, prepared by me in the winter of 1883, when he was a candidate for the office of U. S. Senator from the State of New York.

As General Tremain is a cherished member of the old Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, this little work is affectionately dedicated to the Third Army Corps Union.

[Signed,] ★ J. WATTS DE PEYSTER. ★

Honorary Member of the Clarendon Historical  
Society, Edinburg, Scotland.  
First Honorary Member, Third Army Corps Union.  
Brevet Major-General, S. N. Y.  
&c., &c., &c.

## CHAPTER I.

(ORIGINAL CHAPTER XI. OF COMPLETE MEMORANDA.)

"If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will surrender," says Sheridan, in his official dispatch to Grant, at the close of to-day [Thursday, 6th April, 1865]. The next day [Friday, 7th April, P. P. M.] Grant wrote first to Lee on the subject.

Long before dawn, the next morning [7th April] the cavalry bugles were echoing through the bivouacs a lively *reveille*, and everybody was astir. It was with cheerful, hopeful spirits that the sleepy soldiers obeyed the summons. They lit their little coffee-fires, groomed and saddled their horses and *mules* (for the latter were now an important ingredient of "Sheridan's Cavalry"), rolled up their packs, breakfasted frugally on their salt meat and hard-tack, and at the first break of day only awaited the order to move. Any particular headquarters might be distinguished by a movable flagstaff, surmounted by a carriage lamp, planted in the ground before a fire rather more blazing than its neighbors, around which a group of officers might be seen crawling from under their blankets, or making a hurried toilet; while just behind was a candle in a bottle candlestick, flickering upon some rude structure intended to serve as a table and showing a unique set of tin and crockery table furniture, no two of whose dishes belonged to the same set. Here was an army wagon backed almost upon the table, with its tailboard let down, exhibiting its load of tents, pots, kettles, valises, boxes, barrels and all such paraphernalia, waiting to be reinforced by the table and its contents. The hot coffee fumed in delicious fragrance over bright and burning rails, and was not unfrequently upset by some careless fellow as he moved around the fire at every change of wind to avoid the smoke; the ham and bacon, or tough beef-steak, if anybody was so fortunate as to have it, "sizzled" away in the frying-pan, while the cold, uninviting, huge plate of hard-tack announced to the general and staff that breakfast was ready. Some few might be able to find seats, but more usually was this simple, weird-like meal sleepily partaken of by all "standing and in silence." All was over by daylight. The hum of busy preparation was passed; a division general and staff quietly mount; the bugles sound, "To horse!" "Forward!" the confused mass of horses and mules and men takes shape; and a column files out from among them to follow their leader.

Every soldier appreciated what the cavalry were to do to-day. In their comprehensive phraseology it was nothing else but to "pitch in." "If we could only once get the Rebs started" . . . they used to say in less encouraging times. But now they were really "started," and all were eager to keep them "on the wing." In the cavalry operations of to-day it was intended that the immediate pursuit of the enemy should be resumed; that he should be attacked and harassed wherever found; and the subsequent movements of the day were to be determined by events. Crook's column was given the advance. Shortly after starting it, however, Sheridan learned that a command of General Ord (of the Army of the James) having, during the fight of the day before, met a strong and formidable line of the enemy on the railroad between Burkesville and Rice Station, had not been able to press far enough to prevent the possibility of Lee's escape by moving his main body around the left flank, and Grant's armies, and thus get ahead of him on the road, south, to Danville. Especially might this be attempted on the part of the enemy, as a good and wide road ran from Lee's bivouacs near Farmville through Prince Edward Court House in the very direction to assist such a movement. Fearing an attempt of this kind on the part of the Rebels, which, if successful, would undo all the strategic advantages of the day before, Sheridan divided his forces and sent General Merritt's corps to march around the rear of the Army of the James and to strike the road mentioned at Prince Edward Court House as soon as possible. Deeming this matter of the utmost importance Sheridan rode himself with this column, which constituted about two-thirds of his entire command—Custer's and Devin's Divisions.

I do not believe that Lee could have attempted any move of the nature indicated, with the shadow of success, especially with the deficiencies in his supply trains. Besides, he was much nearer Lynchburg than Danville, and had a better chance of reaching Lynchburg. He must have thought so then, for no move was made in the direction feared by Sheridan, and the long march of Merritt's corps on this day was without further incident than is afforded by uncertain country roads and the passage of two or three deep and sluggish branches of the Appomattox—the Sandy river, the Bush river and the Briary river.

It should be added, however, that this move afterwards proved the best that could possibly be made for the main body of the cavalry, as it located them again on the extreme left flank of Grant's lines and placed Sheridan so as to be able to operate away from the entanglements of our infantry columns, while it situated him most favorably for that grand march of the day fol-



lowing [Saturday, 8th April], when the enemy was intercepted, his last supplies captured, his reserve artillery parks attacked; and his army commanded [compelled?] to halt for the night, that Grant's infantry might march up and demand a surrender.

The main pursuit, then, by the cavalry, on the 7th of April, fell to General Crook's division, *the old cavalry of the Army of the Potomac*. Soon after starting and marching in the direction the enemy had traveled, as indicated by the wreckage and remains of wagons, baggage, caissons, destroyed ammunition, clothing, documents and stragglers, Crook found that the gallant Humphreys, ever vigilant and earnest, was already marching on his right with the veterans of the combined Second-Third Army Corps. Each had calculated upon marching by the same road; but, giving way to the infantry, the cavalry sought its way through the woods and across plantations, and neither column halted in the eager pursuit. It was a clear and glorious morning, and the sun seemed to smile in triumph over the beaten tracks and the abundant evidence of a defeated and flying foe.

The Lynchburg railroad between Rice's Station and Farmville, as may be seen by the map, curves like a siphon between the two stations, crossing the Appomattox river nearly equidistant from each, at High Bridge. Here is also a country bridge for ordinary vehicles. Thither Humphreys marched at once, hoping to overtake the enemy and effect captures before he could cross, and prevent, if possible, the destruction of this valuable structure. In this he was only partially successful, reaching the river just as the wagon bridge was being fired by the enemy's rear-guard, and while the second span of the railroad bridge was burning. The smaller bridge, fortunately, was secured, and Barlow's Division, having the advance, at once prepared to cross. The ground on both sides of the river is high and affords most commanding positions, and on the opposite bank appeared a considerable force of the enemy, drawn up to oppose the passage, in a good position strengthened by redoubts. Artillery was posted to cover the attack and Barlow advanced. The enemy's skirmishers were quickly driven from the bridge and ten pieces of artillery captured from him in the works he abandoned on the north bank, while on the south side eight more pieces were taken. But, the fort blown up, the Rebel column moved off without awaiting further attack.

Meanwhile Crook diverged from Humphreys to the left and west, marching by the most direct route towards Farmville, where the railroad again crosses the Appomattox and where in all probability important captures would be effected. Leaving the combined Second-Third Corps and crossing the railroad, two

small tributaries to the Appomattox, the Sandy and Bush rivers, lay on his route. Reaching the former, Rebel cavalry appeared on the opposite bank, while a few men made a bungling attempt to fire the bridge. The infantry skirmishers of General Ord's column at the same time appeared. The enemy fled without a shot and all hands went to work to put out the fire. Rather a difficult task for men provided with nothing more serviceable for this purpose than muskets and sabres. The bridge was high, too, and forty feet long; its beams were already burning. There were no pails there either; but the fire was put out. Exactly *how*, it is pretty difficult to tell; it did not take long either; but "where there is a will, there is a way," and *some* soldiers carried water in their hats. This was the vicinity of that terrible slaughter of the day before, where a detachment from the Army of the James, under General Reed, its adjutant-general, sought to march around the enemy's rear, reach High Bridge and destroy it and all the crossings of the Appomattox before the enemy had yet crossed it. But when near Sandy river they had marched into a snare. They found the enemy on all sides of them, as a "V," and out of the little picked brigade of about 1,500 men scarcely a third escaped. General Reed was killed, the colonel of his cavalry (the 4th Massachusetts) was seriously wounded, and all the command was killed, wounded, captured or scattered. The 116th and 123d Ohio were almost destroyed and the wonder of the sad affair is that any survived it.

This was the most serious reverse of the campaign, but fortunately did not in the least affect its results. But while the loss in life is deplorable, the dangerous character of the important service purposed, the enthusiasm which prompted and led the whole affair and the fruitless gallantry and heroism of those engaged, commands universal admiration. It was a part of the war.

After crossing Sandy river, Crook soon again encountered Rebel cavalry and some very sharp skirmishing continued for about a mile, until reaching the Bush river near its junction with the Appomattox, to which it is tributary. The road to Farmville, on which the column proceeded, here crossed this little stream by a country bridge within sight of High Bridge, and while Humphreys' operations were going on there, the Rebels also attempted to hold Crook in check until the bridge ahead of him should be destroyed. Here, too, the banks were steep, the bridge low, and the grounds on each side of it swampy and impracticable for cavalry. Smith's brigade was dismounted and, while skirmishing, the head of General Ord's infantry column arrived. The destruction of the bridge was prevented and after some little delay in fighting and manœuvring the enemy retired with our advance

close in pursuit, at about the same time that Humphreys crossed High Bridge. [Mark! the infantry were up with the cavalry!]

Taking now a short but rugged plantation by-way, the cavalry moved quickly towards Farmville, leaving the better and more common road on the left to the infantry following.

Farmville is a pretty little town nestling at the foot of its surrounding hills, in Prince Edward county, near the junction of the Buffalo with the Appomattox rivers, and before the war of about fifteen hundred inhabitants. It is old enough to look thoroughly Virginian, is the principal point on the railroad between Petersburg and Lynchburg, about sixty-eight miles W. S. W. from the latter. It is therefore an important tobacco depot and much of the weed was found stored here. During the war it has been the location of extensive work and repair shops. Ambulances, wagons and many other manufactures for army use were here made and repaired by the Confederates. Near the railroad depot there was a firm trestle bridge across the Appomattox, which is here *ordinarily not fordable* [error?] [and "is navigable for batteaux from Farmville to its mouth"]. Arriving at the top of the cleared hills overlooking the town, the Rebels were found to be in occupation, with strong rear guards of cavalry to defend the neighboring heights. Fighting at once ensued and after an hour's heavy skirmishing, assisted greatly by Lord's battery of horse artillery, the enemy sullenly retired down the hills towards the town, when our men, suddenly emerging from the woods, found themselves on the brow of most commanding heights, in a most beautiful and open country, with Farmville at their feet. On the bridge over the Appomattox a train of cars was standing, while the fields on the opposite bank were black with a multitude of men. Who could these be? Humphreys, it was known, had crossed the river below, but he could not have marched the main body of his corps around there so quickly. It could not be the enemy. He must have known on which road we were marching, and it was not usual for him to treat us with such bad generalship as thus to expose a whole corps to destruction.

It was probably, then, some strong body, suddenly detached by Grant from one of the extremes of his army, and which had succeeded in forcing some extraordinary march. If so, good, for here was a considerable body of Rebel cavalry intercepted. The sky had clouded over and the distance was too great to distinguish uniforms. Whoever they might be, there they were beneath us—one vast crowd of men, not resting in lines, but wandering in disorder over the field. They seemed completely under our control; their lives at our command. From the water's edge to the wooded brow of the hill beyond, they appeared a moving, rest-

less mob. Now a few men were observed on the railroad bridge, and soon a little tuft of smoke puffs out from one of the cars; the wind fans it into a flame."

"They have not been able to get that train off the bridge," says one officer, "so they are burning it."

"No," replies somebody else, "it is our men destroying the bridge to prevent the Rebel cavalry down in the town from crossing and will 'gobble up' the whole lot of them certain."

To open fire on them would surely entail a most fearful loss of life. To justify it there must not remain a single doubt that it is not the enemy. If Rebels, every moment was precious to us.

Generals peered through their glasses and staff officers galloped off to find a negro citizen or somebody who might decide the question, and thus passed several minutes of terrible uncertainty. We can wait no longer; it must be the enemy; at any rate it will soon be determined.

"Tell General Smith to charge down through the town," was a simple order which now needed no further explanation; and "Train those guns on those men!" indicated that somebody would be hurt. The bursting flames and black heavy smoke arose from the railroad bridge. Helpless to prevent it and before our very eyes almost, under our feet was the destruction now being completed. Two Napoleon guns were at once rolled to the brow of the hill and trained as if for a pleasure salute towards the mass of men on the low fields beyond [the river]. A shot was fired and in their very midst a shell exploded. Another quickly followed, and another, and another, as fast as two brass guns could be loaded and fired for a few rounds. Had there been here a few more guns, I doubt if many of those men would have escaped with their lives; as it was, they were powerless. What could they do? Not fight! They were infantry. A river was between us, and they were down on a plain under our guns, and musket fire could not injure us. So they quickly glided away. What were the actual casualties just at this particular time can never be known. General Lee himself was there and under his personal direction a section of artillery was posted and answered to our fire. But its shots were wild and futile and were only laughed at by our officers.

The Rebels of course sought safety in flight; yet so great among them was the general demoralization of their forces and so worn out with continual marching and fighting of the campaign that many exhibited no desire for escape. *They seemed resigned to the chances of death or the sure fate of capture* and evinced much reluctance to retreat any further. So plain were the evidences of this fact that a mounted guard was seen to encircle the whole

field with a full skirmish line and by force drive away the multitude of stragglers beyond the range of the guns now playing upon them. Such being the *morale* of an army no wonder the surrender of its remnants followed within forty-eight hours.

These troops proved to be of Anderson's corps and had retired on Farmville after the battles of the day before [6th]. Part of the army, however—as has already been seen—retreated from [Little] Sailors' Creek by way of High Bridge. Lee himself was with the former portion, which reached Farmville during the night, the troops crossing the river and bivouacking where they were first seen by the cavalry, while their venerated commander took up quarters in the town of Farmville. In the morning, fully appreciating the close pursuit and straitened circumstances of the Rebel army, many of the citizens had begged General Lee to remove his men from the vicinity of the town as soon as possible and thus avoid, perhaps, its entire destruction, which would be a likely consequence of any battle in the immediate neighborhood. *We shall presently see with how much consideration these inhabitants were treated by their rebellious countrymen.*

Meanwhile, Smith, with his gallant little brigade of the 1st Maine, 6th and 13th Ohio and 2d New York, had ridden down towards the edge of the town. There was no "masked" fighting here; no manœuvre was hidden; the Rebels saw him coming and were prepared. It is common for historians to tell of bloody charges up to the deadly crest; how brilliantly and gallantly this command stormed a position; or that one scaled a height. But you do not often read of a charge *down hill*, least of all such a *cavalry* charge. Yet here it was. Gen. Putnam, a name always revered by Americans, than whom [according to popular opinion] none bore a more honorable part in the nation's virgin war, accidentally helped himself to immortality by a John Gilpin escape down a flight of stone steps! Connecticut people to-day will take visitors to the field and, with no little pride, point out the hill and precise location of the now obliterated steps. Why may not Virginians do likewise? To be sure there are no stone steps there, but there might have been if rocks had been more plenty, and then this deficiency is compensated by numbers. In Connecticut only one warrior rode down hill [in the defense of the nation; in this case there were a thousand patriots as true as any Putnam].

By this time the remainder of Crook's cavalry had come up and were marching into the town. Davies' brigade arriving as a support to Smith, had taken charge of the place, while the latter was pursuing the enemy to a safe distance and recalling and reforming his regiments. Guards and patrols were placed about the streets and, while the troops were passing through, the bands



played, colors waved, and the soldiers were filled with contentment and enthusiasm. But there was no answering sympathy among the people. Stores were shut up, houses closed, frightened women peeped through dilapidated doorways, sullen men lolled about the porches, obsequious and venerable negroes attempted to bow in respectful salutation to each individual soldier of the line, while others, less reverent, attired in such dazzling colors as their own or their former proprietor's limited wardrobe might afford, sauntered carelessly through the streets, as if they were celebrating a holiday and the arrival of the blessed Yankees, which they innocently believed bestowed, finally and forever, upon them that complete and practical freedom which their crude intelligence conceived as the only result of emancipation.

The infantry of the Army of the James and the head of the Sixth Corps now appeared and massed on the neighboring hills, while Humphreys with his [combined] Second-Third Corps had pushed on after the retreating enemy from High Bridge on the *direct road to Lynchburg*, sending Barlow's Division, however, towards Farmville, as a matter of judicious precaution and to intercept any part of the enemy who might yet remain there. *This excellent disposition of Humphreys greatly accelerated* the retirement of Lee's forces from Farmville and its vicinity, and a large portion of them narrowly escaped capture. Barlow had considerable skirmishing, but the enemy was well posted on commanding hills and was enabled to check an advance until his main body, from Farmville, had retired well on the road before him. Barlow's attacks, however, more than annoyed the enemy. In abandoning the town and its environs the Rebels were compelled to burn about one hundred and thirty of his wagons which he was unable to get away. Retiring, then, before Humphreys' main column, as well as Barlow's detachment, the enemy fell back to a well-chosen position, some four or five [three] miles from Farmville.

During these operations, Brigadier-General Smythe, commanding one of General Barlow's brigades, a gallant young officer who had risen rapidly in the service and whose Irish extraction had only added notoriety to a well-earned reputation, was mortally wounded while conducting in person the operations of his skirmish line. General Humphreys mentions in his official report that the fall of General Smythe "led to the loss of some part of our skirmish line." It is claimed that he was the last Union officer killed in the war. [But let it not be forgotten that Maj.-Gen. Gershom Mott, of New Jersey, who commanded the Third Division (representing all that remained of the Old Third Corps) of the combined Second and Third Corps, had been severely wounded the preceding day, 6th April.]



☞ Marching through Farmville, Crook's cavalry sought to ford across the Appomattox and by a slow and tedious crossing, over a deep and difficult ford, succeeded in the course of the afternoon in forming itself for further operations on the other side. Barlow's Division was here met, and after a short deliberation between the generals, the advance was continued by General Crook, while Barlow moved off further to the right to rejoin the main body of his corps. The Sixth Corps was visible on the hills to the south of the river and it *was supposed that they would cross at once and follow the cavalry*. The difficulties in crossing infantry, however, and the destruction of the bridges prevented, and they occupied the afternoon in preparing a suitable bridge. This was not accomplished until after dark, so that no further operations took place during the afternoon of the 7th [April] in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, except the attacks upon him of Generals Humphreys and Crook.

The road to Lynchburg from High Bridge was the main road of that section of the country, and over this it was now quite evident that Lee with his main body was retreating. The principal part of Humphreys' Corps was following on the same road. This road, however, was intercepted by two nearly parallel roads from Farmville, which were also the main routes for country travel from the latter town to Lynchburg. On one of these Barlow moved and again, about dark, established himself in connection with the remainder of his corps, while on the other and a mile or two further to the left [west] Crook marched with his cavalry division, *hoping to intercept the trains or at least some part of the forces* whom the Second Corps was pursuing. Four or five miles [3] north of Farmville, near where the two roads above spoken of unite, General Humphreys found the enemy *strongly entrenched*, covering both these roads, known as the Stage and Plank roads. This Rebel force were posted apparently with the purpose of remaining there and resisting all attacks, until the trains, whose movements it was thus covering, should be well out of the way. General Humphreys at once formed his troops for attack, advanced his skirmishers, and developed the position of the enemy in his front to be one naturally strong and *well entrenched*. They had chosen the crest of a hill which gradually sloped off in front over open ground, well swept by artillery, leaving no opportunity for a front attack. A flank manœuvre was attempted, but the Rebel line was found to extend far beyond our own. General Humphreys having as yet only two divisions with him, and finding so strong a portion of Lee's army thus posted in the front—indeed the indications were that it was the main portion of the Rebel army—occupied himself with watching and manœuvring until Barlow's

division, which was now ordered up, could arrive. Not being aware of the difficulties of crossing the river, at this time, at Farmville, owing to the destruction of the bridge, General Humphreys in sending information of his own situation to General Meade, naturally suggested that an attack should be made at once by troops—the Sixth Corps, for instance—from the direction of Farmville. *The suggestion, however, proved unavailing.*

General Humphreys with his Combined Second-Third Corps disposed in the immediate front of the enemy, and just at this time the only portion of Grant's army halted and so situated, awaited with appropriate demonstrations the arrival of General Barlow's division before any more serious attack should be made. While doing so, however, he heard firing from the direction of Farmville and *supposed that the Sixth Corps had attacked the enemy, as he had suggested to General Meade.* He at once ordered an attack on his extreme right with a part of General Miles' division. This was made by three regiments from the First Brigade, General Ramsey's; but it was unsuccessful and resulted in considerable loss. The enemy had not reduced his strength in his front, nor had he yet given Humphreys an opportunity to turn his flank. But the firing heard by Humphreys did not proceed from an attack of the Sixth Corps, as he had premised, that command not having yet crossed the river. It resulted from an engagement between the enemy and General Crook's cavalry, and this affair is, perhaps, more distinctly than any other in that vicinity, entitled to be known as the *Battle of Farmville*. To be sure, there was a kind of a battle at Farmville in the morning, when the charges were made, and constant smaller engagements in its immediate neighborhood had been going on all day. But this particular contest can be described separately; it had a well-defined beginning and end, and enjoyed a complete entirety unusual to combats between the opposing forces in a running campaign. It deserves a little narrative of its own. Crook's cavalry, having crossed the river and formed, took up the line of march along the Old Plank road and moved without encountering any enemy directly towards the right flank and rear of the Rebels, whose centre and left were in front of Humphreys.

The fording of a stream by a cavalry column is an occasion of very general interest and amusement. In the first place it usually affords an excellent opportunity for refreshing the animals without any delay, while the fresh rippling of the waters seems to stir up the dry jokes among the soldiers. The boys, too, have a keen sense of the ludicrous and find no little enjoyment in the various mishaps of their comrades in the middle of the stream. The efforts of a "pack train" are especially amusing. The "pack



train" of a column beggars description. It generally contains more mules than horses, and often more contrabands than either. It takes the place of wagons and is intended to consist of extra-horses and animals of burden, carrying rations and blankets, officers' and pack-horse feed. Practically it is a sort of "*omnium gatherum*" of all the little necessary traps used in camp and bivouac comprising a column which, when marching, stretches out to the length of a regiment wherein every man rides one animal and pulls another half way alongside of him, in vain attempts to lead him in the way he should go—both creatures stepping to the flapping music of loose dishes and hard tack, as improvised paniers shake at every trot their unmentionable contents. When equipped and ready for the move, the demure mule, who usually bears the heavy packs, stands before you in his natural plaintive attitude, betokening compulsory submission to two large champagne-baskets or cracker-boxes strapped tightly to his sides, while on the top of his back are huge piles of brown blankets, shelter tents, tent flies, india rubber ponchos, and massive bags of corn or oats. On top of this, indeed, will often be fastened an extra camp chair or two, a valise, a tin wash basin, iron coffee kettle, a venerable looking axe, spade, and hatchets, with sometimes an extra saddle or two. Indeed, a roll of hay or corn-fodder sometimes surmounts all this, and not unfrequently is a poor animal so completely hidden with his burden that head, tail, legs and ears appear as only the animate protuberances of a concentration of stable, kitchen and household-ware. Overcome with such weighty embarrassments, it will easily be seen why that pulling at the halter of laden animals is a greater inducement for him to attempt an elongation of the neck than to accept the earnest tugs at his head as a pressing invitation to speedy locomotion. Encumbrances of this character require considerable care in their adjustment, and, unless well-secured, accidents often occur, so that is not unusual in crossing a stream to observe an unexpected stumble of a faithful mule cause his unevenly balanced burden to describe a graceful evolution from the back and poise itself beneath the animal in a position more interesting than convenient. Should the water be deep and the current swift, some hungry shivering officer mourns the following night the loss of his bivouac *Penates*.

When General Crook's column was again on the march after crossing the stream, Gen. Irwin Greggs' brigade was in advance, followed closely by that of Davies and of Smith's and Lord's Battery. Light showers had lain the dust, and the brilliant successes of the morning added to the zeal which inspired the troops. There were no signs of an enemy visible, and officers and soldiers rode quietly and carelessly along, discussing incidents of the day



and the prospects of the pursuit. The road lay through cultivated farms, fine timber, and was lined with well-built fences, an item always noted by campaigners. After a march of two or three [one] miles, a wagon train was discovered moving in the direction of Lynchburg and cutting across the road on which Crook was travelling. The white covers of the wagons were partially screened by the woods, yet nothing more than a picket guard appeared to intervene. At the same moment a column of Rebel cavalry was espied moving with the train. Without a moment's delay the advance regiment under Colonel Young (4th Pennsylvania Cavalry) charged down the road, severing the enemy's column and attacking his train. The success bid fair to be speedy and complete, but before one brigade could deploy, the Rebel cavalry, comprising in all about two brigades, quickly rallied under cover of the hills, one to the right of the road and one to the left. Gallantly charging, they enclosed Gregg's column on the narrow road in perfect V. There was little chance to fight, and the high fences on each side prevented countercharges. While our first attack had thus been sudden and without resistance, the return of the compliment was now impetuous and irresistible. To retreat was to expose the whole column to utter disorganization, by turning in its head upon itself. Pistols and carbines at short range was the order of things. Sabres might have been but for the fences, and before they could be removed, the inimitable "pack train" decided the present issues, sustaining their general reputation in the army of never being on hand when wanted and always being where they were not wanted. By some mishap a portion of one had fallen into the column, not far from its head. The result was that the contrabands, mules, and all the various camp-paraphernalia thereunto appertaining, were not just at this unfortunate moment in a situation appropriate to non-combatants. They found themselves in plain view of more Rebel cavalry than they had any reason to believe existed in the entire Confederacy, and, with that quick appreciation of danger so characteristic of non-combatants, the conclusion was speedily arrived at that masterly inactivity was not then and there entirely appropriate.

Thus, seriously exposed to the fire of the Rebels, retreat was instantly determined upon, and extra horses, beasts of burden, lazy mules, and frightened contrabands united, suddenly, in one glorious charge, invincible—but, to the rear. The same impetuosity of this handful of animals, if propelled in the other direction, must certainly have seriously damaged any foe with which they came in contact. As it was, dashing headlong down the narrow lane, they carried to the rear everything before them. Regiments calmly marching forward to their places, suddenly found them-



selves completely broken by a contagious panic, while the pack animals and their leaders flew on as if messengers of destruction. Of course, these things seriously interfered with the formation of the troops, as well as with their *morale*, while the Rebels, appreciating the advantage, pressed on and doubled the head of the column completely back upon itself. The First Brigade was entirely broken up and its commander, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Irwin Gregg, was fence-cornered and taken prisoner in the melee while attempting to reform his men. General Crook also narrowly escaped capture. The rout at this time bid fair to be complete; but the next brigade (the First, under General Davies) at this time coming up and meeting the retreating and pursued forces, where the country was more open, quickly formed and checked the enemy. Broken up by the countercharge, while the enemy rallied for another, a line of battle was quickly assumed, with Davies on the right of the road and what was rallied of Gregg's Brigade under Colonel Young on the left. Lord's Battery was posted to command all parts of the field and Smith's Brigade held in reserve. Prisoners taken now brought out the fact that Crook's advance, in attacking the enemy's wagon train, had actually ridden into the lines of a large force of infantry belonging to Anderson's corps, and that this corps was now posted in our front under cover of the *dense woods*. Further attacks on our part were just then and yet unadvisable. The Rebels, too, relieved us of the responsibility by again advancing their cavalry to the attack. When cavalry fight cavalry, both will naturally choose open country, and, probably, there are no more really exciting scenes in war than to witness the charges and countercharges of cavalry. This was one of them. Every movement of the Rebels here was plainly visible, and the gallantry with which the colors were waved in the advance, urging forward the reluctant, displayed a spirit worthy of a better cause, and told more plainly than South Carolina bombast that the old *élan* and military ardor was not yet lost in the defeated army. The moral effect of the few artillery shots that were now fired by Lord's Battery was instantly perceived. Well directed and effective, the "rude throats" of these mortal enemies spoke in loud tones of warning, and, after one or two unsuccessful attacks, no further aggressions were attempted on our lines.  The skillful operations and manœuvres of General Humphreys about the same time seriously aided in producing this effect. 

There was no other road leading to Lynchburg on this [the north or left] side of the river, except the one in use by the enemy, and General Crook remained in his position until he could hear from his superiors. Before Sheridan, who was now at Prince Edward Court House, could be heard from, it was after sunset. Mean-

while General Grant had arrived at Farmville [see collection of Telegrams and Despatches, collated and appended] and had ordered General Crook's division to recross the river, and to march towards Lynchburg by the nearest route, south of the river, along the railroad, and to halt at Prospect Station. The cavalry, therefore, recrossed the Appomattox, marched again through the town, and arrived about midnight without further incident at its destination. This evening had given quite a new appearance to the quiet little town of Farmville.  The country about it became one vast bivouac for the Army of the James and the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, while the fields were filled with parks of artillery and wagon trains.  Eligible houses on the outskirts of the town were occupied as various headquarters, at some of which the sweet strains of serenade softened the asperity of war, subduing the boisterous groups about the bivouac fires. Many a weary soldier after a tedious day march gazed musingly into the curling flames of his camp fire, and was carried back to comfortable homes, cherished voices and loving faces, as the night breezes wafted over the fields the notes of a familiar selection. With the twinkling stars unhidden, the blazing, crackling rails, the little cup of "sizzling" coffee, the steady tramp of the sentry, the dim outlines of tents and wagon covers, the "munching" of the animals, the otherwise hushed quiet of the sleeping camp about him, the soldier muses on the day gone by and conjectures the changes of the morrow. Who—but those have once experienced it—can tell the effect, with this weird scene, of the solemn strains of the *Miserere*, the wild notes of *Robert le Diable*, the voluptuous serenade from *Don Pasquale*, or the stirring marches from *Ernani*? Who, then, will taunt military music as a superfluous expense, as only the "pomp and circumstance of glorious war!" None know better than commanders the silent potent influence of the "Bands."

Near Prospect Station several roads crossed the railroad leading south in the direction of Danville from the roads on which Lee was known to be moving. Apprehensive that by these means the Rebel general might even yet make an attempt to change the direction of his retreat towards Danville, Sheridan, on his arrival at Prince Edward Court House, sent McKenzie with his cavalry to cross the Buffalo river, and to make a reconnoissance to Prospect Station. This was accomplished by the latter without meeting anything but stragglers from the enemy. McKenzie had scarcely been gone half an hour from the station, when the head of General Crook's column arrived there, and at once went into camp. The station house was filled with tobacco, and the only other building in the locality seemed to be occupied by a "lone



widow," her children and servants. It has been amazing how many "widders" the Yankees found in the Confederacy. This particular one had a story a little different from many others. "She did not know"—on enquiry—"where her husband was." "Had she a husband at all?" "Yes, she *did* have one!" "Well, what had become of him, then?" "She didn't know; he went down the road one day to get some rations, and she never had heard of him since. This was some months ago, and she supposed now that he *had been cut off*."

Arriving at Prospect Station, it was a little difficult to learn from the intelligent contrabands whether a column of Lee's army had passed that point or not. So great had been the number of Rebel stragglers that they were by many mistaken for regular organizations of regiments and brigades on the march. This may account somewhat for the reports brought to Sheridan's headquarters, by scouts and others, that part of the enemy were believed to be moving towards Danville. The country over which we were now operating had not before been visited by large bodies of soldiers, and the simple inhabitants were deceived by the squads and crowds of stragglers which travelled every road. Many of these soldiers were accompanied by their line officers, and with most the conclusion had been arrived at that the war was now about finished.

The operations of the 7th of April, of the *tenth* day of the campaign [the "Last Hunt,"] may be summed up in brief to be the close pursuit of Lee's army from daylight until dark for about the distance of fifteen miles, during which skirmishes had taken place at the crossing of every creek, the Sandy river, Bush river, High Bridge, Farmville, and again a few miles beyond. The loss of the enemy was nineteen pieces of artillery and the destruction of about one hundred and thirty wagons of their train, and this was inflicted by the Combined Second-Third Corps alone. The loss, also, of the stores, machinery and material at Farmville was not inconsiderable. No accurate mention can be made of the number of prisoners taken during the day, or the number of stragglers induced away from their commands by the vigor of the pursuit. Among the Rebel generals known to have been severely wounded, was Brigadier-General Lewis, commandant of a brigade in Walker's division, Gordon's corps, who fell into our hands. The loss on our part was principally in the Combined Second-Third Corps, although Crook's cavalry also lost quite heavily. Humphreys loss was six [five] hundred and seventy-one in killed and wounded [since he started on this hunt; how many on the 7th has never been separately stated. This statement (if erroneous) originated with William Swinton. As soon as one wolf howls, the

pack, without cause, will join in a chorus of discord ; so it has been in this matter.] Probably one thousand is a large estimate for Grant's entire loss ; among the officers were Brigadier-General Smyth, mortally wounded, and Brevet Brig.-Gen. John J. [not the famous David McGregor] Gregg, taken prisoner.

General Gregg, it will be remembered, was captured in the heat of battle near Farmville, on the 7th, P. M., and at the same time his watch, pocket-book and valuables demanded of him as the price of his life, a threat which could have easily been enforced, and his death charged to the general conflict. Discretion, however, was the better part of valor, and two days afterwards General Gregg was released, his captors being themselves captured with the army.

The movements during the day of the various corps under General Grant may be easily traced on the map. The combined Second Third Corps moved from Sailors' Creek across the Appomattox, via High Bridge, to Farmville, and about five miles beyond on the Lynchburg road. The Sixth Corps, direct from the battlefield of Little Sailors' Creek, via Rice's Station, to Farmville. General Ord's column of the Army of the James also moved from its position near Rice's Station direct on Farmville. The Fifth Corps, which was early in the morning near the combined Second-Third, followed the latter corps to High Bridge, when it moved directly across the rear of the army, from its extreme right to its extreme left, and halted for the night at Prince Edward Court House Thither also Sheridan had moved Merritt's cavalry corps, via Rice's Station, from [Little] Sailors' Creek. Crook's wing of cavalry moved in the front and centre of the army, on the left of the combined Second-Third Corps ; but after crossing the river at Farmville [to no purpose except to show that it could be forded] recrossed again and encamped about midnight at Prospect Station. To the latter point McKenzie's cavalry also had made a reconnoissance from Prince Edward Court House. No indications, however, had yet appeared that Lee was disposed to attempt a retreat on Danville. His object seemed to be to get out of Grant's way by the most available routes, without paying any special attention to their general direction. Lee, too, was out of rations, and the account of the operations of 8th April will indicate his prospects as to a retreat towards Lynchburg and how they were baffled.

A last, but a most important item of to-day's results are the two little notes which passed between the commanders of the opposing forces, beginning the correspondence which terminated the contest. General Grant's first letter was written on this day, wherein he expresses his conviction that the result of the last

week must convince General Lee "of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle." He regards it, therefore, as his duty to shift from himself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking the surrender of his enemy. An interesting preface to this note—perhaps its inspiration—is read in a dispatch from General Sheridan, dated the previous evening, 6th April, 11.15, P. M., and reporting his engagement of that day. This characteristic dispatch tersely concludes, "If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will surrender." (The "thing" was "pressed," and Lee did surrender.) Lee replied to General Grant's note under the same date, reciprocating the "desire to avoid useless effusion of blood." But General Grant did not receive this answer until the following morning (8th). [Be it remembered in this connection that all the correspondence, to and fro, of the 7th and 8th, passed through the lines of the combined Second-Third Corps under Humphreys, who alone was persistently pressing and almost the whole time in contact or treading on the very heels of Lee, on the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th, and ready, with the help of the Sixth Corps, to demolish him on the 9th. Had the Sixth Corps reinforced Humphreys on the 7th (so has he often declared by letter and in conversation) it would have been done at Cumberland Church, on the 7th.]

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## CHAPTER II.

(ORIGINAL CHAPTER XII.)

Step by step we have marched over the great eleven days' campaign, and now we come to the last day of its continuance. The record of April 8th will be unusually dull and without brilliancy; yet, it was on this day that the marches and masterly [?] movements were made, which the next morning brought at bay the Grand Army of Northern Virginia, checked its fruitless attempts at escape, repelled its assaults, doubled it back upon itself, and encircled the proud and weary host with a final "anaconda." April 8th was the day and the night when legs usurped the rights of valor, and fleetness, not impetuosity, won the victory. It is curious under these circumstances that the operations of the Army of the Potomac for this day should be officially detailed in two lines; but official reports should be brief. General Meade's is especially so in this instance; his account of this day's move-

ments being contained in the remark, that "the next day, April 8th, the pursuit was continued on the Lynchburg Stage Road."

From the position of Grant's forces the night before, of course, the combined Second-Third Corps had the advance, and took up the direct pursuit. Lee had encamped for the night along "the Stage Road," just mentioned, many of his troops extending south as far as the Appomattox river. The camp fires of his numerous stragglers spread his forces out in every direction, but the main body rested a considerable distance beyond the advance of the combined Second-Third Corps; so that when Humphreys resumed his march, on the morning of the 8th, he did not come up with the enemy for several hours. Lee's march, however, could not have been perfectly serene. Four pieces of artillery were abandoned, the usual rubbish cast away by encumbered troops and wagon trains still lined the roads. After a march of nearly fifteen miles, at New Store, the combined Second-Third Corps came up with the enemy's cavalry pickets. The corps had but one road to march on, and in his report Humphreys says that "a halt was made of about two hours at sunset, when the march was resumed with the object of coming up with the main force of the enemy; but, finding no probability of doing so during the night, and the men being much exhausted from want of food and from fatigue, the head of the column was halted at midnight. The rear did not get up until morning, and the supply train of two days' rations later." Thus did the combined Second-Third Corps pass the day.

Following the combined Second-Third was the Sixth Corps, which during the night had constructed such a bridge over the Appomattox at Farmville as answered the present purposes. The Sixth, therefore, played no important part during the day [but might have played the most important, if they had improvised a bridge on the 7th, and hurried across to the support of the combined Second-Third Corps.]

On the south side of the river, by the same route used by Crook's cavalry the night before, General Ord's command moved from Farmville along the railroad towards Lynchburg, followed by the Fifth Corps under General Griffin. These movements were under the personal direction of the Lieutenant-General, as the following brief dispatch will show, while, at the same time, it illustrates General Grant's judicious generalship in seizing the opportune moment, and giving to his subordinates orders for their guidance too explicit and direct to admit of any mistake or modification.

[If this book expressed the Editor's sentiments, the preceding sentence would be obliterated and quite another substituted.]

## HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

FARMVILLE, April 7, 1865.

GENERAL MEADE :

Order the Fifth Corps to follow the Twenty-fourth, at 6, A. M., up the Lynchburg road, the Second and Sixth to follow the enemy north of the river. [Signed,]

U. S. GRANT,  
Lieutenant-General.

Here was the programme for the infantry. Brief and complete, it offers another explanation to the harmony and success of the campaign. The vigilance of the Lieutenant-General suffered nothing to escape him, and on this occasion he himself arranged the details for the march of his armies, lest another such mistake [Whose? Grant's! that of nobody else Meade, in this case was blameless, but saddled with the blunder] as that after the battle of Jetersville might again lose him a few hours and golden opportunity.

Sheridan, with the cavalry of Merritt and McKenzie, resumed the march at daylight from Prince Edward Court House direct to Prospect Station, where Général Crook awaited his arrival. West of this point the railroad makes a considerable bend to the southward. The cavalry moved to the west, therefore, in two columns, one along the railroad, and one by roads further to the north; Merritt's corps taking the latter, with his two divisions, under Custer and Devins, moving for a while parallel to each other, while Crook's wing marched along the railroad.

This order of march placed the latter more distant from the enemy, and left General Merritt to manage affairs in their immediate vicinity. Although the Rebels were supposed to be moving on the Lynchburg Pike, yet, early in the day, little had been heard of them. Custer, however, whose division was nearest to this road, began soon to gather in quite a number of stragglers, and, from all he could learn, deemed it of great importance that his march should be prosecuted with every diligence. Hence he arrived first at the point where his road was crossed by the one over which Devins was marching, and, therefore, assumed the responsibility of continuing his progress, although the advance to-day properly belonged to Devins' (First) Division.

(In explanation,—It was the custom in most parts of the Union Army, in forming the daily programme for march, to assign the advance to the various commands in regular rotation.)

Sheridan himself accompanied the former [Custer]. The cavalry were followed on these routes by the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps. The march continued during the greater part of day, without any more special interest than would be awakened by



the reception of a great variety of reports from the different sections of country through which the column was marching. The large number of stragglers from Lee's army, who had been seen in some quarters, completely deceived the people. They had scarcely any definite idea as to the whereabouts of the Rebel army. Some thought that it had gone towards Danville, others that it was pretty well dispersed and all united in confirming the broken spirits of its soldiers. Some of the simple people, when asked what would be done, now that Richmond had fallen, rejoined with an expression of the most implicit confidence in General Lee. Two elderly ladies strolled quietly into the lines during one of the short halts, and, calling an officer aside, one cautiously remarked that she "didn't 'zactly know, but she didn't see how they could fight any more now, nohow. Fact is," she added, in a much more confidential manner, and with a significant nod towards her companion, indicative of a suspicion that she might betray her, "they won't fight any more; they'll surrender. I think they'll really surrender." It is almost useless to say that the old lady at once became a favorite, although the veterans of the Army of the Potomac could scarcely credit the belief that their antagonist, for so long a time at the head of the Rebel army, should, under any circumstances, succumb thus early in the usual spring campaign.

At Pamplin's Station, [about 8] miles from Prospect, were found some cars and disabled locomotives, while in the depot were stored sorghum and some boxes of fine new Springfield muskets. Meanwhile, Sheridan had learned through his ubiquitous scouts, that at Appomattox Station, about ten miles beyond, there were four trains of cars laden with commissary stores and supplies of various kinds for the Rebel army; and the cavalry pressed on with more vigor. It was a long day's march with but one short halt. While nothing had been seen of the enemy, a brush, more or less serious, was, of course, anticipated when the trains were reached. Of course a considerable force of Lee's army must, by this time, have reached that vicinity. It could scarcely be possible that Sheridan was completely in their advance, and I do not think I am wrong in stating it as the general anticipation that, on encountering the force in the neighborhood of this new depot, we would be in the very midst of a large camp of the enemy.

In reply to Custer's despatches to Sheridan, reporting his progress and observations, the latter replied that, "if those trains can be taken work enough will be done for one day." But this was not the end of this day's work.

Lee was more than weakened. His army was retreating,



where, or for what good purposes, who could tell. The Confederate capital had fallen and its President taken flight. Defeat and demoralization had dispersed the Army of Northern Virginia. Officers had told their men that they might as well go home now, everything was lost. Many arms had been thrown away. Artillery by batteries and wagons by hundreds abandoned, burned. Every calculation during the campaign for the supply of his commissariat had been thwarted. The fall of Richmond, although perhaps anticipated and partially provided for, was sudden and premature. There was no opportunity to care for the preservation of the immense stores there, so necessary but now lost to the supply of Lee's army. Rebel officers are fond of inveighing against the Confederate authorities for the large amount of stores abandoned in Richmond. They might better, it was thought, have been given away to the soldiers and to the needy in the city, rather than to have been destroyed. Quantities of coffee, flour and sugar were found there. It was a long and harassing march by night and by day, with skirmishes, and without the best of roads, from Petersburg, on its fall, on the 2d, to the Danville railroad, which was reached two days afterwards. But here the supplies expected and so confidently telegraphed for were cut off and Lee detained to watch and to fight. Again he pushed for Lynchburg and succeeded, with a portion of his army, in meeting a few cars at Farmville. But his army received therefrom no substantial additions to its commissariat, and retreating, fighting, wearied, heartsick and almost without hope, his men marched on to the west again. The stores there awaiting their arrival were doomed to become spoils for Sheridan. Is it a wonder that this army, so closely pursued, harassed, pushed back from one road to another, away from the course it would follow, its supplies captured and without any base of operations in the present or in prospect; is it a wonder that these men lost spirit, dispersed, and, in a short ten days, from a large, well-appointed army dwindled away, down to a mere handful scarcely enough to constitute a good division. [This remark can only allude to those who had arms in their hands—some 9000—when they surrendered, and cannot refer to over three times that number who had weapons and ammunition and were opposing the Union troops desperately or sullenly an hour or so previous.] This, too, while its commander, whom all so revered, was corresponding with his adversary for surrender. The wonder, rather, is, that any army was left, or that there yet remained any of that military *esprit* which delights in victory, which exhibited itself in some of the closing charges of the Rebel cavalry on the morning of the final surrender.

Custer's Division, having the advance, first struck Appomattox

Station, defended only by a squad of cavalry, and by quick manœuvring surrounded and captured the trains, from which wagons were being loaded, before any force could appear for their relief; even before they could steam away—so complete was the surprise. The railroad at this point is about two miles south of the Lynchburg stage road, which runs through Appomattox Court House, and along which the main body of Lee's army was moving. Near this point was a camp of hospital train, a large park of wagons and a park of surplus artillery, estimated by some officers at twenty-five and by others at fifty pieces. Being well in Lee's advance these troublesome encumbrances to the speedy movements of an army were preparing to bivouac for the night in fancied security. The artillery was guarded by a small division of infantry and a division of cavalry. A detachment from Lee's advance also reached the depot about the same time with our cavalry. They were at once driven back, however, when the trains were captured, and followed closely by Custer. A portion of the wagon trains nearly succeeded in moving off, but there now occurred, here, however, one of the hottest and hardly contested collisions of the campaign. It was one of those affairs that did not really occupy a very great length of time and of which official reports would have nothing more interesting to say, than that "a short engagement with the enemy here took place." According to General Sheridan's official report, "General Devin coming up went in on the right of Custer. The fighting continued until after dark and the enemy were driven." But this brilliant little fight is entitled to more consideration. It took place near the Lynchburg stage road and was brought on by Custer in his attempts to drive the enemy and secure the possession of this great highway. It was the only route now open for Lee towards Lynchburg, or, indeed, the only main route that he could travel in any direction, in his efforts to escape our forces. Could Sheridan obtain and hold possession of this road thus directly in Lee's front, and there remain, well established, until a good portion of the strong corps of infantry following him should arrive for his relief [support or stiffening], Lee would be completely surrounded, with no possible means of escape. To the north of him and parallel with his line of march, wound the Appomattox, unfordable and with no established crossing for many miles. Even if any such had existed, a journey in that direction would have been of no avail to the enemy. In his rear the main body of the Army of the Potomac (the combined Second-Third and Sixth Corps, under Humphreys and Wright, respectively), was in close pursuit and [the former] constantly harassing him. On his left flank, towards the south, Sheridan's cavalry column, followed by

the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps, were marching almost directly parallel and endeavoring to intercept him, in which intention, should Sheridan be successful, reach and hold a point on the road beyond Lee's advance, there offered the Rebel leader no possible means of escape, other than to pierce the lines surrounding him.

The appearance of Sheridan at Appomattox Depot, almost as Lee's extreme advance had arrived, was therefore an additional disaster, and sound military policy dictated that no effort should be spared to repel any further advance of the Union troops in this direction. But the small force of cavalry and infantry guarding the trains and surplus artillery, which had reached this point in advance of the main body in order to escape the uncertainties of battle, was not sufficient to delay, permanently, the onward progress of Sheridan. It is a doubtful principle, but one held by some of our most successful cavalry leaders, that it is the province of cavalry never to hesitate in making an attack; that no time should be lost in cautious reconnoitering. [This was Suwarow's idea.] If anything is to be gained, the more precipitate and unexpected the attack, the greater its probable success. The chances in its favor greatly overbalance the risks of serious disaster incurred by attacking an enemy with a position and force uncertainly ascertained, and, should the movement prove injudicious, a skillful general will usually discover it in time to prevent any great misfortune to a well-disciplined cavalry. It was in strict accordance with views of this character that Sheridan and his generals pursued this stirring campaign. Without "note or comment" the Rebels were attacked wherever found. No time was previously consumed in reconnoissances and dispositions, but when the occasion presented itself a fight ensued. Thus it was in the attacks of each division, successively, at different points, of the enemy's line of march on the morning of the 6th (April) near [but south of] Deatonville. [Let there be no mistake; *not* on the road on which Humphreys fought, over and ahead, fourteen miles and for eleven hours. The cavalry, always claiming the lion's share of the glory of this pursuit, which justice cannot assign to them, is said to have been "in Deatonville." Justly does Humphreys remark (12, 10, 71): "The dispatch from Meade to me (signed "Webb, Chief of Staff"), telling me about Deatonville, *was received by me after I had got two miles beyond Deatonville and had left it behind me for more than an hour.* If any one will look at the map, on which the operations of the different corps and services are distinctly marked, he will see that the cavalry were at work upon a mere side issue and moving on a lateral road. The whole district thereabouts may have been known by the principal settlement, as Deatonville, but there was no "station."

General Custer admitted the cavalry were not on the line or route the combined Second-Third Corps fought over, driving the Rebels before them, from one strong and strengthened position after another. The fact is, history, "that vast Mississippi of falsehoods," as Matthew Arnold styled it—particularly military history, is simply an aggregation of special pleas for this one or that.]

It was again on the afternoon of the 7th, near Farmville, when Crook's column was brought so quickly to a halt. Independently of the principle that the pursuers should always harass the pursued, the cavalry of Sheridan owes much of its success in previous campaigns, but especially in this one, to the dashing compliance of its leaders with this interesting theory.

So on this evening of the 8th April, Custer had captured the railroad trains near the station of Appomattox, while the probability was that he should soon encounter a large camp of the enemy, or perhaps his main body. The facts are, that with the small force at his command and without awaiting further advice or instructions, he at once opened a battle. The trains being captured, the enemy began a most destructive artillery fire upon the station and there was great danger of the prize being lost. Upon this, just as when the Massachusetts 6th and New York 7th were on their first journey to Washington, at the breaking out of the war, and a call was made for engineers, to put the locomotives in order and start them out with the troops from Annapolis to Washington, there was a ready and competent response; so, now, at the close of the war, during the hasty movements consequent upon a cavalry engagement and while the shots flew over and through the newly-made prizes, and when each soldier had a duty to perform which might pardon him for not remembering what was his former civil occupation or whether he ever had any at all, a call was made for engineers from the ranks. "Who could engineer these trains from the danger of recapture?" A response was ready in the Harris Light Cavalry and the new engineers assumed their posts. Soon a timorous whistle and laborious puffs announced the struggles of the iron monsters and in a short time a long bold whoop and the regular sounds of movements over the rails aroused the curiosity of the troops not yet arrived. The track being in order the trains were run into better established positions within our lines. They passed by columns of our men, awakening the most intense interest and curiosity among the soldiers of Devins and Crook, who were also marching up along the railroad.

Meantime Custer continued his fight, to assure his position at Appomattox Station and to advance his troops, if possible, as far as the Lynchburg pike, capturing such artillery and trains as



might be between him and that road and holding a position here, directly across Lee's line of march, until further orders should be received from his superiors. This was the true plan and it was most skilfully and successfully executed.

Pennington's and Capehart's brigades, numerically known as the First and Third Brigades, being the leading commands in the columns, were brought into action as soon as on the ground, and strong efforts were at once made to capture the artillery, which was doing considerable damage among the troops. Canister was freely used by the enemy, and it was at one time quite doubtful whether the trains could be run off successfully. The extemporized engineers from the "Harris' Light" did their work well, however, and the prizes were secured. The position of the enemy was covered by thick woods, on every approach, and night was fast coming on. But Custer maintained the fight by repeated charges, now on the right, now on the left, now in the centre. The enemy was kept thoroughly occupied and no opportunity was given him to reconnoitre or test the strength of the attacking force. Had he done so, with a well-disciplined although small force of infantry, the wooded character of the country was greatly in his favor as against cavalry. Custer's charges were repulsed or only a few rods would be gained. The Second Brigade (third in column), under Wells, was then brought into action and fresh charges made, both mounted and dismounted, against the enemy's position. His guns continued to grow more destructive at each approach. Men and officers were becoming discouraged in these attempts, apparently so futile. Custer himself now led the charges and seemed ubiquitous, exerting his every effort to maintain every inch he could gain, and to imbue his men with the enthusiasm of his own nature. In this latter endeavor his mercurial temperament usually helped him to success. No rail fences were converted into slight breastworks, no defensive line attempted; but bold, persistent and determined personal efforts were made to break the enemy's front. Many officers, however, engaged in this contest, expressed the belief that it was impossible to gain the position desired, and urged that further efforts be desisted from at present. Not the slightest anxiety, however, was manifested as to Custer's ability to hold his own position before what opposition might here be brought against him.

The whole fighting force of the three brigades was kept in action. Darkness came on, and, guided by the flashes of the enemy's guns, Custer was still pushing and pressing here and there along the line. His officers kept track of him with difficulty and sought him by recognition of his voice in words of command, or by the blasts of his bugle as ever and anon it sounded the "For-

ward!" and "Charge!" It must have been about nine o'clock in the evening, which had been passed in this entertaining manner, when, as though impatient of further delay, he shouted to a staff officer (Brevet Col. E. W. Whittaker, Chief of Staff and Lieut.-Col. 1st Connecticut Cavalry), that "those guns must be taken in five minutes." The officer quickly passed the word along the line, which responded in renewed and hearty cheers. The shout was taken up from man to man and simultaneously the lines moved forward. The Rebels heard it and did not rejoice, but began to retire. They were discovered to be abandoning their guns, many of which had been taken off to the pike running from Appomattox Court House to Lynchburg, which road was not far distant from the scene of the fight. With cheer upon cheer the line advanced and swept everything before it. The enemy's position was abandoned and an indiscriminate mass of guns, caissons and baggage-trains captured. Without stopping to lose themselves among these trophies, under the lead of Custer, in the darkness, by a narrow obscure road and through the thickest underbrush, our men pushed on in pursuit. The column was obliged to march "by fours" only, but the random shots of stray pieces of artillery, by which the Rebels sought to intimidate our men, were now without result. The advance was continued and over an uncertain by-road the pike was finally reached.

The enemy now took both routes of retreat; one toward Lynchburg and the other toward Appomattox Court House, not two miles distant, where Lee's army was bivouacking for the night. Here the troops emerged into an open country, while over undulating fields, and, glimmering like fire-flies, on the hills just beyond the little village, broke into view the camp-fires of all that remained of the Rebel host. Will the soldiers who saw them that night ever forget the scene?

But there was no time for contemplation. The road was packed with trains of baggage, supplies and artillery in one grand inextricable confusion, some headed one way and some another, and all so thoroughly interlocked and obstructing the road, that over this excellent highway, ordinarily passable for several wagons travelling abreast of each other, a single horseman could with difficulty select a bridle path. But the enemy was not yet disposed to abandon the hope of holding this road. They seemed to feel assured that our cavalry could not remain long upon it, and that portion of them who fled toward Lynchburg now unlimbered guns on our men from that direction, while those fleeing for rescue toward Appomattox Court House assisted in the annoyance. While incidents of this character frequently gave commanding generals the most anxious solicitude and attention, it



sometimes happens that the quick impulse of some officer meets the emergency. So it was here. Before any provision could be made for disposing, in the darkness, of the somewhat scattered troops to silence this fire, now in the rear, a group of horsemen, which was afterwards proved to consist, in great part, of officers led by the enthusiastic proposition of one of their number, guided by the flash of the guns, suddenly charged this new fire, silenced it, and captured the guns. All the plunder seemed now in our possession, as well as the road by which Lee was retreating, and over which he must pass to escape the "anaconda."

Custer did not halt, however, but continued his advance toward the Court House, until he encountered an infantry barricade, when a halt was ordered, and a line in front thereof established. Directions were given to secure the artillery and valuable portions of the captured wagon trains as speedily as possible by running them off to the south side of the railroad at the station.

About this time, General Devin's Division dismounted, and reached the road on which Custer was operating from across the fields at his right. Devin's troops had been dismounted early in the action, and disposed on the right of Custer's line, where the service they rendered was chiefly to distract the enemy by the appearance of "Yankees" upon every quarter. The dense character of the country rendered communication between the different generals exceedingly slow and difficult, especially after dark. Hence, Devin's troops did not become seriously engaged.

It was now arranged that General Devin's troops should assume a line of one brigade, facing Lee's army toward the Court House, and one also toward Lynchburg at the west, thus relieving General Custer's men, while the latter should be occupied in clearing the field of the captures. These, it was found, amounted to twenty-five pieces of artillery and over two hundred wagons, the latter filled mostly with baggage. It was midnight before Custer himself left the field, when he rode to the hospital and visited his wounded. Had it been daylight, then, he would have seen the green saplings, about which his men so valiantly and successfully fought, bent and split by canister from the artillery. The trees and the artillery carriages in the park were perforated with bullet holes; horses wallowed in bloody mud, and the first dawn of day upon the spot would tell any observer of the deadly character of that evening's contest. Surgeons of wide experience in the cavalry remarked that they never treated so many extreme cases in so short a fight. The wounds were chiefly made by artillery, and were serious; many patients being badly mangled. This battle, fought on the eve of surrender, when the Rebel general knew too well that further resistance was in vain, entailed, as usual,

its sad sacrifices. Lieutenant-Colonel Aug. J. Root, of the 15th New York Cavalry, a noble and brave man, was killed in the last charge on the "pike," near Appomattox Court House. His body fell into the hands of the enemy, and was found with Lee's army on the next morning after surrender, stripped of all clothing. Major Howe, of the 1st West Virginia Cavalry, was also instantly killed in this action. But my pen fails me to do justice to the memory of all these faithful soldiers. Their name, too, is legion, and I leave the task for better hands.

Sheridan, of course, lost no time in notifying General Grant of the result of his day's operations, as well as Generals Ord and Griffin, commanding the infantry on this wing and in this vicinity, respectively, of the Army of the James and of the Fifth Corps, which had started in the morning in rear of the cavalry. Knowing that daylight would again appear before General Grant might be able to receive his message and to issue fresh orders upon his report, he urged the generals just mentioned to press on with all possible energy, and that, if they could reach him in time, there was no possible means of escape for the enemy. "The last ditch" had been discovered. These commanders judiciously determined to force the march, and the head of their columns reached Appomattox Depot about two o'clock on the morning of the 9th, thus having marched all day and the greater part of the night. The march, too, at times, was to some of the troops exceedingly tedious, owing to the frequent halts, which are often unavoidable when so large a column uses only one road of travel.


["I" (Capt. Charles W. Greene, 111th Colored Troops, U. S. Volunteers), "belonged to Ord's column of the Army of the James. I think it was on the 6th of April, 1865, that we arrived near Farmville [Rice's Station?]. We encamped in dense young woods, and lay there till the 7th. We lay in shelter tents on the 7th. We marched eastward across a beautiful valley, fording two or three wide streams, waist deep, and encamped near Farmville. Early on the morning of the 8th we awoke, passed through Farmville in the early twilight, and made a splendid march of forty-seven miles (so it was said) to a point near Appomattox Court House. We had not a straggler—every man was in his place when, near midnight, we fell upon the damp April ground, and slept sweetly till 4, A. M.; then a rapid march, a halt for coffee (drunk boiling hot) and for a hard-tack bolted in haste; a sharp cannonade, a swift double-quick, a headlong run, a rush of our cavalry out of the woods with some Rebel battle flags, with the news that Langdon's Battery was lost to the Johnnies. We rush in, our left in front, a hurrying deployment of two companies of skirmishers, a fine march into a field by the rear rank in our haste,


my company with the colors ; a halt, news from one of Sheridan's staff that Lee was about to surrender ; then a dozen or two hurrahs, with tears of joy unnumbered ; then written orders from Grant to move no men, but to remain where we were ; then directions from Sheridan to move under cover of a hill to an unguarded road, by which, I doubt not, many of Lee's men might have escaped, if some did not ; then news of the *Surrender* ; and a closing in of the lines and the exit of a large number of our prisoners from Lee's lines. That was news enough for one day !"]

That portion of Sheridan's cavalry which had not been engaged, aware of the length of the day's march they had accomplished, went into bivouac, long after dark, and were astonished at the first break of the day, in answering to *reveille*, to find in the same field with themselves long stacks of trusty muskets. *A cavalry soldier may feign a want of respect for infantry ; but he usually expresses a certain sense of relief on learning of the proximity of troops from that branch of the service !* So on the morning of the 9th ; conscious of the importance of the next few hours, these men answered in silent sympathy to each other.

This infantry obtained little sleep during the night. Many were marching all night (8th-9th), some not arriving until (9th) morning. The same was the case with the other wing of Grant's army, who were following Lee more directly, where the rear of the Second Corps did not get up until (9th) morning." If the pursuers were obliged to make these extraordinary exertions, what must have been the efforts of the pursued ? But it was these forced marches during the day and night of the 8th-9th of April, which settled the fact of Lee's surrender on April 9th. The cavalry could not have withstood by itself the attacks which, on the morrow, were brought against it. The march of a strong body of infantry, with a fleetness unknown, because, perhaps, unnecessary, during many of the former operations against which Lee had contended, was unexpected to him ; and, as we shall see in recounting the affairs of to-morrow—9th April—when once he learned the fact, hostilities were suspended. It is universally admitted in military circles, that the unusual march of the troops just mentioned was the most effective among the intermediate causes of the final surrender.

Before daylight, the next morning, the rubbish which encumbered the Lynchburg Pike had been cleared away by Custer's veterans ; and the bugles awakened the weary troops before the break of dawn. All were in the saddle, fully prepared for the grand contest anticipated. The unexpected sight of the infantry, too, served to impress the soldiers with the belief that their commanders deemed hearty work to be before them, and the extraordinary

march accomplished made the infantry earnest of success. The hostilities of the day were opened by the Rebels in an attempt to dislodge the troops at the Lynchburg Pike, who were now halting Lee's army.  There has been quite a popular impression that, on the morning of the 9th, seeing the difficulty of his position, Lee quietly determined to surrender without an engagement, and acted accordingly.



This, however, is a serious error.  It is true that some of his most prominent subordinates believed that nothing but cavalry was in his front, and that a strong attack with infantry would open the way for his continued retreat. It was not thought that the Union infantry could possibly have marched so completely around the Rebels, and it was confidently expected, therefore, that the line in the latter's front toward Lynchburg might be forced early in the morning, before succor could arrive from the infantry corps presumed to be marching to the support of the cavalry. [The operations of the 8th and 9th would have been superfluous if the afternoon of the 7th had been properly utilised.] At an interview between the opposing generals, which took place later in the day, these sentiments were acknowledged, although there were one or two Confederate generals present who were engaged in the battle of the morning, and who expressed it as their opinion at the time that our infantry had arrived, and that it was useless to continue further hostilities. It was a contrary sentiment, however, which induced the action, and the spirit which seemed to animate a considerable portion of the Rebel cavalry, in their manoeuvres of this morning, indicated that they were anticipating an easy success. Under these circumstances a determined effort was made to break through the Union cavalry on the Lynchburg road, clear the country in that direction and open a way for the further retreat of the Rebel army. Crook's Division, having been more fortunate than any other part of the cavalry corps in securing a few hours rest during the night, moved from its bivouac before the dawn, and by sunrise had relieved the troops of General Devins at the extreme front, allowing the latter to move off toward the railroad, across the fields on the right, that they might there attend to their horses and prepare for the work of the day. But the enemy was already alive. The fog of the morning was just rising from the open fields over which his movements were now obliged to be made. The sharp ring of carbines greeted the rising sun, and an occasional discharge of artillery ["the diapason of the cannonade"], harmonized with the clamor, intensifying a warlike prelude whose significance at this early hour every veteran appreciates.

The Union infantry, for the present, remained near Appomat-

tox Depot to obtain some slight rest and refreshments, and the new dispositions of cavalry were quickly made. The extreme left, or the whole of the care of the Lynchburg Pike, was now left to General Crook, McKenzie's command being sent to support him. Merritt's Corps reorganized, and was disposed to meet any emergency which might arise on the right of General Crook, and to protect the latter from being flanked from this direction, until the infantry of the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps could be brought up into a proper position. Sheridan himself had remained at his headquarters during the night, near Appomattox Depot, where, early in the morning, he was able to consult with General Ord as to the prospective labors of the day. The task assigned to General Crook soon proved to be of no little importance and difficulty. Smith's (Third) Brigade, with a section of Lord's Battery (First U. S. Artillery), supported by J. Irwin Gregg's Brigade (Second), under Colonel Young, and McKenzie's brigade of cavalry from the Army of the James, were posted on a rising slope across the road; and, while attempting to repel the advances of the enemy in their front, also essayed, by patrols and detachments, to glean all possible information regarding their movements in other quarters. Davies' Brigade was sent to the north and west, militarily described as the left and rear, to give speedy warning and to cut off and prevent, if possible, any movement indicating an attempt of the Rebels to march around the flank of those now confronting them. All of these commands soon became more or less engaged; some of them quite seriously. With the clear sunrise, advancing toward Smith across the open fields, came the glittering lines of battle, with colors plainly flying. Not far behind them lay the little village of Appomattox Court House, surrounded by a most beautiful and undulating farming country. Just out of sight, beyond, were supposed to rest the remainder of the Rebel army; while even within the view a few wagons and a bivouac fire here and there appeared as a distant feature of the picture.

The Rebel lines of infantry seemed not to advance with that mobility and elasticity which usually characterized their movements, and the number of colors in the lines was remarkable. This latter fact was afterwards explained by the general demoralization of Lee's army, which was already so great that the men were gathered together irrespective of the particular command to which they may have belonged and as if by military instinct grouped themselves under the nearest colors convenient. Officers had forbidden to insist that every man should be present with his own regiment. Many commands had no representatives and men were collected and marshalled under any flag, in a manner most uncere-



monious and expeditious. The troops in front of Sheridan consisted chiefly of Gordon's and Longstreet's Corps and Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry. [This is an error. Longstreet's Corps was opposed to Humphreys' combined Second-Third Corps, in the opposite direction, towards the east; the cavalry were to the west of the Rebel lines and position.] The direct attack on Crook's front was not at first successful. Some sturdy men from Maine were there and Smith's Brigade were not accustomed to retire without the most serious persuasion. The enemy then attempted to outflank Sheridan by sending cavalry completely around the left of his lines, with a view of striking the pike again nearer Lynchburg and then, by vigorously attacking his rear, break through his troops, effect a junction with Lee's main body and thus open the road for further retreat. In making this effort Davies' Brigade was encountered, and this portion of the field being more wooded than others afforded the latter the advantage of concealing his real strength, which was quite small, and allowed him to display a force at whatever point circumstances might require. Davies established a long, circular-shaped line, extending from the left of Smith around again to the pike, which he was obliged to defend against any movement from the direction of Lynchburg. While his attention was thus occupied, however, the fighting grew louder and heavier at the front. Warned by their first unsuccessful attempt, the enemy were now making a second stronger attack, directly in Crook's front. It was the last time that the infantry of the Rebel Army of Northern Virginia ever advanced upon the defenders of the Union. The latter occupied a well-chosen position overlooking the whole country, over which their assailants were obliged to manoeuvre; and, behind hastily constructed rail barricades the Union dismounted carbineers, with four light pieces of artillery, held out manfully against many times their number.  But the Rebel lines extended much beyond ours, both to the right and left.  Merritt's corps had not yet gone into position on the right and there was imminent danger of Crook's flanks being turned. The Rebel officers could be seen encouraging their men and leading them on in a manner most confident and valorous. The country to the right of Crook, as far as the railroad, was mostly thickly wooded and had afforded a convenient and appropriate location for a considerable number of his extra horses. Not meeting with much resistance in this quarter among these, the Rebels soon made their appearance. Our men [horse-holders] ran off the animals so speedily that few, however, were lost. About the same time also the right of the Rebel line of infantry overlapped our own left and compelled us to retire, while the direct advance pressed up closely to the overworked guns. The



ammunition, too, was giving out. The brigades heretofore held in reserve, under Colonel Young and General McKenzie, had been ordered into action, respectively, one to the left and the other to the right, and they temporarily checked the enemy's advance. The gallant little band in front, however, were becoming unable longer to protect their guns and, finally, sought to withdraw them. Many of the artillery horses had been killed. Amid smoke and fire and the whistle of bullets the pieces were dragged away, but one of them, becoming stalled, was abandoned. *It was now an unsuccessful battle; the Rebels had partially dislodged our cavalry and were pressing with a force strong enough to complete its retirement.* Nothing appeared to prevent their entire occupation of the coveted highway; and while our men were rallying, a column of Rebel cavalry approached to charge the road. Officers were galloping to and fro, men were wandering about to find their companies, no lines were definitely established, and there was a lull of that "dread clamor" of glorious war; yet all was hopeful expectation. It was known that the infantry were not far distant and it must not be long before they would arrive on the ground. It was not more than eight o'clock and the mist of the morning had hardly cleared away. The air was thick with the smoke and dust of battle. The fresh sunbeams breaking through, lifted into view the Rebel horsemen. Slowly and confidently they rode in solid columns towards us. Their peculiar cheers [yells] broke the stillness of the temporary lull and their sabres waved with a joyful flourish. There seemed to be a renewal of their ancient spirits. They had passed the spot where our guns this morning had first opened and where the Union lines had given way. *The way seemed clear before them and the road to Lynchburg once more secured.*

But joy was turned to grief. The sounds of battle had not fallen unconcernedly on the troops in bivouac. General Ord's infantry had already started from Appomattox Depot, and with scarce an hour for rest, after a night-long march, were hurrying to the scene of action. Foster's Division was in advance and had already reached the Lynchburg pike. Seeing the condition of affairs a regiment was at once formed across and a second one was going into line at its side. The column of Rebel cavalry at the same moment, by a little rise in the road, suddenly discovered the new enemy across their path. How their hearts must have shrunk with bitter disappointment! Not a shot was fired. The officers, plainly visible, riding quietly at the head, quickly halted. General Foster and staff were in front of their troops, in person directing the dispositions. There was a moment of silent suspense, while the infantry hurried at double-quick into position. A Rebel

officer wheeled and gave a brief word of command. Sabres fell, cheers ceased; one, two, three, a dozen shots were now quickly exchanged. A volley followed and before the smoke could clear away the Rebel cavalry was gone and the lines of General Foster were sweeping forward in close pursuit. Some colored troops appeared on the field, quickly assumed their positions, and, as frequently happens with troops when brought for the first time into action, opened a noisy volley, which was not without its effect in accelerating the enemy's movements. (This can not be construed into a reflection on the efficiency of the negro troops; it is an occurrence by no means unusual, even among veteran regiments.) The Rebel infantry was soon met and the firing continued with renewed vigor. Foster's and a part of Birney's (Colored) Divisions were about to become seriously engaged. All was activity and preparation. Fresh artillery was going into position. The lines of infantry were readjusted. The morning had become bright and clear and on the open fields now before the Unionists was spread out an enemy whose complete destruction was most imminent. Seeing their danger the Rebel cavalry again attempted to move around the command of General Davies and to strike the Lynchburg road beyond him. By making a wide detour, they were finally enabled to accomplish this result, though not without some loss in wounded and prisoners, caused by the constant charges of Davies on their flanks. Once in possession of a portion of the Lynchburg pike they proceeded by a dashing charge to break through Davies and overtake the rear of the forces advancing toward Appomattox Court House. But this attempt was unsuccessful. The cavalry under McKenzie and Colonel Young, which by this time had reformed without serious loss and which had captured from the enemy during the short fight several stands of colors, was ordered to reinforce Davies, and the latter was instructed to whip anything he could find worth fighting and then hasten to join in a grand charge on the enemy at Appomattox Court House. Meanwhile Sheridan had formed Davies and Custer on the slopes of the hills surrounding the little village, for an impetuous charge on the main body of Lee's army, which now appeared plainly visible on the hills and in the valley beyond.

Meanwhile the Fifth Corps, which had bivouacked for the night close to General Ord's command, moved forward at dawn and marching directly across the country from the railroad, about six o'clock had reached the vicinity of Appomattox Court House. Learning through Sheridan that a portion of the cavalry was heavily engaged and hard pressed, Ayres' division was pushed forward at a double-quick, two Pennsylvania regiments (the

190th and 191st Pennsylvania Volunteers), armed with Spencer rifles, deployed as skirmishers and the main part of the division formed at once in two lines of battle. General Bartlett's (First) Division, formed likewise on the right of Ayres, was covered with a heavy skirmish line (155th and 198th Pennsylvania and 185th New York Volunteers). Thus disposed, the corps moved forward and attacked the enemy.

At the same time Sheridan had formed the two divisions of Merritt's cavalry corps, under Devins and Custer, to the right of the infantry (Fifth Corps), on the slopes of the hills to the westward of the little village of Appomattox Court House, for a grand simultaneous charge on the main body of Lee's army, spread out before them on the fields in the valley beyond.

It was a thrilling spectacle, on this beautiful spring morning, to witness the advancing lines of the Union grand army. All its movements were now in fair and open view and could be taken in at a glance. The troops here may be said to have constituted one wing of Grant's army; while the combined Second-Third and the Sixth Corps, following directly in the rear of Lee and more immediately under the command of General Meade [so to speak; Humphreys was in actual command] may properly be named as the other. (The Ninth Corps did not advance beyond Farmville during the campaign.) Sheridan was the leading spirit of the [west] wing now more immediately referred to, and amid the various colors which moved rapidly among the troops, followed by a group of horsemen, his headquarter pennant was especially distinguishable.



Custer's gay color was likewise conspicuous, and, while the attack by the infantry was progressing, his division was sweeping along the hills and forming nearer the village for a charge in column of squadrons. *It was one grand jubilee of warfare!* The sight to every soldier was inspiring. Advancing lines of battle "to the right of him and to the left of him;" the steel glistening in the morning sunlight; hundreds of colors proudly waving along the lines; the eager generals, with their staffs and escorts, here and there dotting the fields; the artillery rumbling ponderously by battery front, now hurriedly unlimbering its guns and now skilfully limbering-up again; aides and orderlies dashing gaily over the plain; while at right angles to the grand advance, and almost within sight of every man, the squadrons of cavalry swept along the slopes in a style peculiarly attractive. It was about nine o'clock. The enemy, no longer able to maintain the semblance of organized resistance, retreating, kept a good distance beyond our advance. But retiring directly over the country whence they came, they must soon encounter the rest of the Army of the Potomac under General

Meade. Who now could doubt that capture or annihilation was before them. The panoramic view and the moral spectacle of this morning was unparalleled. Long and patiently had many a weary soldier waited for this day. Proud and haughty had many a noble-spirited youth felt it postponed by "strategic" retreat. Brave and valiant had many gallant soldiers found their graves in fighting, that we might see it. Hopeful and sincere had noble women prayed that it might come. Silent and obedient the veterans longed for it. Industrious, energetic, intelligent and faithful, the army had worked for it. Powerful and unyielding the whole nation demanded it. Quiet and persistent the Lieutenant-General determined it. A short time longer and this pomp and circumstance of battle would be turned to combat and slaughter. Weary, hungry, defeated, pursued, harassed, surrounded, the Rebel "Army of Northern Virginia" was helpless. When, therefore, its further defiance was complete destruction, Captain Simms, of General Longstreet's staff, hailed General Custer, bearing a large white towel, asking, in the names of Generals Lee and Longstreet, a suspension of hostilities.

Colonel Whittaker, of General Custer's staff, was, thereupon, sent with Captain Simms to General Longstreet, to reply that General Custer was not in chief command, and he could not, therefore, avert his impending charge without the announcement of unconditional surrender. General Longstreet hoped he would do so, and replied that Grant and Lee were in "conference," which was not the fact. General Grant did not reach the field until afternoon; for, under his own hand, we are informed that at 11.50, A. M., on that day, he was "about four miles west of Walker's Church," which was nearly ten miles distant.

General Custer, however, stayed his column, and quickly sent to General Sheridan information of the state of affairs. The precaution was taken, also, to form the troops in a defensive attitude with carbines at a "ready," to be prepared for any emergency. Colonel Whittaker also carried the same flag of truce to our infantry. Their advance was halted, and neutral ground was marked out between the opposing forces, it being generally considered that the surrender was virtual.

When Sheridan received Custer's message, he rode at once to Appomattox Court House. On approaching this place, he was fired into by some parties of the enemy, who, doubtless, misconceived his staff and escort to be an advance detachment of the cavalry whose charge had so recently been averted. It is miraculous that among so large a group this fire was harmless, while it is equally curious that men accustomed to distinguish one part of an army from another should have mistaken a general

officer, accompanied by his staff, color bearer and a few orderlies, riding in advance of well-defined bodies of troops, for a charging squadron of cavalry. Sheridan was about to order his lines instantly forward again; but the *mistake* (?) was soon rectified. Soon afterwards he met Generals Gordon, Wilcox, Longstreet and others of the Rebel service, and, at their request, a suspension of hostilities was agreed upon, pending negotiations for a surrender then said to be progressing between Generals Grant and Lee. It seems the latter had expected to meet General Grant personally, at ten o'clock this morning, "on the Old Stage Road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies." In the same note in which this was stated, and which was written late on the day before (8th), General Lee had also said that, "to be frank, he did not *think the emergency had arisen to call for a surrender.*" This would indicate that he thought there was yet a possibility for the escape of his army,  which opinion he certainly could have not entertained, had he been acquainted with the massed and speedy movements of Union troops marching to intercept and to occupy the only route, at that time, open for the further march of the Rebel army.  Lee, therefore, desired to meet General Grant only to learn whether he had any "proposals that would tend to the restoration of peace!" General Grant had previously informed General Lee of the single condition upon which a surrender would be accepted, and, hence, in a note written early on the morning of the 9th, he declined to meet General Lee. So, when the latter rode out towards the rear of his own army, the next morning, to see General Grant at ten o'clock, as he had appointed, he, there, received this note of Grant, last referred to.

It is worthy of remark, here, that no proposition had yet been made by Lee for the surrender of his army, and that, about the very hour now spoken of, his subordinates, generals in front of Sheridan, having been for several hours convinced of the impracticability of escape, IN THEIR OWN NAME *requested the suspension of hostilities.* While Lee was going to the rear for the purpose of conferring with General Grant on "terms of peace," his troops were making one more final effort to escape. The news of this unsuccessful attempt was fresh in the mind of Lee, when he learned, on the picket line, that the Lieutenant-General had declined to meet him. It was THEN, and not before, that Lee again requested an interview, with direct reference to the surrender of his army. Therefore, be it said that, next to Lieutenant-General Grant [Gen. A. A. Humphreys], to General Sheridan, more than to any other one man, is the country indebted for the speedy and complete success of the great "ELEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN."



The temporary truce being agreed upon, as soon as assurance was given that a surrender was intended, and of which there could be no doubt, General Forsyth, of Sheridan's staff, was sent by the shortest route, directly through the enemy's camps, to inform General Meade of the truce agreed upon in this part of the field. The infantry and cavalry, under Generals Ord and Sheridan, rested just where they had halted in their lines on the sloping fields. Before them lay the little village, and about it a confused mass of troops and wagons; our soldiers strained their eyes to observe every feature of the scene.

They sought to observe it more accurately, and, while there was naturally among them some vacant curiosity, there were more speculative whispers, or else a proud triumphant silence. The various commanding generals, being notified, repaired without delay to the Court House, which remained between the lines of the two armies. Here were soon assembled: General Ord (the ranking officer of this, the left, wing of the army), commander of the Army of the James; General Gibbon, commanding the Twenty-fourth Corps, only two divisions of which were in this campaign; Generals Foster, Turner and Birney, division commanders; General Griffin, commanding Fifth Army Corps; Generals [Crawford] Ayers, Bartlett, and other principal general officers from the Fifth Corps; General Sheridan, commander of all the cavalry and of such infantry corps as, from time to time, might be assigned to him; Generals Merritt, Crook and the other principal cavalry generals whose names have been, heretofore, so frequently mentioned—being, in fact, all the chief officers of the wing of the army now under Ord and Sheridan; together with Generals Longstreet, Gordon, "Runy" Lee, Wilcox, and a number of other leading generals of the enemy. These gentlemen exchanged such simple courtesies as might be expected between officers of rank who had fought in opposing armies through many campaigns, and whose troops had, as a consequence, come to regard each other with no little respect. Indeed, soldiers as well as officers strike a bond of sympathy, as between brothers in a foreign land, when unexpectedly acquaintances are formed between those who stood face to face in the same battle. It is true, too, that the veterans of either army habitually entertain a higher regard for the soldiers of the other than they do for those bombastic patriots whose love for the cause, be it good or bad, has been expended in urging others to the field of action. If we were to search the whole country for the elements of the Northern and the Southern population best calculated to harmonize in the great work of "reconstruction," "rehabilitation," "regeneration," "restoration," or by whatever title is indicated a general fixing up of our national af-

fairs, we should be most successful in bringing together the old soldiers who fought under Lee, and the sturdy veterans of the old Army of the Potomac.

About twelve o'clock, when the head of his column was not more than three miles from Appomattox Court House, General Meade received a note from General Lee, requesting, for the present a suspension of hostilities, and, about the same time, General Sheridan's staff officer arrived with information of the state of affairs on the other side of the enemy's camp. General Meade consented to a truce of two hours, and communicated this arrangement to General Grant. The combined Second-Third Corps had the advance of this wing of the army, but had not been able to begin the day's march before eight o'clock, on account of unavoidable delay in receiving and distributing the supplies just arrived. A march of about three hours was made before the final halt, although many temporary interruptions were occasioned by the passage across the advancing line of the communications already spoken of.

There is one other feature of the military operations of the day, already casually referred to, which deserves mention again, as in all probability representing the very last contest between any portions of these two great armies. It will be remembered that, early in the day, shortly after the infantry arrived on the field, Davies, who had been defending the left and rear of Sheridan's or Ord's wing of the army, was ordered to engage all the Rebel cavalry he could find and to whip them, and then to repair to Appomattox Court House for further service. Apparently a good force of the enemy's cavalry had succeeded in marching toward Lynchburg around the flank of Sheridan's position, and these troops it was designed to defeat contemporaneously with the first flag of truce to Custer; they were stationed across the Lynchburg pike and Davies was disposing his troops to charge them.

The country was quite broken and troublesome fences intervened. Before we were prepared to advance the Rebel cavalry made an impetuous attempt to break through our lines; but they were beaten back by Davies' brigade. A second charge met with the same success, while by this time General McKenzie and Colonel Young had arrived, each with a brigade from a different part of the field, and were ready for the fresh and exciting task just assigned them.

The soldiers had learned of the grand advance, and success contemporaneously progressing in that part of the field nearer Appomattox Court House, and evinced a laudable desire of emulation. Skirmishing was brisk; many of the fences had been leveled. "To horse!" sounded; battalions and squadrons dis-

posed for a charge, according to the nature of the ground, and all was ready for a fight. *It was to be successful*; everybody SAID so and FELT so; and then there was to be a grand pursuit which might take the pursuers half-way or even as far as Lynchburg itself. *It was to be more, too, than a simple success.* It was to destroy the Rebel cavalry force in front, known to be a portion of Fitzhugh Lee's Division. This was the work in hand.

It was just at this critical moment, when a short time longer would have made it impossible, quickly, to stop the fight, that an aide arrived from the Court House other [East] front, bringing the startling but welcome intelligence that hostilities were suspended; that Grant and Lee were holding negotiations for a surrender!

I said welcome intelligence. But there were some among these troops who were anxious to witness a real enthusiastic success. It had been the good fortune of most of them to have had experience of many battles, but to have participated in few or none where the opposing forces were comparatively annihilated. *Now total destruction only was being anticipated.*

But orders for the truce arrived and the charge was averted. Not, however, until some time after the general cessation of hostilities along the main lines of the army. So that there could be no doubt that the last hostile shots between the "Army of Northern Virginia" and the Army of the Potomac were exchanged by the cavalry of whom we now speak.

As to what particular regiment fired the last bullet, that is most difficult to say.



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### CHAPTER III.

(ORIGINAL CHAPTER XIII.)

The next morning Sheridan's Cavalry was early on the move, and marched through the bivouacs of the army *en route* again to Petersburg. 🖱️ *There was not a little disappointment in many quarters that no opportunity was given the victorious soldiers to observe more closely the men and officers of Lee's army. Thousands expressed their dissatisfaction at the unprecedented liberality granted to the Army of Northern Virginia, and at the manner in which it was allowed to disperse. Our soldiers did not cherish any spirit of revenge, nor any desire to see brave men humiliated, but there was a most natural anxiety on their part to catch an interior view of the remnants of the Rebel forces, or to witness a formal surrender of the veteran host which they had so long confronted on the field of deadly strife.* 🖱️

The two armies lay hidden from each other, and while some of our men straggled within the enemy's lines for a coveted glimpse of the combined strength of Lee's army, the weary and destitute soldiers of the latter visited our camps and gratefully shared our soldiers' rations. They woods were filled with those who, not yet paroled, were availing themselves of the permission "to go where they pleased."

 *There was, too, not a little chagrin in some quarters that PICKETT and other officers of distinction who were deserting from the United States service at the outbreak of the war, should be allowed the same generous terms accorded to the others.*  But there was, notwithstanding, a quiet acquiescence in the final settlement which said, in the plainest terms: "Well, I guess, Grant is right after all!" [He was not.] The disposition to murmur soon died away and was speedily swallowed up in the joy of victory. [American patience!]

The infantry corps remained near Appomattox Court House a day or two for rest, but the cavalry, being in need of forage, marched from the memorable field without an hour's delay. The news of the surrender was received by the whole army with quiet enthusiasm—if such a term be proper. An unfeigned pleasure possessed every heart, but the victory [to the Army of the Potomac] was without one-tenth part of that exaltation and sensation with which it inspired the North. There was among the soldiers an unexplainable feeling of wonder at what would come next. [Just my sensation at the time, inserted the copyist, a conscript who served in the Shenandoah Valley and elsewhere]. There was scarce a single instance of that wild fervor which assembled the thrift and intelligence of Wall Street around the steps of the Custom House and gave the key to that grand chorus of voices which, at midday, and at the busy exchange, swelled in unison thousands of voices in praising "God from whom all blessings flow." Not that any soldier failed to appreciate the great success, but the habitual quiet acceptance of facts as they are, surrounded every proud member of the victorious army with an halo of dignified reserve. As to the number of men actually surrendered, accounts have much differed. It has been, however, authoritatively stated recently, "from the rolls in possession of the government, General Lee's army, when it surrendered, contained 28,000 men [this is a very low estimate] and General Johnston's 37,000." [Associated Press dispatch from Washington.] The number actually paroled at Appomattox by General Sharpe, of General Grant's staff, was a trifle over 26,000.

A low estimate of the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia when the campaign opened [pursuit commenced], places it

"between 40,000 and 50,000"—perhaps nearer the latter; that it lost over 10,000 men in killed and wounded; over 20,000 in prisoners and deserters, including those taken in battle and those picked up in the pursuit. The actual number of muskets surrendered, however, was not over 8,000 or 10,000, although more than twice that number of men were present. This, however, included teamsters, hospital and quartermaster's employees and other non-combatants, *while many of the soldiers had no arms.* At any rate the available fighting force at the time of the surrender could not have exceeded 12,000 or 15,000 men. [Great error.]

The total amount of artillery captured during the battles and pursuit amounted to about 170 guns. As to the number of wagons taken and destroyed, the only possible method of arriving at any accurate calculation is to ascertain from General Lee, or his responsible officer, the number which started with his army from Richmond and Petersburg, and, deducting therefrom the 200 or 250 wagons surrendered, we have the immense number previously destroyed or captured by our troops. The Rebel trains during this movement were large and cumbersome, and the animals were in bad condition and overworked. *Had Lee chosen to have abandoned all his trains, his chances of escape, in several instances, would have been excellent.* [Editor always said this, in conversation, communication and print.]

In the agreement for surrender the officers gave their own parole for the men within their command. The following form of the personal parole of officers is taken from that given by General Lee and a portion of his staff:

"We, the undersigned, prisoners of war belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, having been this day surrendered by General R. E. Lee, commanding said army, to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, do hereby give our solemn parole of honor that we will not hereafter serve in the armies of the Confederate States, or in any military capacity whatever, against the United States of America, or render aid to the enemies of the latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as shall be mutually approved by the respective authorities.

R. E. LEE, General.

W. H. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.

CHAS. S. VENABLE, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.

CHAS. MARSHALL, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.

H. E. PRATON, Lieut.-Col. and Ins.-Gen.

GILES BOOKE, Major and A. A. Surgeon-Gen.

H. S. YOUNG, A. A. G.

"Done at Appomattox Court House, Va., this ninth (9th) day of April, 1865."



The above parole is the same given by all officers, and is countersigned as follows:

"The above-named officers will not be disturbed by United States authorities as long as they observe their parole, and the laws in force where they may reside.

GEORGE H. SHARPE, Gen. Asst. Provost-Marshal."

The obligation of officers for the subdivisions under their command is in form as follows:

"I, the undersigned, commanding officer of ———, do, for the within-named prisoners of war, belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, who have been this day surrendered by General Robert E. Lee, Confederate States Army, commanding said army, to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies of the United States, hereby give my solemn parole of honor that the within-named shall not hereafter serve in the armies of the Confederate States, or in military, or any capacity whatever, against the United States of America, or render aid to the enemies of the latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as shall be mutually approved by the respective authorities.

"Done at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, this 9th day of April, 1865."

"The within-named will not be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside."

On the tenth of April Lee published his farewell to his army.

#### GENERAL LEE'S FAREWELL TO HIS ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

April 10, 1865.

GENERAL ORDER No. 9.—After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources. I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them, but holding that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would attend the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past vigor has endeared them to their countrymen.

By the terms of agreement officers and men can return to

their homes and remain there until exchanged. You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consequences of duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend you his blessing and protection. With an increasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

(Signed,)

R. E. LEE, General.

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To Brevet Major-General Merritt was assigned the duty of paroling the Rebel cavalry, and, after completing this work, rejoined his command at Nottoway [Court House] on the 15th April, 1865. On the road thither he met Gen. W. H. F. Lee and staff, coming in to surrender, their men having almost entirely deserted them.

A correspondent of the daily press shrewdly remarked, concerning the general surrender: "The Rebel army laid down their arms by brigades, *but an officer remarked that a large number of men appeared without arms of any kind.* \* \* \* \* \* *It was noticed also that all the good horses in Lee's army were private property.* General Gordon's private baggage is said to have filled four or five army wagons which were furnished to take it away. (Which fact, the author [H. E. T.] thinks, is quite doubtful.)

In a volume entitled "The Fourth Year of the War," written in the interest of the South by Pollard, and whose author is not famous for reliability, Lee's surrender is thus spoken of:

"There can be no doubt in history that Gen. Lee, in taking his army away from Richmond and Petersburg, had decided, in his own mind, upon the hopelessness of the war, and had predetermined its surrender. The most striking proof of this is, that on his retreat there was no order published against straggling—a thing unprecedented in all deliberate and strategic retreats—and nothing whatever done to maintain discipline. The men were not animated by the style of general orders usual on such occasions. They straggled and deserted almost at will. An idea ran through the Virginia troops that, with the abandonment of Richmond, the war was hopeless, and that they would be justified in refusing to fight outside the limits of their State. Nothing was done to check the notorious circulation of this notion in the army. The Virginia troops scattered off to their homes at almost every mile of the route. We have seen that Pickett was left with only a handful of men. [NOTE.—Sheridan can also tell why "Pickett was left with only a handful of men." H. E. T.] Some of the brigade commanders had not hesitated to advise their men that

the war was virtually over, and that they had better go home and 'make crops.'

"But there are other proofs, besides the omission of the measures against straggling usual on retreats, that General Lee had prevised a surrender of his army. He carried off from Petersburg and Richmond all the transportation of his army, sufficient, perhaps, for one hundred thousand men—certainly largely in excess of the actual needs of the retreat. The excessive number of Virginia troops who were permitted to drop out of the ranks and return to their homes shows very well that there was no firm purpose to carry the war out of the limits of that State. Prisoners taken on the retreat invariably reported that the army was soon to be halted for a surrender; and General Custis Lee, when captured by the enemy, is alleged to have made the same revelation of his father's designs."

The return march of Sheridan's cavalry was continued, without any special interest, towards Burkesville, and, except at nights, no halts were made until the column arrived at Nottoway Court House, a little station on the Southside railroad and the county-seat, as its name implies. Here the command expected to recuperate.

General Grant had hastened to Petersburg and thence to Washington, for conference as to the future. While North, he took occasion to make a flying visit to his family and thus narrowly escaped the blow of the assassin prepared for him. Not so with the lamented Lincoln. The crowning martyr to a glorious, but tedious though successful war, he had shared its trials and hardships, had watched its struggles with paternal care, had guided its issues. The vicissitudes of the contest had educed his wisdom and the bloody scenes of this national drama were closed with the vile and mournful tragedy of his death.

It had been a warm spring day. The camps were basking in the sun. The soldiers lolled carelessly about, or built little fires and washed their clothes along the banks of the Nottoway. In the absence of the blacksmith they tinkered at a loose horseshoe or burnished a cherished carbine, polished an honored sabre, wiped Virginia mud from equipments, patched a dilapidated bridle, or straggled out of camp in search of chickens, horses and other good things, or amused themselves with divers employments congenial to the modern disciples of Mars. More than an ordinary halt in the march, it was one of those well-defined periods in a campaign whence each one dates a fresh experience, a "landmark" of time about which to group facts of history. *It was really the first calm after the storm*, the first resting spell which the cavalry had enjoyed since leaving Petersburg to begin the

grand advance of this spring campaign, and a convenient opportunity to review the eventful doings of the past ten days. Soldiers only can appreciate these periods.

Martial music appropriately toned the evening scenes and the bands had concluded their indifferent attempts. There was no moon, the stars were shining brightly. A cheerful rail fire broke the night chill and crackled merrily on the neat grass plot of an old door yard, fitfully lighting into view the background of white folds of open and inviting tents. A group of officers lazily reclined in Turkish postures on blankets and overcoats, smoking, recounting experiences and chatting over the scenes of the past two weeks as only such groups can talk. The virtues of the slain were feelingly narrated, the successes of the living freely discussed. There was a sense of relief, freedom from care, an appreciation of the absence of all possible alarm, a quiet contentment that nothing was likely to disturb, and a general relish of security and peace. Not only was the campaign ended, but the conclusion of the war seemed now inevitable. The serenity and quiet of the evening was only broken by the soft notes of the bugles as the night breeze wafted their musical "tattoo." Comfort and contentment were reigning supreme.

The spurs and sabre of an officer on duty suddenly rattled by the group.

"What's your hurry?" says one, making room for another in the little circle.

"Bad news to-night, boys," briefly answers the aide, as he hurries by towards the general's quarters.

"What is it? What is it?" is eagerly asked, and the whispering reply is caught:

"THE PRESIDENT IS ASSASSINATED!"

Who believed it? Each man sought an explanation in the amazed and saddened countenance of his neighbor. Who dared repeat the message? Did you understand him correctly? There must be some mistake. Silent and contemplative faces waited around that camp-fire. Presently the aide reappeared. He explained, reading a brief dispatch from the War Department (from Major Eckhart) to General Meade, who in turn had sent it from Burkesville to General Sheridan. It announced that PRESIDENT LINCOLN HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED AT FORD'S THEATRE; *he was insensible and would not likely recover.* Verily was a pall cast over the nation, as, on the next morning (April 16th) after this tragic deed, men of one accord closed their places of business, and, instead of celebrating the nuptials of a re-united people, felt that the country was turned into an house of mourning. But

the silent anger and grievous sadness in the army! Who will depict it? Every soldier felt the loss of a personal friend!

Revenge and retribution found no little favor among many natures; sadness was in all. "*'Twas well,*" said one, "*that this did not happen before the surrender of General Lee!*" and the significant sentiment met with a deep response. The soldiers gathered in groups, discussing the subject in a subdued and reverential manner. Strong and hardy men, commanders, too, of others, bent in tears among their comrades. Who shall tell the stories of the next day as the sad news floated through the camps? The army wept!

[“There was one man in the Army of the Potomac who saw all this clearly, and spoke out in trumpet tones—Major-General Horatio G. Wright. He has not been mentioned in the course of the Third Corps biography more than was indispensably necessary, because the writer was desirous of avoiding any side issues, but by no means because the noble commander of the Sixth Corps was not fully appreciated. Were it necessary to cite proofs of the nobility of soul possessed by the “Burster into Petersburg,” one would be almost sufficient to demonstrate the man, viz., his dispatch to Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, of the 15th April, 1865, in connection with the death of Lincoln:

“HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

April 15th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL WEBB, Chief of Staff:

With deepest sorrow the dispatch, announcing the assassination of the President of the United States and the Secretary and Assistant-Secretary of State, is received, and I advise that every officer of the Rebel army within control of the Army of the Potomac be at once closely confined, with a view to retaliation upon their persons for so horrible an outrage.

H. G. WRIGHT, Major-General.”]

The march of the cavalry towards Petersburg was resumed and continued, without further incident, under General Crook, General Sheridan having preceded the command for better communication with General Halleck at Richmond and General Grant at Washington.

A corps having been left at Appomattox Court House, to attend to the details of matters connected with the paroling and disbanding of Lee's army, the Army of the Potomac withdrew to Burkesville Junction and the Ninth Corps was distributed along the Southside railroad. Sheridan camped his cavalry corps at Petersburg. All eyes were now turned towards North Carolina and Johnston's army. The fate of the latter was certain, yet,



without an immediate surrender, an active campaign in North Carolina was inevitable.

General Grant had sped to Washington immediately after Lee's surrender, and the first orders from the government were issued looking towards a retrenchment of necessary military expenditures. The victories around Petersburg; its fall; the capture of Richmond; the successful battles in the hasty pursuit; the final surrender of the Rebel Army of Northern Virginia; the assassination of the President; and the simultaneous attacks on the lives of the nation's leaders; had thrilled the country with the intensest excitement. The public mind was prepared for any news and yet could scarcely comprehend the passing events of day to day.

But the skill and wisdom of the head of the Union armies did not stand startled and quiescent at success. Each moment was appreciated and every opportunity grasped. Johnston's Rebel army had acknowledged itself to be at bay before those marching hosts of Sherman, and the wily Rebel leaders sought to take advantage, themselves, of the discomfiture of their brethren elsewhere to gain wide and retrieving terms in support of their falling fortunes. Sherman's "arrangement," which it is not proposed to discuss, was quickly vetoed in Washington and the Lieutenant-General himself became the messenger of a new programme. He started at once for Sherman's headquarters in North Carolina, having first, however, taken such preparatory measures as would be rendered necessary in case Johnston should decline the "unconditional surrender" which was now to be demanded and enforced.

As far as Sheridan and the Army of the Potomac were concerned, these wise precautions comprised orders to the former to be prepared to move his whole force, with such a number of rations and light supplies as indicated a long campaign without an immediate base, and to the latter for the detachment of the Sixth Army Corps, under General Wright, which was to be ready to march under similar conditions.

Nothing more favorable being heard from Johnston, these two columns were put in motion, both under the command of General Sheridan, the Sixth Corps moving from Burkesville on Sunday the 24th and the cavalry from Petersburg on Monday, 25th April. The infantry column marched directly south along the Richmond and Danville Railroad, towards Danville, while the cavalry left Petersburg by the now famous Boydton plankroad. It was expected; therefore, that after three or four days the two columns would unite near the southern boundary of Virginia and march thence into North Carolina, to operate as circumstances might require. The march of the cavalry was without special interest, the country

traveled over being well worn out with war and possessing naturally but few attractions. The spring weather was becoming warm and the roads dry and dusty. The Boydton plankroad bore painful evidences of having once been a "plank" road and its dilapidated condition added seriously to the difficulties of the march. Troublesome creeks and rivers, where bridges had been destroyed, were to be crossed and occasioned no little delay. Rebel officers and soldiers of Lee's army now and then were met, many of whom were not yet paroled, strolled to the column for protection, a parole, or out of idle curiosity.

At the crossing of Stony Creek, the ford was found to be impracticable, but the abutments and piers of the bridge appeared in good order; all else was destroyed. With tools and a few skilled workmen the bridge might, in ordinary times, have been repaired in a day or two. Now a few beams floated about in the stream as the only material, axes the only implements and soldiers the only workmen on hand. The bridge must be rebuilt. A regiment of troopers dismounted and their officers set to work in right earnest. It was in the middle of the day and every hour delayed the march. Sheridan, Crook, Davies, and other generals who happened to be near the head of the column, watched and nursed the work, so that *in less than three hours* a complete bridge, fifteen feet high and thirty to forty feet long, was ready for the passage of cavalry, artillery and trains. [This activity is notable and contrasts with the inactivity at Farmville, 7th April.] Meanwhile two Rebel officers rode up and watched the scene. After a short time said one to a soldier near him, "No wonder you Yankees always get along so fast. Our men would never have gone to work to rebuild this bridge in that way."

"What would you have done?"

"We would have waited for the 'construction corps' and the niggers to come up, or else dashed in and forded the river anyhow."

"Suppose you had artillery?"

"Oh, we would have emptied the caissons, carried the ammunition across the foot-bridge and pushed ahead."

To have adopted this course would have crossed a few men, rendered the ford impracticable, separated the command and thus delayed the march. This was the difference between Southern enterprise and Yankee ingenuity. The latter would give the entire column a short halt and an unimpeded passage of the river, the former would have created accident and delay. The compliment, however, to Sheridan's soldiers, was gracefully paid by one of the foemen who had fought them, and as kindly received as it was intended.

The general impression of the people along the route of march

was that Johnston's army had already surrendered. They had heard of the first truce which was agreed upon between Sherman and his opponent and taken it for granted that the latter's terms would be acceded to, or that the armistice must end in a surrender. They believed that the present march of Sheridan through the country was entirely uncalled for. They were unable to appreciate the policy of subjecting their beautiful country of Southern Virginia, hitherto scarcely visited by troops from either army, to the devastation and scourge of war.

The chief feature of this peaceful march of Sheridan was the new experience of traveling through the enemy's country without the ordinary precautions of war. Four years of life *a la qui vive*, which is, or should be the normal condition of a soldier, gave to a journey, without it, a joyous and reckless character. The weather was pleasant, the beauties of spring just budding and the country betokening comparatively few evidences of the civil strife now happily drawing to a close. Brigades and divisions marched without advanced guards or the delays of reconnoitering. Officers preceded the columns daily for miles, to select appropriate bivouacs, a convenient practice not heretofore within the bounds of prudence. Regular and irregular foraging parties scoured the country for miles on each flank of the column, and woe to the innocent quadrupeds which fell in their path. [This reads like Michelet's paragraph summing up the conquest of the kingdom of Naples in 1495, "A captain without soldiers was sent into Calabria to require the submission of the province," the most savage of barbarous districts, the ancient Bruttii, so faithful or submissive to Hannibal, a country and people which, between the great "Carthaginian" and earthquakes, have not recuperated in 2,000 years. "In every direction the French soldiers, armor laid aside, in undress, their feet in slippers, went about with pieces of chalk, marking their lodgings." The famous and infamous Borgia said, that "the French expedition of (six-toed and six-fingered) Charles VIII., (in this respect like the Philistine giant of the Hebrew Chronicles, or the six-toed Henry the Pious; or the two-thumbed Princess Hedwig Sophia, of Sweden),—had conquered Italy, not with steel, but with chalk;" and, Macaulay observes, "The only exploit which they had found necessary, for the purpose of taking military occupation of any place, had been to mark [with chalk] the doors of the houses where they meant to quarter." To cite another example, the "court chaplain, in speaking of this expedition" (the campaign of Gustavus Adolphus in Kurland, Semigallia and East Prussia, in 1826), "said, 'The King took cities with as much promptitude as he crossed the country on horseback.'"—STEVENS, 137.]

The region along the Dan and Staunton rivers always enjoyed a favorable reputation for its stock, and knowing, as the soldiers did, that few, if any, troops had ever visited it, every nerve was strained to discover and seize its horses. Every negro was interrogated, every stable searched. The news of our approach spread through the country as if by telegraph, and farmers rushed their animals to the woods and swamps, endeavoring in every imaginable way to secrete them from the search of the omnipresent troopers. The "intelligent contraband," however, appeared in his old character, as an unfailing well of information, and, either from natural sympathy, or personal fear, in nine cases out of ten revealed the concealments of the coveted animals. Many a valuable steed was thus obtained. Indeed it was scarcely possible that for ten and often for twenty-five miles off each flank of the line of march, a single horse could escape capture, so thorough was the search for a prize most highly esteemed among these energetic troopers. It seemed hard, often, to take from his comfortable stall the pet of the family, or to lead out a clean-limbed, nimble little mare for the heavy packs and saddle of the cavalryman. But was it inappropriate for the stern-eyed, haughty and wilful stallion to be "drafted into the armie." Yet it was harsh to leave the plow standing in the furrow, and who could fail to be moved by the pitiful appeals of the poor people, begging that their animals might be spared, lest the crop should fail and children ask for bread in vain.

"Sheridan's scouts," on this expedition, were more ubiquitous than ever. Being in appearance undistinguishable from the ex-Rebel soldiers, who were by this time well dispersed through the country, and being relieved of the natural caution exercised by campaigners in the presence of the enemy, these enterprising individuals extended their rides for many miles in every direction, meeting with numerous opportunities to expedite their journeys by the resident relays awaiting them on every farm. Their incursions and excursions, however, were not without profit in a strictly military, as well as personal, point of view. They learned the character of the country, its resources and the various roads, and, thus, each night assisted the commander to determine the most feasible line of march for the day following. If a bridge had disappeared they learned all about the fords or the probable length of time it would take to rebuild an old or to construct a new one.

Their most remarkable success, however, about this time, was the construction of a complete bridge over the Staunton river, near its confluence with the Dan. The stream at this point is wide and turbulent (?) and Sheridan's cavalry column was not provided with a pontoon train [! ?]. Unless a crossing could be effected in this



locality, a detour of many miles, causing a delay of several days, would be necessary in marching higher up the stream to a more established crossing. The Sixth Corps had crossed the Staunton river near the Richmond and Danville railroad; but, if Sheridan should now be obliged to cross at the same point, the cavalry would be in the awkward position of two or three days' march behind the infantry. This, on approaching an enemy, would be almost inexcusable in any commander. Under these circumstances it was not a little embarrassing to find that the excellent road along which we were now marching led only to an ordinary flat-boat ferry, over which to transport five thousand cavalry, with its light trains and artillery, would occupy perhaps a week.

The scouts dispersed up and down the river banks for miles. Clarksville, a little village to the south, was visited, and, on one pretext or another and by the compulsory employment of any negroes whose labor could be made available in one day, a large number of flatboats were collected and "poled" to the ferry. These boats were about twenty-five feet long and just wide enough to admit a wagon. The river could not have been less than two hundred feet broad and was quite deep. The current was rapid and it seemed inevitable that the column must halt and paddle itself across with great delay in small detachments. It appeared impossible to bridge it. Yet, one by one the flatboats arrived from up and down the stream, and, as it happened, all were of the same size. It was at once determined to fasten them together as firmly as the odd ropes and chains collected would permit. It was ascertained that there were just enough boats to reach across the stream and with remarkable ingenuity they were soon swinging into the current, a few of them anchored and, in almost as short a time as it takes to lay a pontoon bridge of the same length, a secure passage for the column was provided. It could scarcely be supposed that this frail structure would have supported the burden of a large cavalry force, yet, without a moment's delay, the whole command crossed without a single accident. The scouts, however, accustomed to move with the advance, did not watch the result of their engineering skill with the ardor of *connoisseurs*, and, with the troops fairly across, left the bridge to look after itself, so that, when the lumbering commissary trains attempted to cross, they found themselves too late. The bridge was just broken and the flatboats were floating carelessly down the stream.

The impromptu construction of this bridge and the rapid crossing over it of Sheridan's cavalry column is an episode worthy of serious attention by the military student. Had it occurred during more active operations, in the presence of an enemy, it



would have been recorded as one of the most remarkable instances of industry and enterprise in the history of war. [A similar conception was that of Colonel Bailey, when he bridged (18th May, 1864) the Atchafalaya, at Simms' Port, over 1,800 feet (about a third of a mile) across with steamboats, over which the wagon train passed 19th May, P. M.] How will the work of energetic unprofessionals, so successfully and skilfully completed, compare with the efforts of those military *savants*, which were manifested earlier in the war in digging earth before an inferior foe and in purposing that a victorious and pursuing army should construct a line of defense as a protection from a retreating enemy. [See Chapter, *infra*, on "Fording and Bridging."]

It may not be generally known that, after the battle of Williamsburg [5th May, 1862], on the Peninsula, in May, 1862, one of General McClellan's representatives asked General Heintzelman (commanding the troops of Hooker and Kearny, by whom the battle was won) if he did not think it would be advisable to construct a *military road across* the Peninsula, to aid the communication between the wings of the army in the *new line of defence* which was about to be assumed. At this moment the fighting was over and the enemy under Magruder [Longstreet] were in full retreat. General Heintzelman also received orders the next morning not to advance his troops without further authority. Kearny's division was at that moment pursuing the rear-guard.

At the Staunton river, Sheridan had learned that Wright, with the advance of the Sixth Corps, had entered Danville without opposition. The cavalry therefore pushed on up the Dan river for the first available crossing, with the intention of marching by the shortest route for Greensboro, North Carolina, or if the enemy was found to be too troublesome, to unite with the Sixth Corps at some convenient point south of the Dan. The bridge over the latter, at South Boston Station on the Danville Railroad, presented the first opportunity, and on the afternoon of Friday, April 28th, Sheridan here encamped, Crook's command being crossed to the south bank. Early in the afternoon, while the troops were being assigned to their various bivouacs, General Sheridan received a dispatch from General Halleck at Richmond, informing him of the final surrender of Johnston to Sherman upon the same terms accorded by General Grant to General Lee at Appomattox Court House, and ordering General Sheridan with his troops to return at once to Petersburg.

The necessity of obtaining forage and the eager horse hunts had scattered small parties through the country in every direction. Some even penetrated as far south as Roxbury and Yanceyville

and several visited Milton, North Carolina. Every flat-boat ferry over the Dan was used by one or more of these venturesome foragers, who met with not a few interesting adventures. They became thoroughly acquainted with the spirit and temper of the inhabitants, as well as with the resources of the country. The news of the presence of these foragers in any particular locality was quickly noised abroad, and, as Johnston's surrender was in these parts believed to have taken place at the time of the original truce between Sherman and himself, not a few of the people openly disputed the right of roving troopers to inspect their stables. This fact only increased their misfortunes and led to a more vigilant and determined search. As parties from Wheeler's Rebel cavalry were riding about North Carolina, pillaging and helping themselves to stock in some localities, the citizens had improvised small bodies to protect themselves. It therefore happened sometimes that our men narrowly escaped serious encounters and in a few instances single collisions actually occurred, one of which was fatal. Some of these foragers had extended their operations so far from the main body of the corps that they did not succeed in rejoining Sheridan until after he had reached the camp at Petersburg.

The return march was without noteworthy incident, unless the parade of the cavalry corps through the city be recorded. Dusty and triumphant, that series of reviews through Petersburg, Richmond and Washington, of Sheridan's, Sherman's and Meade's grand armies commenced one pleasant afternoon in the streets of the city around which for now nearly a year great hosts had battled and where the skill, science, industry and magnitude of war was without a parallel. The people naturally were worn out with battle and manifested little or no interest in the affair, while the irrepressible negro watched the passing array with unobtrusive grinning satisfaction. The cavalry corps was encamped on the north bank of the Appomattox.

The Army of the Potomac soon arrived in Richmond and these war-worn veterans marched as victors through the city at which they had toiled and fought for nearly four bloody years. Generals Halleck and Meade reviewed them *en passant*. The troops continued their course over the old battle-grounds of Virginia, across war-worn fields, through destroyed villages, old encampments half hidden in the underbrush, and passing uncultivated wastes on which solitary chimneys stood as monuments of a complete desolation. Did not the hand of Providence guide those hosts on their homeward march along the former fields of strife, to impress on each the image of "grim-visaged war" and the "wrinkled front" of its declining days, that the veteran might

the more appreciate his home of happiness and prosperity, peace and virtue.

Sherman's armies, after most expeditious marches, were soon reviewed in Petersburg and followed on to Richmond. Sheridan now turned over the command of his cavalry to Major-General George Crook and himself repaired to Washington for consultation with the Lieutenant-General.

Before the corps was placed *en route* for Washington, however, General Gregg's brigade of Crook's Division was sent to garrison Lynchburg and the surrounding country, and General Smith's Brigade was assigned to the same duty at Petersburg. Taking up, then, the line of march, the remainder of the corps started north, passing General Sherman's armies in camp near Manchester. Marching through Richmond without display it continued towards Washington by a westerly route *via* Louisa Court House and Warrenton Junction, crossing the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford and the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford. This detour was rendered judicious in order to leave the more direct roads unobstructed for the march of Sherman's infantry, artillery and trains. By this route many scenes of former conflicts were visited and reminiscences revived of Sheridan's first raid about Richmond. This, it will be remembered, had occurred just a year previous, during that memorable campaign of Grant from the Rappahannock to the James. 📖 "Yellow Tavern" was passed, scarcely a mile or two out of Richmond, where fell the famous Rebel cavalryman, J. E. B. Stuart, and whence—as his followers now acknowledge—*nothing could have seriously prevented the march of Sheridan's troopers through the streets of the Rebel capital.* 📖 The line of the Virginia Central railroad was observed until the column approached another battlefield at Trevellian Station. The railroad was lined with evidences of destruction and decay; violence and want of repairs, in some instances, had rendered it scarcely passable. Temporary shanties or silent ruins were often all that remained of the former depots.

Stevensburg was passed, with its existence known only by a name on the map, one or two houses were standing and only an experienced antiquarian could have discovered evidences of a village. The beautiful country between the Rapidan and the north fork of the Rappahannock was rich with the verdure of innocent spring, but it afforded scarce an object of animate life. Not even the "intelligent contraband" greeted the "true blues." Of fences there were none. The fresh sunlight of heaven smiled anew across the overgrown fields; the old log huts of the army camps were falling to decay, as if conscious of approaching peace; the feathered songsters chirped merrily through the pleasant

woods; the little streams rejoiced again in mountain purity; "vain man" seemed to have departed and his lands regenerated and rededicated to freedom.

The valley of the Rapidan, the beautiful slopes of rolling Culpepper charmed the eye; the desolate hearthstones chilled the heart; the ruined homes awakened sympathy. Then a little ways beyond the half-covered grave reopened that wound and an ill-fated battle-ground recalled the present triumph. From the Rappahannock to Centreville, every inch of the ground might tell a battle story. Who will attempt to conjecture the silent emotions of these homeward bound veterans, as they marched finally and peacefully across the historic fields of Virginia.



## CHAPTER IV.

[ORIGINAL CHAPTER XIV.]

By the middle of May [1865], two hundred thousand veterans had encamped about the [national] capital. South of the Potomac the country was for miles a vast camp. It was but an item of the host that you might view from any one of the fortified hills; yet, glance in any direction, toward any point of the compass, and in that line of vision alone an army appeared, stronger than that which was supported by [or at the disposal of] the Continental Congress [during the Revolutionary War, or our First Struggle for Independence]. The garrisons of the numerous forts straightened themselves up and looked with pride on the less punctilious but honored campaigners about them.

It had been scarcely three years since the first grand army of the republic [alluding to the Army of the Potomac in 1862] had moved from the same grounds in search of an enemy who fled ere its first advance. War-worn and weather-beaten, after perils and adventures by land and by sea, after retreats and victories, battles and sieges, the vicissitudes of burning summers or shivering winters, after pleasant marches, or experiences of snow, ice and mud, these veterans now returned to end their military career where it had voluntarily begun. The dome of the Capitol was visible from every camp. The soldiers saw it and remembered that when they started it was unfinished. Now it typified their success. Freedom was triumphant! The nation was entire! When the fiat of emancipation was proclaimed the Queen of Freedom was enthroned. It was only then that the Statue of Liberty surmounted and adorned the nation's capitol!



Preparations were now commenced for the Grand Review with which it was proposed to honor the triumphant armies as well as to give the country and the troops an opportunity to appreciate the military power which was about to be dissolved and the strength and energy of which was soon to be absorbed in the arts of peace.

Objections in some quarters had been hinted against any pageant or attempt at a holiday display so soon after the death of him for whom the nation was mourning. But its propriety was very generally conceded, and, in view of all the circumstances, the close of so severe a struggle, the inauguration of a new President, the assembling at the capitol of the grandest and one of the largest armies the world ever saw, the discharge and dissolution of these veterans so soon to occur, and the universal desire of the people to give the soldiers who had won their victories every official and substantial recognition of the value of their services within the power of the United States to bestow, the wise consideration prevailed, so that the motives for the proposed review could not be misconceived, while its effect, both on the troops themselves, on the officials at the head of the government, on the people at large and on the powers and populations of foreign nations, all justified its propriety and usefulness.

Soon after the arrival of the various armies about Washington the city began to be rapidly filled up with strangers from all sections of the country. When the time of the review was formally announced, every train brought hosts of the relatives and friends of the troops. By the time the actual display occurred, it was estimated that there were more people in Washington than at any inauguration within the memory of the oldest inhabitant. Hotels reaped a harvest and in the usual Washington style. Men stood behind each others' chairs at table and took their turn in attempting to make a meal.

On the 18th of May the initiatory order for the review was thus announced :       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*

The troops which were here named to participate in review comprised commands which had served in every insurrectionary district and were representatives from every loyal state. There were in Sherman's army men who had been with Grant at Shiloh ; who had campaigned in Missouri and Arkansas ; who had fought at the siege and in the battles about Vicksburg ; who had accompanied Sherman in his famous unsuccessful raid from the Mississippi to Meridian ; who had been transferred from the Mississippi to Tennessee ; who had participated in the glorious summer campaign culminating at Atlanta ; who had made the " March to the Sea " and through the Carolinas, in those series of extensive



operations which ended at Chappel Hill in the surrender of Johnston's Rebel army; who had thence walked across the broad and beautiful state of Virginia to the fallen capital of the enemy; who had trodden the sacred grounds of the Potomac battlefields and who had finished at the nation's capital a military career, perhaps begun on the Ohio and including in its varied experience the vallies of the principal rivers, from the Missouri to the Potomac. Few soldiers, indeed, can boast of fortunes so diverse, yet there were such veterans gaily cooking coffee around the bivouac fires, the smoke of which girdled in close and small or farther and farther and more expansive circles, the White House.

It was regretted on the part of many, who had some definite notion of the nature of a military review, that there was not to be a formation of all the troops, so that the grand whole of their imposing lines might be enjoyed from some eligible locality by a comprehensive view. But the number of troops would have made a mass too unwieldy to manœuvre on any locality adjacent to the national capital. The topography of the country about Washington is at best unfavorable, while the presence of the river between the proposed scene of the review and the main camps of the army presented another very serious difficulty. A marching review only was practicable, and this informal display would, perhaps, be the more appropriate in any case, in view of the recent public bereavement. As soon as it was known, however, that Pennsylvania Avenue was to become the ground to be made classic by the tread of this veteran and triumphant host, the whole country was alive for the sight. The fact was quite forgotten that was to be simply a "march" of the troops through the city and that one regiment and one brigade looked very like another, and that each day would witness the same constant, never-ending stream of bayonets and blue.

Workmen had already commenced to prepare stands for the accommodation of the reviewing officers and the military and civil dignitaries who were expected to be present on the occasion. Immediately in front of the White House the main stand was erected and directly opposite another stand for certain staff officers and others who were fortunate enough to secure places thereon. Not far distant were other smaller stands, erected by different officials for the accommodation of disabled soldiers and their friends and whoever else could get on them. Near Major-General Augur's headquarters, at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and Sixteenth street, another stand was constructed by the military; while near the Treasury building, at the head of the avenue on Fifteenth street, and looking straight down this spacious thoroughfare to the Capitol, some enterprising individuals had built a stand

on their own account and for a consideration of one, two or three dollars, in greenbacks, be the same more or less, an eligible position was to be obtained, whence, at a glance, a mile of solid, moving, glistening bayonets came before the spectator. As he looked thence, down towards the Capitol, and saw, for eight hours each day, this close column of marching soldiers, their tattered banners waving joyously, their steel shining in the sun, heard the inspiring music to which they walked in cadence, saw the prancing war-steeds who seemed to know the day, and watched the bronzed and happy countenances of officers and men, or caught the firm lines in the face of a famous commander, an unexplainable thrill crept over the beholder; delight amazement, chagrin and triumph in turn possessed him. Could it be possible that the great war was over and so many soldiers left? Could it be possible that so many soldiers had fought and the war not ceased before? Could it be possible that this was only a portion of that grand army which for four long years had waged so many bloody conflicts with another army not much smaller in size and equal in determination and valor? Now it was possible to begin to appreciate the magnitude of the recent contest and to rejoice that peace was at hand.

But this is diverging. To return to the official history of this event. General Grant's order was succeeded by two other orders, respectively issued by the officers who had been temporarily assigned to the command of the troops on each day of the review, viz.: General Meade on the first day and General Sherman on the second:       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*

The camp of the cavalry corps was about halfway way between Alexandria and Washington, while the camps of all the other armies stretched along the hills, up and down the Potomac. With only two bridges across the river it would be impossible on the day of the review to pass troops over fast enough to keep a large body moving in close column. It became necessary, therefore, that some should cross before, and another camp was selected for the cavalry corps in the vicinity of Bladensburg, Maryland, whither they were ordered to move on Sunday morning.

General Sheridan had not yet rejoined the command since leaving it at Petersburg, but, being at Willard's Hotel, the cavalry corps continued to move under his directions. His subordinate generals, however, found it convenient in making this change of location to pass directly by the quarters of their favorite commander, who, it was now generally known, was about to depart for new and distant scenes of service. Sunday morning [21st May], unfortunately, was stormy, and the column moved in the mud and dirt usually accompanying such weather. Early and unheralded,

however, the clatter of squadrons, as they splashed slowly across Pennsylvania Avenue, awakened the citizens and in a short time Sheridan and staff appeared on the balcony to receive the informal and impromptu compliment of a marching review.

The soldiers were without the trappings of a holiday parade and were encumbered with the usual unmentionable paraphernalia belonging to a moving cavalry column. The spirits of the men were light and gay, but the weather was dull and heavy and these famous troopers were reviewed by that portion of the population enthusiastic enough to see the "pomp and panoply" of war as it looked in the drenching rain. The column occupied a good part of the morning in passing through the city, and wagons followed during the whole day.

The affair created no little stir among the good people of Washington and the more demonstrative evinced a practical patriotism in setting out in front of their houses all the bread and biscuits that happened to have been cooked, while others heated their ovens and according to their capacity and ability dispensed the warm food from their thresholds to troopers who had already had a comfortable soldiers' breakfast before breaking camp, but who, true to martial instinct, never lost an opportunity to eat or drink. It was a happy sight, however, and not without its good effect on the mind and heart of every soldier, to see the little ones run to the edge of the sidewalk with a plate of hot biscuit in one hand and a glass of water in the other and a pretty speech, like "Mister, have a bite, sir," and without dismounting one thankfully accepted the hospitality and wondered if this is but the beginning of the cheerful reception which awaited the veterans throughout the country [sadly forgotten in a short time in favor of rum-sellers, political dead-beats and bums]. It was new and unexpected and awakened a lively appreciation of the fact that the troopers were no longer in an enemy's country.

One venerable patriarch, more patriotic than thoughtful, and unmindful of the martial distinctions between a mounted squadron and an awkward four-mule team, enthusiastically received the troops under the joyous folds of his household's "star-spangled banner," and even after the column had passed, gaily continued waving his flag at every individual, mule and wagon-master in the baggage train.

The whole affair was simply an unavoidable march of the corps through Washington City, but it was telegraphed [with the usual accuracy of such reports] all over the land that Sheridan had held a grand preliminary review of his cavalry.

Tuesday, May 23d, dawned bright and pleasant and none who saw them can ever forget the scenes of that day at the capi-

tal. The walks were just drying in the morning sun after a most delightful shower and the streets of the city presented every appearance of a holiday. There was, however, a notable deficiency of that private enterprise which, had this grand review taken place in any other city, would have exhibited itself in numerous banners, arches and every possible civic adornment. The preparations for the reception of the troops, however, seemed to have been chiefly made by those expressly directed to do so by the officials to whom the charge was confided. This was appropriate, but the fact involves comparison to the streets of New York city on the occasion of some simple militia parade.

By eight o'clock the whole of Sheridan's cavalry were formed in column on Capitol Hill, the head resting near the famous "Old Capitol." Not far distant was the infantry of the Ninth Corps, which, by the order of march, was immediately to follow the cavalry. The *old* Army of the Potomac, proper, which comprised the chief part of the troops reviewed, were now marching across Long Bridge and so forming as to be ready to assume their appropriate place in the line. All the troops were to move in heavy column.

Soon Major-General Meade, the commander of this day's review, appeared with his staff and escort. General Sheridan, the day previous, had left for his new post in the Southwest and General Crook, the next ranking officer, had been allowed a leave of absence. Thus Major-General Merritt, whose acquaintance the reader has already made, assumed command of the cavalry corps for the review. General Custer and himself, heretofore only brevet major-generals, had just received promotions to full major-generalships.

Before nine o'clock the bugles sounded, and promptly at that hour the commanding general appeared at the head of Pennsylvania Avenue.

As the head of the column passed the Capitol every niche and window, every conceivable standing place on the porticos and around the pillars, were crowded with "fair nymphs and well-dressed youths." The children of the public schools had been gathered there in holiday attire, and, rich with gay ribbons, fresh toilets, appropriate mottoes inscribed on tasty banners, and with flowery garlands, they had assembled to do honor to the soldiery. What big heart, throbbing under bronze features, did not melt at this unexpected homage, to sturdy veterans, from childish purity and innocence. There seemed no limit to the fragrant luxury of the spring wreaths and bouquets, of all shapes and sizes, rained on the head of the column. The horsemen caught some as they flew over their heads, others fell on the ground and were trampled



under the following squadron; so that soon the very street over which they rode was carpeted with flowers. Children's voices broke in unison upon the cheerful morning air, as they sang with glee the words of happiness and welcome.

The people elsewhere had scarcely believed that so immense a military display could be entirely prompt to the hour appointed and the streets were as yet comparatively quiet; few persons had assembled. Indeed it would seem that high officials agreed in this opinion, for the President, Secretary of War and General Grant did not reach the reviewing stand until after General Meade and several other officers had passed. General Sherman accidentally rode up the avenue about the same time, on his way to the reviewing stand. *His* triumphal ride occurred twenty-four hours later, when he rode up the same street at the head of those armies who had campaigned from the Mississippi to the Potomac.

The cavalry, as well as the other troops, marched in close column, and of the former not the least noticeable feature after the many days heavy work they had so recently experienced, was the excellent appearance and condition of the horses, than which nothing, after a march, will more quickly indicate the efficiency of cavalry.

Without intending to give a detailed account of this review, the cavalry would never excuse my omission to mention that notorious incident which bereft one of its favorite generals of the dignified circumstance of martial array and carried him past the reviewing officer, the President of the United States, his Cabinet, the military, civil and diplomatic functionaries of this and many other countries, not in the stately and sedate manner of a warrior-chief on his prancing charger, but shooting like the wind. On an Arabian race-horse, with dishevelled locks, uncovered head, aye, lost helmet, dangling scabbard, no trusty blade at his shoulder, but hands, arms and bare head working to check the frantic steed, the pomp of generalship was completely enveloped in the unexpected character of John Gilpin! Was this a disappointment or was the sensation agreeable? Who among the spectators or performers at this state occasion will forget "how Custer's horse ran away with him?" But there was nobody hurt and the review continued.

The most correct schedule of this Grand Reception which has yet been published, is to be found in the *Army and Navy Journal* of 27th May, 1865, and these cursory sketches cannot better be closed than by acknowledging indebtedness to that number—92 (Vol. II., No. 40), pages 628-29 and 632—[where the programme is to be found] which constitutes one of the most comprehensive and interesting exhibits that has yet been published



regarding a martial occasion, which for the present—thank God—practically ended the career of the American armies. [Remember these pages were thrown together in the summer of 1865.]

A few days after the review, the cavalry removed its camp again from Bladensburg to the Alexandria and Fairfax Court House turnpike. As a corps it retained its nominal organization for some time afterwards, but its regiments were consolidated or mustered out of the service as fast as the orders and the necessary papers could be prepared. A brigade was placed *en route* to Missouri, where it was supposed it would soon follow Sheridan to Texas; another was sent to Kentucky; another to West Virginia. Several New York and Pennsylvania regiments were, after some little difficulty, consolidated with others from the same States, and some were likewise ordered home to be mustered out.

On the fourth of July, 1865, only one small brigade was left in camp to represent the corps. Meanwhile General Crook had been ordered North to await further orders; Generals Merritt and Custer had left for the Southwest, under orders, immediately after the review. In the course of the last month or six weeks of its life, therefore, necessitated by the various changes, the cavalry corps came under the command, successively, of Generals Crook, Brevet Major-General Devins, Brigadier-General Wells, Brevet Brigadier-Generals Thompson and Avery.

By the middle of July the last regiment was *en route* for home, the last staff officer had been ordered away, and the books, papers and headquarters establishment of the cavalry corps were engulfed in the depths of the quartermaster's department. No formal order of the Secretary of War had disbanded it, but Sheridan's cavalry was forever dispersed.

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## APPENDIX.

Regarding the conference (informal) at Appomattox Court House between a few of the prominent generals of each army, of which mention is made in Chapter II. (original Chapter XII.), there are to be inserted the following facts.

The conference at Appomattox Court House, about eleven o'clock on the morning of the 9th, was merely to arrange the suspension of hostilities, until Generals Grant and Lee could adjust the terms of the surrender. Among the Union generals

present were Sheridan, Crook, Merritt, Ord, Griffin, Barlow, Gibbon, Ayres and Forsythe, and among the Rebel generals were Longstreet, Heth, Wilcox and Gordon; "Rooney" Lee was near by, but did not join the circle. The tone of conversation at this interview was very friendly and both sides appeared glad to see each other [Rebels and Southerners were generally always amiable and conciliatory when they had points to gain and Northerners to take in. "*Timeo Danaos*," &c., &c., a trite proverb, always apposite in every place, &c.] Many mutual inquiries were made after old friends and acquaintances. Heth said that he would rather fight the politicians who brought on these difficulties, than the soldiers arrayed against them. Gordon said that for himself he had fought conscientiously and had established somewhat of a reputation as a fighting man, but had he known that his friends would have been received so kindly and treated so magnanimously by their enemies, he would have long since laid down his arms. Wilcox, alluding to an obsolete idea entertained by some of the Southern people, facetiously inquired how high the grass had grown in the streets of New York?

Copy from a New York daily of Sept. 10th or 11th inst., 1862 :

(From the *Richmond Dispatch*, Sept. 8th, 1862.)

The following named Yankee citizen and negro prisoners were received at the C. S. prison, corner of Cary and Twentieth streets, Saturday, Sept. 6th, from Gordonsville, via Central Railroad, at nine o'clock, viz. :



\* \* \* \* \*

(Here follow the names of fifty-eight officers, including H. E. Tremain, A. A. A. G., Sickles' Brigade.)

\* \* \* \* \*

Besides these there were about fifty-seven members of the 1st, 2d and 3d Virginia regiments (Pierpoint's Sattelites) mostly with very outlandish names for persons claiming to be Virginia Volunteers. The following citizens were also in the group, having been found in suspicious company, viz. : (7 names.)

*Negroes*.—Tann Genns, from New York, free boy; Geo. Jordan, do., Pennsylvania; Tom Jackson, do., New York, do; Esau, slave of Wm. Bowen, who has taken the oath of allegiance to Lincoln's government; Chas. Montgomery, free, from Washington; R. B. Wilson, free, Ohio; and John Williams, free, from Alexandria, Va.

All the white men in the above lot *who bore commissions* are considered as *belonging to Pope's army*, and *are therefore not prisoners of war.*"  *Were HOSTAGES—to suffer DEATH—by lot—*  
BY HANGING. 

## GEN. H. EDWIN TREMAIN.

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Having devoted a number of years to the studies necessary to complete a History of the Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, it was but natural in the course of the work to prepare a series of Biographical Sketches of officers who made themselves prominent in it. Among these was the present Brevet Brig.-Gen. Henry Edwin Tremain.

It is wonderful how soon, when red tape or routine are temporarily dethroned and a nation appeals to the patriotism of its population, what numbers of admirable officers are furnished by the learned professions. That doctors should make good soldiers is not surprising, as carving and killing is their natural trade; but why the study of the law should lend a peculiar dash to the wearer of a uniform is enough to awaken reflection. During the Revolutionary war certainly the cavalry commander who acquired the most world-wide notice was Tarleton, who, if he never practiced law, certainly studied it, and passed from the quill to the sabre. What is more curious, when it is necessary to embody volunteers and the legal profession form an organization apart, they are almost invariably known as the "Devil's Own." Why such things should be has no solution, but many exemplars. One of them constitutes the subject of the present sketch.

Henry Edwin Tremain, like so many of the distinguished men of the Third Corps—like Kearny, like Sickles, like Graham, is a New Yorker born, grew up in this city, and in 1860 was graduated at the College of the City of New York, aged twenty, and immediately entered upon the study of the law at Columbia College Law School. April 17, 1861, he enlisted as a private in the New York Seventh Regiment, and served in the ranks during its first brief campaign. Soon after, in company with a younger brother (Lieut. Walter R. Tremain, who died in the service), he recruited a company in the city of New York, and went to the front as First Lieutenant in the Second Regiment Fire Zouaves (Seventy-third N. Y. Volunteers), which was attached to the deservedly famous Excelsior Brigade. He served until April, 1862, in the line, and as adjutant of this regiment. At the siege of Yorktown he was promoted to the staff of General Nelson Taylor, commanding the Excelsior Brigade, in which capacity he served during the Penin-

sular Campaign under McClellan and the final operations of Pope, his brigade being attached to Hooker's glorious second division, the "White Diamonds," of Heintzelman's Corps. He participated in the engagements at Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Williamsburg Road, of June 25; Savage Station, Glendale and Malvern Hill the operations of the Seven Days' Retreat, the battle of Bristow Station and the Second Bull Run, under Pope.

At the Battle of Williamsburg he was one of the aids on the staff of Gen. Nelson Taylor, commanding the brigade, and in his official report of that engagement General Taylor takes occasion to express his satisfaction with the able manner in which Lieutenant Tremain's duties were performed. General Sickles' official report of the Battle of Fair Oaks thus speaks of him:

"My particular acknowledgements are due to Lieutenant H. E. Tremain, A. D. C. and A. A. Gen., upon whom I relied for nearly all the staff duty in the field through the day. His arduous duties were performed with courage, zeal and ability."

The official report of the battle of Malvern Hill also says:

"Lieutenant Tremain, the only officer of my staff able to report for duty, was, as usual, distinguished for zeal and gallantry, although suffering throughout the day with severe indisposition."

During the Second Battle of Manassas, participating in a charge, he was taken prisoner and sent to Libby Prison at Richmond. On arriving in the Rebel capital the authorities announced that Lieutenant Tremain and other officers should be held as hostages to prevent the execution of Pope's obnoxious order in regard to the destruction of Confederate property, and in case the same was enforced these officers were to suffer death. [See page 68, *supra*.]

General Nelson Taylor, in his report of the participation of his Brigade in the Second Battle of Bull Run, makes this allusion to Tremain: "His bravery and gallantry excited my admiration and have my warmest thanks; he was taken prisoner while endeavoring to check the panic and the rapid advance of the enemy."

When the Army of Virginia had failed, through causes beyond the control of its commander, officers belonging to the army corps that had been serving in McClellan's Peninsular army were released on parole. Less than thirty days found Lieutenant Tremain in Washington negotiating through the War Department for a special exchange. This being accomplished, and his parole canceled, he resumed the field on the staff of General Hooker's old division (Second Division of Third Army Corps), at this time under the command of General Sickles. In 1862, Lieutenant Tremain was promoted to be captain, and served on the staff of

General Sickles at the battle of Fredericksburg, and until the reorganization of the army.

Shortly after General Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, Captain Tremain was, on 25th April, 1863, commissioned as Major and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Vols., for the staff of the Third Army Corps. Here he served with great efficiency, as shown by the army records and extracts from special reports. For gallant services at the battle of Chancellorsville he was specially recommended for a brevet, which he received in 1865.

General Tremain's connection with this battle of Chancellorsville is worthy of special note. [See "Anchor's" (J. W. de P.) publications and criticisms on "Chancellorsville."]

Early on Sunday morning, Sickles' front, the apex or salient of the Union line, was fiercely attacked by the Confederates, according to their wont, in successive lines. Furious as were the onslaughts, they were met by resistance no less fiery in its determination. Indeed, the weight of the battle fell on this point, and the resistance was worthy of the assault. On this day Sickles was severely injured in repulsing, or checking, the enemy; and Maine's grand volunteer representative, Berry—the noble Berry—fell in a charge worthy of mention with any of the loudly trumpeted efforts of modern war.

"Again and again did Sickles send to Hooker, asking for reinforcements. They did not come. Then, about 8 to 9 o'clock, A. M., Major Tremain, senior aide to General Sickles, bore to Hooker his last and most urgent appeal for support—a support indispensable, since the last reserves at the disposition of Sickles had been put into position. When Tremain reached the well-riddled Chancellorsville House—afterwards destroyed and converted into a pile of ruins—Hooker, who saw him coming, and was eager to receive his report—one of many of similar import brought in that day—bent over the rail in his anxiety to hear it, when a heavy missile—a twelve-pounder solid shot, it is said—struck the column against which Hooker had been leaning, tore it from its base, dashed it against his body and head, and struck him down apparently lifeless. Well might Tremain, in narrating this catastrophe, dilate with horror upon his feelings at that moment. It would have been terrible enough at any time to see his commander-in-chief thus smitten down before his eyes and at his feet; but, at that supreme moment, the awful consequences of this disabling of the directing mind and central source of power was a still heavier shock to the comprehensive mind of the able and experienced aide-de-camp. He says the result (that result the compulsory abandonment of another key-point—a dreadful necessity when, west and east, to right and left, disaster and delay had already lost so much), was the crisis."



After this campaign, while visiting New York, hearing of Lee's second invasion of Maryland, Tremain telegraphed to General Hooker, volunteering his services in any capacity until his own general (Sickles) should return to the field. General Hooker promptly thanked him and requested him to join his headquarters at once. Tremain thereafter served on the staff of the commanding general until Hooker was relieved by Meade. General Hooker thus wrote to Governor Fenton of Major Tremain's services:

"He served in my command during the whole time that I was connected with the Army of the Potomac in a capacity which brought him within my immediate notice. I have always regarded him as an officer of uncommon promise; he is capable, energetic and devoted in the discharge of his duties, brave in battle and of unexceptionable moral character."

When General Hooker's command of the army ceased, Major Tremain resumed duty at the headquarters of the Third Corps, and, as the chief staff officer of that organization, played an important part in the battle of Gettysburg. In 1864, Major Tremain was sent with General Sickles, by order of President Lincoln, on special service to the West, and he visited every army in the field. While with Sherman's army at Chattanooga, he volunteered to act on the staff of Maj.-Gen. Butterfield, in response to a request to this effect, and served in this capacity in the Twentieth Army Corps during the operations before Dalton, and in the engagements at Buzzard's Roost and Resaca; and at the latter battle General Paul A. Oliver and he were the two staff officers selected to accompany and direct the storming column. On the occasion of Major Tremain's departure from the Twentieth Corps, under orders, General Butterfield wrote:

"As you are about to leave us, with a feeling of sincere regret at losing your valuable services, it is a great pleasure to thank you for them. Your devotion and energy in camp and on the march, your gallantry at our assault of the enemy's works at Resaca, and your genial qualities have endeared you to us all. Our best wishes go with you. I speak not only for myself, but for all the staff.  
\* \* \* I shall always be grateful for your generous services at so opportune a moment." \* \* \*

Upon his return East, Major Tremain was ordered to remain with General Sickles, who was at home in New York awaiting orders. But, after the election in 1864, Tremain was unwilling to retain his commission unless his services were desired in some more active field. Upon communicating this determination to the War Department, Secretary Stanton promptly ordered Major Tremain to report to General Meade for assignment in the Army of the Potomac.

Hastening to comply, he was soon, at his own request, assigned to the cavalry corps. Here he served in the operations about Petersburg, on the staff of General D. McGregor Gregg, and his successor, General Crook, and participated in the battles of Hatcher's Run, Dinwiddie Court House, Five Forks, Amelia Court House, Sailor's Creek, Farmville and Appomattox Court House.

At the termination of this campaign, Major Tremain, on recommendation of General Sheridan, was breveted lieutenant-colonel, "for gallant and meritorious services." Shortly afterward he was breveted colonel. He also served a short time on the staff of General Mott, commanding Second Division [combined] Second [Third] Corps, in front of Petersburg.

By reason of his services, from time to time, at so many and various headquarters, he was probably more generally personally known in the Army of the Potomac than any other officer of his rank in that army. In 1865, as the armies dispersed, Col. Tremain was ordered on reconstruction duty at Wilmington, N. C., on the staff of General Crook; but, in November, 1865, he asked to be mustered out of service, and returned to his home. While awaiting his discharge, he resumed his legal studies at Columbia College Law School. Instead of his muster-out, as desired and expected, he was ordered to duty at headquarters, Department of South Carolina, and was also breveted brigadier-general. He continued on duty in South Carolina until April, 1866, when, after completing five years of continuous military service, he resigned his commission and returned to New York city, where he opened a law office and commenced his civil professional work.

With the military services of the present presiding officer of the "Third Army Corps Union" (1880) this biographical sketch appropriately terminates. Still, in civil life, it is pleasant to be enabled to have recourse to the synopsis of a career which demonstrates that the young lawyer who achieved so much when transmuted into a soldier, did not fall below the high mark which he set for himself when he resumed the practice of his original profession.

During a temporary absence from the field, in 1864, he had submitted himself to the usual examination of applicants, and had been admitted to the bar. He was graduated at Columbia College Law School in 1867, having already acquired no little professional experience and a most promising business. His practice and clientage speedily increasing, in 1869 he organized with Colonel Mason W. Tyler (a young officer from Massachusetts, and a graduate of Mr. Evarts' law office) the present well-known firm of Tremain & Tyler. In 1870, Mr. Tremain received the nomination for Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, in the city

of New York. Although Tremain, received more votes than any of his associates on the county ticket, he was defeated, his party being in its usual hopeless minority on New York island. In 1870, the United States Marshal employed Mr. Tremain as special counsel to aid in the prosecution of cases for infringement of the census law, and in enforcing the United States election laws, then for the first time applied and tested.

Mr. Tremain has often been employed by the Government as special counsel, both before and after his appointment as first Assistant United States District-Attorney at New York. This position he occupied with signal ability during the second term of President Grant's administration, and until some months after President Hayes' inauguration, when he resigned. Subsequently the Treasury Department at Washington employed Mr. Tremain to conduct the trial of some important revenue suits, in which he was remarkably successful. For four years there was scarcely a notable case tried to which the Government was a party where Mr. Tremain was not of counsel. While in the United States District Attorney's office, the cases he conducted were generally of such prominence that he was obliged to encounter an imposing array of skillful adversaries. The questions also were such as required settlement by the United States Supreme Court, before either party would give up the controversy. On questions of law the result before appellate tribunals generally justified his advice. Before juries Mr. Tremain was rarely unsuccessful. During his experience at the bar he has probably conducted the trial of more civil causes than any man who is not his senior in years in the profession.

In 1871, Mr. Tremain was elected President of the Alumni of the College of the City of New York, to which position he was annually re-elected for five terms. He took an active interest in all matters relating to public education, and was frequently called upon to make public addresses in that connection. In 1869, he was elected by the Columbia College Law School to deliver the Annual Alumni Address at the Academy of Music, before the graduating class, and his address, entitled "Lawyers and the Administration of Justice," was received with marked appreciation.

At the same place, he addressed the Literary Societies of the New York College, in 1877, in favor of higher and more extended means of public education. Among Mr. Tremain's many literary efforts, his address, delivered by special invitation, on the occasion of the Centennial at the "Gospel Tent," in New York city, in 1876, has been given extensive circulation among the clergy of the country, in a work entitled "Under Canvas." Mr. Tremain had not unfrequently been a contributor to the press. During the

war he was often a correspondent of the New York *Evening Post*. While stationed at Wilmington, in 1865, he wrote editorially for the Wilmington *Herald*. He has also been employed editorially in professional publications. In May, 1879, he was elected President of the Third Army Corps Union.

If this record of a life still young is read carefully and calmly reflected upon, it will demonstrate a length of service, and a strictness, a success, and an honorable discharge of duty in the most opposite careers, to which it will not be easy to find a parallel.

ANCHOR (J. W. DE P.)









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MARCHES, OPERATIONS, ENGAGEMENTS AND POSITIONS OF THE COMBINED SECOND-THIRD CORPS,  
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, UNDER MAJOR-GEN. ANDREW ATKINSON HUMPHREYS,  
ON THE 6TH AND 7TH APRIL, 1865.

## LA ROYALE!

[Fanfare, or Call on the Hunting Horn, sounded when the Hounds arouse and attack a "Stag of Ten" Antlers.]

### PART VIII.

*"The 'toils were set,' and the 'Stag of Ten' was to die at bay."*  
—(*"Pickett's Men,"* 156.)

[Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1872, by J. WATTS DE PEYSTER, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, Washington, D. C.]

#### REMARKS, INTRODUCTORY AND EXPLANATORY.

As soon as the "Great American Conflict" had terminated and our "Boys in Blue" commenced returning home, the writer lost no time in beginning to collect and jot down information in regard to the terrible struggle of four years. In the seven years ensuing, the mass of memoranda, manuscripts, &c.—such as letters, statements and reports—gradually accumulated, until they constituted a huge mass of crude facts for historical mastication and digestion. In addition to this, shelf after shelf became loaded with valuable publications, such as the "Rebellion Record;" likewise with so-called Histories, Regimental Biographies, Biographies proper, &c., some of which, in their hundreds of pages, have no other value than to establish or corroborate a single fact.

All these, all this had to be melted in the crucible of critical examination by the fire of patient labor, to draw off from the black fusion and repulsive scoriæ the bright and precious metal of truth:—Truth which is intended to constitute the biography of the "Glorious Old Fighting Third Corps," which is, in fact, the history of the Army of the Potomac, since some of the constituents of the Third Corps participated in the first battle of Bull Run and witnessed the surrender at Appomattox Court House—four years of war such as the world had never yet witnessed; crowned with a triumph such as no such a period of conflict had ever yet achieved; rewarded with a victory greater and more decisive than had ever yet been won by force of arms.

As one of the noblest of living historians, Scherr, remarks: "The youthful might of Trans-Atlantic Democracy had fought out, in four years, a gigantic conflict for human development, which servile Europe could not have accomplished in an hundred years" by all the internal and external arguments of its statescraftmen and standing armies, written with steel, in blood, upon the ashes and ruins of civilization.

In order to reduce the accretion of manuscript and print into manageable shape, the writer published a series of works and pamphlets which enabled him to survey his route, construct his road-bed and gather together materials for the superstructure.

His "Personal and Military History of Major-General Philip Kearny;" his "Decisive Conflicts;" his "Third Corps at Gettysburg;" his "Fredericksburgh," "Chancellorsville," and "Gettysburg," in Captain Mayne Reid's magazine *Onward*, serve as bridges across deep gulfs. Other minor articles in *Onward*, in other magazines, in weeklies such as the *Ledger*, *Volunteer*, *Era*, and in daily papers such as the *Daily Times*, the *Evening Mail*, &c., were tramways for the transport of filling.

His uninterrupted series of articles—besides previous sporadic biographical sketches, &c., in the *New York Citizen*, commencing 20th August, 1870, and running on continually for a period of nineteen months, to the 23d March, 1872, constitute a temporary roadway, whose sharp curves, in any event, must be shortened, even if the majority is not wholly rebuilt.

This pamphlet, "La Royale," Part VIII., is the station house and structures at the terminus, which will serve every purpose until the permanent track is relaid. It may take years to finish up this work, but the passengers or readers can now make their four years' journey, rough or smooth as it may prove, with a complete understanding what the ultimate result will be.

The publications which have already appeared have met with the highest approbation of experts and competent judges. They will carry all the weight that can be imposed upon them, for they are laid on the rock of conscientious investigation, and have been set up with painstaking labor, without a single bolt headed with prejudice or nutted with personal bias. Where the timbers are only scored or rough hewn, it is because the architect did not deem it worth while to waste time in trimming them; where they are planed and ornamented, it was because it was due to the beauty of their surroundings, their utility and the situation.

No traveller across the continent ever heard the whistle announcing the end of the journey attained with greater gladness than the author, in penning the closing tribute to Major-General A. A. Humphreys, last commander of the glorious old Fighting

Third Corps, which never lost nor permitted any man or men to deprive it of its identity when combined with the Second Corps.

To this great soldier, eminent engineer, admirable chief of staff and unsurpassed general, in every command intrusted to him, he was indebted for invaluable assistance, and who actually corrected and annotated the original edition from which this was printed; likewise, for many courtesies, to Major-General E. D. Townsend, Adj.-Gen. U. S. A.; likewise to Major-Generals Mott and McAllister, U. S. V.; and likewise to Brevet Colonel W. H. Paine, "the Pathfinder" of the Army of the Potomac.

But to cite by name all who have lent him their aid would require too much space. Nevertheless, perhaps he cannot conclude better than by quoting the words of a letter from Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen. It was *his* regiment, the 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers, who held, and held triumphantly, the most dangerous point of the Union line, on the third day of Gettysburg, in front of the famous umbrella-shaped clump of trees on Cemetery Ridge. General Owen's flattering communication is among the precious rewards of the writer's trying and exhausting labors of seven years.

NEW YORK, March 22, 1872.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have read with much pleasure and derived much valuable information therefrom, the articles on the "Third Corps at Gettysburg," published in *The Volunteer*. I thank you for the loan of the two numbers, which I herewith return you.

I beg to express my sense of obligation as a volunteer soldier, to you personally, for your efforts to rescue from unmerited obscurity the names of such officers belonging to the volunteer service, as were distinguished for capacity and gallantry.

Without any desire to detract from the merits of any officer belonging to the regular army, or who had graduated at West Point Academy, I am constrained to believe that the volunteer officers were not treated with entire fairness or equal justice in the General Reports of the operations of the Army.

I am, with great respect,

Your Ob't Servant,  
(Signed,) JOSHUA T. OWEN.



## LA ROYALE!

The Last Twenty-Four Hours of the Army of Northern Virginia.

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### BAYING THE STAG OF TEN.

In my history of the Last Campaign, or Hunt of the Army of the Potomac, the narrative of the events and details was brought down (in "La Royale," Part VII.) to the afternoon of the 8th of April. The last article was set up for the *Citizen* of 30th March, 1872, but that weekly had already ceased to exist with its last issue of March 16th.

Under these circumstances, a paragraph is necessary to demonstrate the relative positions of the Union and Rebel forces on the afternoon of that day. The Army of Northern Virginia, in round numbers—including infantry, artillery and cavalry, also the special services—about 30,000 strong, was falling back, retreating, or flying, as the phrase pleases best or is most suitable, on the Richmond and Lynchburg Plank Road and Turnpike towards Appomattox Court House. It reached this point between after sundown of the 8th and some time before daybreak of the 9th, Gordon leading with the Rebel Second Corps; Longstreet with the main body and the rear, comprising his own, the First and the Third (A. P. Hill's) Corps. The latter, after Hill's death before Petersburg, had no corps-commander, but was combined (?) with Longstreet's.

Immediately on the heels of Field's Rebel Division, constituting the rearguard, followed Humphreys with the combined Second-Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, clinging to it, harassing it, skirmishing with it, deaf to all Lee's cajoleries to let up the pressure.

A few miles behind, closing up to the preceding, came the Sixth (Wright's) Corps.

Away to the southward, from ten or twelve or even more miles distant, the Fifth (formerly Warren's) Corps, Army of the Potomac, and the Twenty-fourth Corps, two divisions, and one division of the Twenty-fifth Corps—these last two belonging to the Army of the James—were marching westward in support of

Sheridan, who, with the cavalry cut loose was spurring towards the setting sun—at once the sinking orb of day, of the tempest-period of internecine war and of the “Slaveholders’ Rebellion”—to head off Lee at Appomattox Court House. Between the Fifth, the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Corps, and the Cavalry and the combined Second-Third and the Sixth Corps, flowed the Appomattox and its numerous affluents, destitute of bridges.

Thus Humphreys, with the combined Second-Third Corps, at this time about 12,000 effectives, was the Union general and troops pegging at Lee and “slambanging” into the Army of Northern Virginia, proper, as they alone had been—since Humphreys discovered the actual route of the Rebel retreat—on the 6th, 7th and 8th April.

Thus (8th April) the pursuit was kept up by the indefatigable Humphreys. At 5 P. M., 8th April, according to his dispatch to Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac (D. B. 5, 39, 23), he had learned from the country people, and from prisoners picked up, that the rear of the enemy’s infantry was about four miles ahead of him; their cavalry less. At this hour—5 P. M.—Wright informs Webb, that the head of his column—Sixth Corps—has reached Curdsville, about eight miles N. N. W. of Farmville, on the Plank Road. He was still seven miles from New Store where he encamped that night, which point (New Store) Humphreys had attained—still pushing on, however—in the course of the afternoon. At New Store the Rebel cavalry were again in sight of the combined Second-Third Corps, which was, indeed, “close upon them.” At 6.30 P. M. Humphreys’ First and Second Divisions (old Second) were two miles beyond the hamlet styled “New Store,” which is twelve (fifteen?) miles, if not more, from Cumberland Church—the scene of the Army of Northern Virginia’s last stricken field—by the route they had followed. Humphreys’ Third Division (old Third Corps) was about one-third of a mile in rear of his other two. His men had marched seventeen miles this day, but his advance had been retarded by the failure of his trains to keep up with his troops.

Humphreys was ordered to “push on to-night (8th, 5h. 45m. P. M.) so as to be in the presence of the enemy,” and be “up to him.” At 6.55 P. M. he was still “pushing on.” Although the men were somewhat exhausted by the want of their rations, Humphreys “moved forward with the First and Second Divisions (old Second) on the night of the 8th before their trains of rations got up. The Third Division’s (old Third) train got up on the evening of the 8th, and Humphreys left it at the ground where overtaken, to get its rations and follow on afterwards.”

Humphreys’ leading (First) division commander, Miles, had,

at this hour, just reported that the enemy were encamped on the first high ground in front of him, and Humphreys, as usual, on fire at the announcement, had ordered Miles to push forward his skirmishers and feel them, to try and find out from prisoners what force he actually had opposed to him. (Rossel, Renseignments, ¶2, 119.)

At this point it is necessary to correct an erroneous statement in a previous portion of Part VII. of this work, "LA ROYALE." The second communication from Lee to Grant (fourth sent and received) was not received through Humphreys until he had halted at dusk two miles west of (beyond) New Store.

At 8.35 P. M. General Meade, through Webb, ordered Humphreys to encamp. He "did not intend to require a night march." Meade then adds the highest commendation from a superior to an inferior: "You have done ALL, in getting up to the enemy."

At 9 P. M. (D. B. 5, 46, 27) Meade follows up the foregoing with the order:

"The Second [combined Second-Third] and Sixth Corps will move at 5 A. M. to-morrow and the Second [combined Second-Third] Corps will attack the enemy [now in its front] at once, the Sixth Corps supporting."

The relative positions of the headquarters on the night of the 8th-9th were as follows:

Lieutenant-General Grant and Meade on the Lynchburg Stage Road near Curdsville, about seven miles W. N. W. of Cumberland Church.

Wright (Sixth Corps) at New Store, seven miles further to the W. N. W., at the junction of the Lynchburg Plank Road and the Pike.

Humphreys (combined Second-Third Corps) about seven miles farther on W. at Rain's, on the now combined roads.

At dusk Humphreys was skirmishing with the Rebel rear-guard, but it would seem as if Lee's troops kept steadily on all night, leaving a small force to cover their movements. Gordon's corps, leading, had struck a better road about midday of the 8th and made rapid progress till dark (Captain [Confederate] J. C. Gorman, p. 27), when the head of the column had reached Appomattox Court House and the rear was within four miles. (Gorman is evidently all wrong here, for he says, just after it, that Gordon's corps was aroused and moved hurriedly at 2 o'clock A. M. of the 9th. When they reached Appomattox Court House they found their [Confederate] cavalry confronting Custer's cavalry.) These troops went into camp early in the evening; the bands of the divisions enlivened the departing hours of the day

with martial music and were applauded with the usual cheers of the troops. Before dark all had partaken of their food. This proves that the Rebels were not as destitute of food as has been represented, and the bands must have had considerable strength to play after such a march. In fact, the same authority, Captain Gorman, says, in his "Lee's Last Campaign," that in the vicinity of Farmville, on the morning of the 7th, the haversacks of many of the men were replenished for the first time since leaving Petersburg. It has been previously established by Humphreys, de Trobriand and others that the country between Jetersville and Appomattox Court House was by no means destitute, or even, to appearance, short of provisions. "The old spirit seemed to be returning." "We had begun to congratulate ourselves that the pursuit was over and felt sure that we would make the trip to Lynchburg, which was only twenty-four miles off."

BUT—"before we had completed our meal the rumbling of distant cannonading sounded warningly in front." \* \* \*  
 "The fact was, that the enemy's cavalry, in heavy force at Appomattox, had disputed our advance—had cut off a train of wagons and artillery."

This same cannonading to which the Confederate Captain Gorman alludes, had been heard at Humphreys' halting place in the early part of the night.

The distant "diapason of the cannonade" broke in sullenly upon the ears of the combined Second-Third Corps about dusk on the evening of the 8th. This cannonade was many miles away, perhaps nine or even more miles off to the southwest and was the bellowing of Sheridan's horse-batteries, engaging with the thirty Rebel guns and upwards, covering the desperate effort to break through "the Circle of the Hunt," making, and about to be made, in greater force, by the Rebel General Walker, with the leading divisions or brigades of Gordon's command.

Thus the Union and Rebel troops were sinking down into their bivouacs or seeking their camping grounds to the portentous echoes of those "fire-throats," whose hoarse roar and duller echoes were for the last time reverberating amid the Blue Hills of ancient Virginia and breaking the early slumbers of the rebellious but now completely conquered dwellers in the Old Dominion.

\* \* \* \* \*

As some changes took place during the night, it is of interest to every reader to learn the relative positions of the Rebel and Union forces on the morning of the 9th. As is well known, Sheridan's cavalry had struck the enemy on the evening of the 8th, at Appomattox Station and captured four large trains of cars

and a number of wagons and twenty-four guns. The reader will do well to compare Colonel Newshall's (Union) "With General Sheridan," and Captain J. C. Gorman's "Lee's Last Campaign" as to incidents; also Gen. H. Edwin Tremain's War-Memoranda, Chapter II,—original XII.

Custer reports that the last train was guarded by about two divisions of Rebel infantry, with over thirty pieces of artillery, all under command of Major-General Walker, of the Third Division of Gordon's [Rebel Second) Corps. The main attack occurred about 9 P. M. The fighting was not over until between 9 and 10 P. M., when the Rebels fell back rapidly upon Appomattox Court House. The Union cavalry bivouacked for the night, in close vicinity to this centre, where daylight of the 9th found them ready and eager for the work of the *SUMMA DIES*—"the day of decision" for Rebeldom.

The Fifth Corps, following the Twenty-fourth Corps, bivouacked about 2 A. M. of the 9th, within two miles of Appomattox Court House. It moved again at 4 A. M. and about 6 A. M. reached General Sheridan's headquarters nearer the Court House and manœuvred into position so as to support the cavalry who soon needed this backing. (Compare Extracts from the Infantry and Cavalry Reports in the *Citizen*, of the 16th and 23d Dec., 1871.)

The two corps, or portions of the one, the Twenty-fourth, and a division of the Second, Twenty-fifth, composing the Army of the James, after having been, as reported, on the march from daylight of the 8th, till 10 A. M. on the 9th April, except three hours, were deployed across the outlet, through which Gordon, with Lee's advance, was making his desperate attempt to escape, and were "barely in time." Ord intimates that Gordon would have succeeded, "in spite of Sheridan's attempt to hold him,"—"our cavalry were falling back in confusion before Lee's infantry,"—had not our "Blue Coats" developed their lines behind our horsemen. This was to the south and southwest of Appomattox Court House, or Clover Hill, although the writer has seen the latter designation given to an eminence in close vicinity to the left flank of Humphreys' front. Cavalry Devin would seem to indicate still another position for Clover Hill. (Bates, History of Pennsylvania, Vol II., 706.) (See his Report, V., *Citizen*, 23d Dec., 1871.)

(This "*blending*," or "masking" of artillery and infantry with cavalry is by no means novel. It is impossible to fix any date when artillery, sufficiently light to accompany the movements of cavalry, was brought into the field, but a French work, "*Curiosités Militaires*," pp. 170-172, says that the novel and



prompt manner of employing artillery *masked* by cavalry was the idea of Charles Brise, a Norman naval artillerist, and it was utilized by Henry IV., in 1589, in one of the engagements near Arques. The "Journal of the Military Service Institution," for September, 1885, states that the introduction of Horse Artillery, in the French service, was due to Lafayette after a visit to Prussia; but it has been asserted that his first suggestions and efforts in this direction were made after his return from service under Washington, and I have seen a picture which leads me to believe that the supposition of his getting the idea in America is correct. What is more, the Spaniards, during the Dutch War for Independence, were accustomed to mask the presence of artillery by *blindages* of the other arms, and I have seen an account of cavalry drawn aside, exactly as at Appomattox Court House, to reveal the startling and decisive presence of infantry. The fact is, such a manœuvre has been practised again and again, with the same satisfactory and startling results, on a variety of occasions.)

Meanwhile the mass of Lee's army, under Longstreet, was entrenched across the Lynchburg Plank Road and Pike, about three to four miles N. W. of Appomattox Court House. Their left, fronting east, was in some woods which fed the head waters of Devil's Creek, their right on Wolf's Creek. Their centre was for a short space at New Hope Church. This, if significant, was but very short-lived, as much so as their stand there. It was afterwards within Humphreys' lines.

Colonel Paine says "Wolf Creek Church or New Hope Church," a curious association of names, unless the New Hope came in after the wolves were cleared out.

Longstreet's or Lee's headquarters was in a house at a locality known as Pleasant Retreat, certainly the least indicative of the actual condition of Rebel affairs which well could be imagined.

According to Col. M. W. Burns, 73d N. Y. V., Longstreet's own headquarters were in the first small house on the combined plank road and pike inside the Rebel lines, designated Pleasant Retreat.

According to a letter from an officer of high rank and the clearest observation, the troops in front of Humphreys were as follows: "On the Confederate right of the road, came first Heth's division, then Wilcox's, then Mahone's. (Heth's First, Second and Third Divisions—all Third, Rebel, Corps.) On the Confederate left of the road, came first Pickett's remnant (800), then Field's division, then Humphreys' (of Mississippi) division, (formerly Kershaw's). L. I., 3.

At 9 A. M. April 9th, Humphreys informed Meade that the

head of his column had gone into camp at midnight. At 11 A. M. he reported that the head of his Third Division (Old Third) had not been able to reach the halting place till 4 A. M. of the same morning. As the train with two days' rations followed this division, the delay in their distribution must have retarded forward movements till 8 A. M.; likewise the fact of Humphreys' "push-forward" during the night, from the camp which Meade, 8.35 P. M. 8th (D. B. 5, 46, 27), had ordered him to occupy, but from which he advanced at 8 P. M. 8th (D. B. 5, 51, 30.) About 6 A. M. of the 9th the supply train was up and rations were at once distributed (7, 4, 72), so that when Humphreys did move on again, he writes: "My men are marching finely, the effect of the rations." This shows that our men, as well as the rebels, were fatigued, indeed, almost fagged out and faint, from want of food. One of the officers on this pursuit said he did not eat for forty-eight hours.

Humphreys was pressing Field's division, *which had resumed its last march in retreat at midnight of the 8th.* (This is taken from information I (Humphreys) obtained and sent in a dispatch to Meade—but it is in conflict with what Gorman says.) It will be remembered that Fields commanded a division, four or five thousand strong, to the very last. It was the Second of the Rebel First (Longstreet's) Corps.

How could this be if Gorman is right: "Gordon's Corps was aroused at 2 o'clock, morning of the 9th," &c., &c.

Immediately in front, that is, leading Fields, were Wilcox's (Second) and Heth's (First) divisions of the Rebel Third (prior April 3d, A. P. Hill's) Corps; Mahone with the Third Division of the same corps was in front of these two corps and already entrenching in the last defensive position occupied by the Army of Northern Virginia.

Besides the troops thus indicated, Longstreet had with him the remnant of Pickett's Division and the remains of Kershaw's (or Mississippi Humphreys') Third Division of Longstreet's own Rebel First Corps.

The nearest Union troops to Lee's main force, at this time, were undoubtedly those of Humphreys. The Sixth, following the combined Second-Third Corps, was not in close support, till near noon of the 9th. This is shown by Webb's dispatch, 10.30 A. M., in which he tells Humphreys, "General Wright is ordered to pass your train and to push up."

Readers may have supposed that in the presentation of this history, incidents have been invested with rose-colored tints to render A. A. Humphreys' conduct more conspicuous. So far from this being the case, the narrative is a sober statement of

clear facts: "You will see in my report (A. A. H.) that when on the 6th April I discovered Lee in retreat and had opened artillery on him, and had directed a brigade of Mott's to feel him, I reported what I had seen and done to General Meade, and then made all the dispositions to cross the whole corps at Amelia Springs to attack Lee, so that when the direction from Meade came, I was ready, and moved at once across the [Flat] creek. From that time forward, until late on the 8th April, my movements and operations were directed solely by myself, as it was proper they should be." It has been shown that Grant and Lee's correspondence on the 7th and 8th passed through Humphreys' lines, under the escort of his staff officers. It will now be seen that this continued to be the case on the 9th, until Grant, by a detour, had left the direct route followed by Humphreys, and had passed around to the vicinity of Appomattox Court House, which, about midday on the 9th, was on neutral ground, between the picket lines, when the flags of truce were passing.

This is not intended to detract in the least from General Sheridan's activity, but neither he nor his troopers were in direct contact with the Army of Northern Virginia *proper*, after the fights of the evening of the 6th, with the exception of Crook's repulse on the 7th, until the evening of the 8th and the morning of the 9th, and then only with Lee's advance under Gordon (comprising the divisions in whole or in part of Early's old Army of the Shenandoah); Humphreys still confronting Lee's main force under Longstreet.

In the *Citizen*, March 23d, 1872, the first four notes of the 7th and 8th April were presented, with the circumstances of their transmittal and delivery.

When Grant wrote his third communication to Lee (Note 5) (Reb. Rec. XI., 357) he was at his camp for the night of the 8th-9th at Curdsville, rather nearer New Store than Cumberland Church, and two-thirds of the way from Farmville to New Store. This communication was brought to Major-General Humphreys while on the march on the morning of the 9th. The bearer of it was Major Chas. E. Pease, A. A. G., Headquarters Army of the Potomac. He it was (A. A. H., 6, 9, '71) who took General Lee's letter (Note 6) to General Grant, after it had been brought in by Colonel Whittier to Humphreys, on the march, between 10 and 11 A. M. (9th), as is narrated by that officer in his own letter, yet to be quoted at length. Whittier delivered Note 6 to General Meade, and Meade sent it by Major Pease to General Grant, overtaking the latter about five miles from Appomattox Court House [11.50 A. M. (Cannon, 446). Midway between Ker's

Church and Appomattox Court House (Greeley, ii. 744)]. General Grant at once opened and read the letter, and his reply thereto is Note 7.

The same staff officer of Lee, who was the bearer of Note 6, subsequently brought two successive messages from Lee to Humphreys, urging the latter to halt his troops and not press on the Confederate forces—messages which Humphreys, with whom war meant fighting, rejected and paid no heed to, just as a good soldier should always do and should have done.

Lee was “on the picket line” in front of Humphreys when he received Grant’s third note (5), and while he wrote his third communication (Note 6) on the morning of the 9th April. The circumstances attending its delivery are narrated at length by Col. C. A. Whittier—(in April, 1865, A. A. G. on the staff of Maj.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys, commanding the combined Second-Third Corps)—as will appear from the following extracts from his letter, dated Boston, 8th August, 1871.

[Colonel Whittier belongs to Boston, went out in the 20th Massachusetts Volunteers—“the crack regiment” from that State; in the summer of 1862 became an aide to Sedgwick, then commanding the Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the Potomac; remained with the general until he was killed, going with him as Major A. D. C. when Sedgwick was assigned to the command of the Sixth Corps, in the winter of 1862–63. From this (Sixth) corps he came to Humphreys, in the winter of 1864–65, and remained with him to the last. (A. A. H. 30, 3, 72)].

“On the next morning, the 8th April, General Williams rode up, and, as he was going out on our front with a flag of truce, I accompanied him, each of us having an orderly. We were fired upon and General Williams’ orderly (behind us) was shot in the leg; the letter was delivered to one of Fitzhugh Lee’s staff officers, General Williams saying that these letters or this communication was in no way to interfere with the operations then being conducted. At noon of the same day (the 8th) it was announced to us that the enemy was showing a flag of truce. I was sent by you (A. A. H.) to meet it. I met one of Fitzhugh Lee’s staff, whose inquiry was whether the flag, before sent, was to affect, in any way, impending operations. As I had already heard this thing provided for by General Williams, I answered, without communicating with higher authorities, in the negative. (It was at this time I sent a regiment to protect our trains of supplies coming up in the rear [12½ p. m., 8, 4, 65], A. A. H.)

“The same night (as I remember, though I can’t at all remember any letter from the enemy being brought in—we were bivouacking at the time in woods just at dusk and the men

eating and resting) I was sent by you to General Meade's headquarters—a ride of two or three hours—and delivered a note to General Meade and waited for him to go to General Grant. I started back to you about midnight with no answer, I think. The corps had moved. I overtook you about daylight \* \* \* \* You took a nap, from which I was awakened by you \* \* \* You said that as I had gone out with the other flags, you would like me to take this one, unless I was too much fatigued—(this letter must have been Note 5). I started out and at last I met a person (chief of General Lee's couriers, so he said), who asked me if I had a letter for General Lee. 'Yes,' I replied. 'I will take it,' said he. 'Pardon,' said I, 'but I must deliver it to a commissioned officer.' 'We will meet one if we ride on a short distance.'

"We soon met Colonel Marshall, of General Lee's staff, who took the letter and asked me to ride up the road with him. We soon met General Lee, who read the note brought by me and commenced dictating (to Colonel Marshall) an answer.

"Heavy firing in the direction of Appomattox was then heard and a Confederate officer (with but one arm) of fine appearance, well mounted, &c., rode rapidly towards us; after speaking with General Lee, the latter, apparently, hurriedly finished his letter (Note 6, I suppose), which was handed to me by Colonel Marshall, who said, 'Please say to General Grant, that General Lee came here expecting to meet him—that he (General Lee) understood that all movements were to be suspended—that he is just informed that a heavy engagement is taking place at Appomattox and he would like to know when and where he can meet General Grant!'

"I at once reported back to you, thence to General Meade. General Grant had gone across country to Appomattox Court House. I returned to you. Later—at about noon—General Meade sent a note (which I think only stated that General Grant had gone to Appomattox Court House); this I started with and soon came in sight of the enemy in their last ditch—the pickets saw me—my flag was a large one. They fired upon me—(*en passant*, I'd like here to make this claim—that the last hostile bullet fired by the Army of Northern Virginia was at me.) (Combined Second-Third Corps.) I dismounted; being told after a short interval to advance, I met an officer who called himself Lieutenant Lamar of Georgia, or Alabama; to my indignant protest at being fired on (stating that General Williams' orderly had been wounded on the preceding day), Lieutenant Lamar replied, '*I have no instructions not to fire upon flags of truce.*' —! methought, but said nothing.



"Our line was then formed for an advance upon the enemy in position, and in five minutes, at least, a conflict would have commenced. \* \* General Meade joined us at about this time and a suspension of hostilities for an hour, either through his or some one else's agency, was ordered. At the expiration of the hour, an advance was directed, and, as we were in close proximity to the enemy's line, we were met by Forsyth of General Sheridan's, Marshall of General Lee's staff and one or two others, who announced an extension of the truce."

LE HALALI ! HABET !

The reader will perceive from the wording of Note 6 [(the third from Lee in response to the third from Grant), (Tenney, 696, 2)], that Lee must have been "on the (Rebel) picket line," which our Humphreys' moving or "all alive, oh!" skirmish line was pressing or feeling-to all the time. He was there on the morning of the 9th of April, asking for and awaiting an interview with General Grant, to ascertain definitely the terms of surrender offered by our Lieutenant-General. This was between 10 and 11 o'clock A. M. Lee remained there, close to the officer of his staff, by whom he sent urgent requests to Humphreys for the latter to halt; this was as late an hour as 11 o'clock A. M. This is all-sufficient evidence that, while Sheridan and Ord were discussing matters, preliminary to a truce, with the Rebel Lieutenant-General Longstreet and Major-General Gordon, as related by "A Staff Officer" in "With General Sheridan," Major-General Humphreys was in direct communication with General Lee.

Lieutenant-General Grant, however, after writing his first letter (Note 5) to Lee, on the morning of the 9th, had ridden across by Walker's Church towards Appomattox Court House. Before reaching the Court House, and while yet five or six miles from it, the messenger sent by Humphreys, Major Pease, overtook him with Lee's letter (Note 6), which was written immediately in Humphreys' front.

As a "Staff Officer" inserts a copy of the same letter (Note 6), originally sent to Grant by Major Pease, and states that General Longstreet was at Appomattox Court House about the hour mentioned, and that he (Longstreet) bore a dispatch from Lee to Grant, this dispatch must have been a duplicate of the communication (Note 6) sent first to Humphreys, and by him sent to his rear by Major Pease, and thence to Lieutenant-General Grant. This must be the letter referred to in the dispatch of Major-General Meade of 10 A. M., 9th April, in which he mentions an answer from himself to Lee, recapitulating Grant's terms, and advises an interview with the Rebel general. Meade was at

this time on Humphreys' route, and his language not only confirms Humphreys' claim, but seems to clear up the matter beyond a doubt.

All this time Lee was in Humphreys' front, repeatedly urging the halting of the latter's troops, to which Humphreys did not feel authorized to accede.

About a mile beyond the last flag of truce, and about fifteen or twenty minutes after Humphreys had ordered Lee's staff officer out of his way, and just as Humphreys was about opening fire upon Lee, General Meade came up, and, having received a communication from Lee, assented to a truce.

Meade's communication to Lee (dated Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 9th April, 1865), is the first mention of his knowledge of any cessation of hostilities between Ord and any portion of Lee's command. As Meade was on Humphreys' front it is important to note the time, 12 M., and the information of Ord's truce with Longstreet was brought to Meade by General Forsyth, of Sheridan's staff, and was undoubtedly received by Meade within half an hour after it was granted by Ord and Sheridan.

This may all seem unimportant, but it establishes several facts. First, where Lee was while Ord, Sheridan, Longstreet and Gordon were treating—*i. e.* in front of Humphreys. Second, that Grant had not yet reached Appomattox Court House to receive, there, the last letter of Lee (Note 6) which passed through Humphreys—that is, the last letter of Lee before Grant and Lee were communicating with each other directly, at first with the lips (Notes 8 and 9) and then with the pen—at the Court House, at which time the retreat and pursuit, the attack and defense, the fighting was all over. To make it perfectly clear, Notes 8 and 9 *followed* the personal interview between Grant and Lee, and *simply put on record* what had been agreed upon. Grant's own report establishes this curious fact. Third, that while hostilities were still ablaze, so to speak, all communications between Grant and Lee passed through Humphreys, because Humphreys with the combined Second-Third Corps was the nearest to Lee all the time and the most persistently pressing him.

Note 6, as several times stated, was the last which passed between Grant and Lee through Humphreys. The next (Note 7) is not to be found in all the histories of the war, but is given by Tenney, 696 (2). It undoubtedly passed through Sheridan's lines, as has always been admitted in these articles.

Col. Newhall, in his "With General Sheridan, &c.," must refer to this note (No. 7) at page 216, confounding it with Note 6, which was delivered at 11.30, when the subordinate Union and Rebel generals were already in conference at Appomattox Court House.

Grant was at the time, as stated therein, four miles W. of Walker's Church, that is, still six to eight miles, by the road, east of Appomattox Court House. This was some time before Note 8 from Grant to Lee, and Note 9, in response, were written. Grant says, in his own report (Reb. Rec., XI. 357), "The interview (between Grant and Lee) was held at Appomattox Court House, the *result* of which is set forth in the following correspondence" (Notes 8 and 9). [The capitulation was signed 3.30 p. m. (A. and N. J., 11, 545—2.)]

Grant and Lee, however, *had not yet met*. A cavalry officer, ("A Volunteer Cavalryman") mentioned that he had heard at the time, that Lee's last note passed through Whittaker of Custer's staff, a name which might have easily been confounded with that of Whittier, Humphreys' staff officer.

It would be very interesting and in some respects profitable to get Lee's own account of his whereabouts at different hours—a time-table of his movements—during this 9th of April and the five, particularly the three—6th, 7th and 8th April—preceding days.

Lieutenant-General Grant, when he wrote his fourth communication (No. 7), at 11.50 A. M. of the 9th—to impress the fact—was four miles west of Walker's Church and still about eight or ten miles east of Appomattox Court House. This Walker's Church is on a road running south from New Store—near which place Humphreys received Note 4 from Lee to Grant—through Planterstown by Cut Banks Ford (mentioned in his report by cavalry General Devin, *Citizen*, 23, 12, 71), to the south of the Appomattox, and stands near the junction of this road with another east and west, about the same course as that river, eventually leading to Appomattox Court House. These roads Grant took on the morning of the 9th.

To close up the whole matter of the correspondence, so as not to have to refer to it again, two last communications (Nos. 8, from Grant to Lee, and 9, from Lee in return) can scarcely be considered as written pending hostilities. They were written *after* Grant and Lee's personal interview. Grant's last (No. 8) is headed "Appomattox Court House" (no hour); but at 12 M. Meade, in a note to Lee, mentions that he had sanctioned a cessation of hostilities that had been agreed on between Ord and Lee's command, which suspension Meade extended for two hours, *i. e.* to 2 P. M. Lee's fourth and last note (Note 9) is headed: "Headquarters Army Northern Virginia." Lee was then at or near Appomattox Court House, and it is supposed that his headquarters were wherever he was. Undoubtedly, judging from concurrent circumstances, the last two notes of Grant and Lee

(5th of Grant, 4th of Lee) were written at the same place. According to the *Army and Navy Journal*, II. 545 [2], "Lee's Letter of Acceptance [Note 9?] was signed in the farm-house at Appomattox Court House, which will always be memorable as the place of surrender."

Having thus disposed of this matter, which is of more importance in its bearing than in itself, in establishing beyond question who was unceasingly nearest the enemy—*i. e.* Humphreys—the reader must now revert back to the antagonistic positions of Humphreys and Lee at the latter's "Pleasant Retreat." It has been so much the fashion to underestimate the number of troops at Lee's disposal on the morning of the 9th and depreciate their physical condition that a very false impression has been created, and would be perpetuated were no voice or pen uplifted in defence of the truth. That this underestimation and depreciation should be done by Rebel writers to lessen the humiliation of the catastrophe, is excusable, and would be almost commendable could the perversion of history be pardoned for any cause.

That, however, Northern writers, calling themselves Union, should minister to this delusion, is a sort of treason to the brave army which compelled the catastrophe.

While writing and running back through the past, how many cases occur where a defeated army abandoned or destroyed its arms, and an army about to capitulate concealed all that could prove trophies to the conquerors? European armies, the French especially, consider this course as commendable, as well as justifiable. After Aughrim, which decided the fate of Ireland, in 1691, the Irish army, which had fought with distinguished pertinacity and valor up to a certain moment, threw away their firelocks in such numbers that Ginkel, the victor, lowered the price of each musket turned in, to twopence. After Woerth, the French tore off and cast aside everything that impeded retreat. Moreover, it is considered the acme of Bazaine's disgrace that he surrendered all his material intact, to the minutest article.

Some of Napoleon's greatest successes were founded on deceptions. Among the notable, remark the stratagem by which Lannes and Murat and Belliard obtained possession of the Thabor bridge across the Danube, 13th November, 1805. The Russians are accused of a similar ruse to escape pursuit prior to, and towards, Austerlitz, which occasioned Napoleon's remark that, "if the Russian varnish is simply scratched off, the original Tartar will be found underneath." Even the upright (*Lebrecht*) Blucher is averred to have resorted to such "a very questionable military stratagem to secure his escape," after Jena, 1806, although this is another French story.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is no criterion to judge of how many men under arms confronted Humphreys on the morning of the 9th, to cite those who actually stacked arms when the surrender became a fact. In an European army the number of *men in uniform* would have formed a sure basis for calculating the magnitude of the force capitulating. But what was to determine this fact in an army whose costume realized the expression "un-uniformed troops?" This idea recalls Macaulay's remark that, when the Irish troops opposed to William's had laid aside their firelocks, there was no means of distinguishing between the pitiless combatant of one moment and the peaceful countryman of the next.

Histories range, as to the numbers surrendered by Lee, from 26,000 to over 28,000; Lossing figures out 26,000; Draper (who wrote under the best of auspices) states 27,805; Harper's History, generally very accurate, agrees with the preceding; Cannon (British) says 28,078 paroled, of whom 22,000 showed upon the 12th, the day of receiving certificates. The report of the Secretary of War sets down the number paroled at 27,805. Colonel Fletcher (British) reads 8,000 armed men and 18,000 too weak to carry their muskets. Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, in this case one of the most competent of critics, discussing the surrender, asked, most pertinently, how it was possible to recognize a soldier, with no distinctive uniform, in a man whose only designative tokens of a soldier were in his arms and accoutrements, which he had thrown away on purpose; most likely in the hope of avoiding the responsibilities which their possession entailed.

One of the most observant of our major-generals and experienced division commanders, *who kept notes*, in discussing the matter, stated that he believed, if the truth could be discovered, that Lee had between 30,000 and 40,000 men of all sorts and descriptions with him at Appomattox Court House, but that, as soon as the surrender became a fixed fact, a large number "put for home," without standing on any of the ceremonies either of war or propriety.

The following examination will expose the fallacy hitherto received as fact:

In front of Humphreys, Mahone had just about 4,000 in A 1 fighting condition and more than this number is claimed for Fields. With them were three other divisions. Is it possible—is it reasonable—that even half of these were unarmed? Besides these, Pickett's remnant. This accounts for many more than are stated to have stacked arms: men *occupying entrenched lines*, resisting and determined to resist. This will be shown by the testimony of three competent witnesses.



Humphreys saw these entrenchments. In a letter (6, 9, 71) he says that Major Pease [already referred to, who took Lee's letter (Note 6) through Humphreys to Grant and accompanied General Grant to Appomattox Court House], in returning to General Meade's headquarters [just after the surrender], passed through the enemy's lines. Their line, fronting Sheridan and Ord, he is understood to have reported, was not entrenched. "That facing the combined Second-Third Corps was entrenched fully breast-high, and had an abattis of felled trees in front. An opening had to be cut to enable him [Major Pease] to pass."

Col. M. W. Burns (73d N. Y. V.) went into Longstreet's lines about the time of the surrender. He is very explicit as to what he saw. Some of the Rebel troops in front of Humphreys belonged to their Third, formerly A. P. Hill's Corps, and he thought that portions of their First [Longstreet's] Corps were also on the same front, because Longstreet's headquarters were in the first small house bisecting the opposing positions—Pleasant Retreat, as before stated—inside of the Rebel lines. He was not able to furnish any data as to brigades and divisions, but was of opinion that one division in Humphreys' front was commanded by General Mahone. This is well known to have been the case. He judged, from what he could see, that there were about 10,000 men who had stacked arms along the road. They were entrenched, as far as he could discern, on each side of this road. They were about ten minutes walk from Humphreys' headquarters.

Colonel Fletcher [(British) III., iii., 212-219] who mainly (?) derived his information from Confederate sources, implies that the reason why Lee gave up at last was because Gordon announced "that he was being driven back." "He [Lee] perceived that Longstreet with difficulty held his ground against the force accumulating in his front"—Humphreys' combined Second-Third and Wright's Sixth Corps. This corroborates Burns as to where Longstreet was.

Now for Colonel Paine. In his diary, jotted down on the spot, he says:

"Being near the enemy's pickets, I noticed they were gathering in knots, and seeing a negro come through their lines and towards us, I hailed him and asked him how he came to be allowed to come through. He said that they were not agoing to let him through, but he told them that 'Lee had done gone surrendered,' and 'they began to talk to each other and he came on and left them, and some throwed down their arms and went away,' he thought.

"I returned to ride up through the gap and by the squad of perplexed pickets, and on into their lines, where I found consider-

able confusion, enough to cover my movements. I let my horse walk, but did not stop, and, although spoken to, was not halted. I carefully noted the courses and distances in my memory, counting my horse's paces, and glancing at a small compass, passed along their lines of earthworks.

"Took a circuitous route back and through the same gap in the picket line, returned, and hastily sketched my work, so that I could designate positions that would enfilade their lines with artillery."

Right immediately within lines which Paine inspected, as he told the writer [7, 8, 71], *i. e.* within the earthworks in front of Humphreys—the Confederate troops were in good normal condition. Outside (*i. e.* beyond) these lines, back and around, many troops were in a broken-up condition, which showed that while some organizations were in good order, others were comparatively demoralized.

Col. Paine said (21, 8, 71), "Holding intrenchments in Humphreys' front and vicinity were more than 8,000 men seen by me, and I am a pretty good judge of numbers; and yet I did not examine this line to any considerable distance, as it was in timber. I was on Humphreys' front on the day of Lee's surrender."

Colonel Whittier, in his letter previously quoted (Boston, 8th Aug. 1871), is even more pointed than Burns or Paine. He says:

"Immediately after the surrender, in company with Colonel Bache, of General Meade's staff, I rode into the enemy's line. I remember Field's Division; can't call to mind the commanders of any others—the force was strong for the extent of the line; a breastwork of medium strength at the front for the pickets and two lines of stronger works in the rear—there being a continuous slight acclivity from their front to rear work.

"I thought at the time this position a pretty strong one against any front attack—it probably could have been easily turned—and they seemed to have troops at *that particular point* to impede us for a while." \* \* \*

What "particular point?" "Yes, at the point where they could be turned (A. A. H) there were Rebel troops (*en potence*) posted there to prevent their right from being flanked or taken in reverse."

Opposed to Sheridan were Gordon's troops, actually fighting till the last minute. Of these, Devin speaks as "the enemy advancing in two heavy lines of battle." Crook reports first a "very heavy line;" again, "a strong attack on my front and flanks with a large force of infantry, while their cavalry attacked my rear;" again, "overwhelming numbers." Custer mentions "two divi-

sions of infantry, in addition to over thirty pieces of artillery." Merritt corroborates Crook with the same words, "overwhelming numbers."

These are Union accounts. Cooke, the Southern historian and biographer of Lee, says, Gordon's "own force, less than 5,000 muskets," which certainly must mean between 4,000 and 5,000.

Add these to the force in front of Humphreys, and we have double the number of those said to have surrendered in arms.

This aggregate, however, is not yet complete. Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser, with the Rebel cavalry, made their escape to the mountains (Fletcher, III., 518-19). Also, according to the author of "Pickett's Men" (172-3, 175), a battalion and battery of Pickett's Division got off to Lynchburg. Undoubtedly many others of all arms made their escape secretly when it was found that Lee was actually treating for a definite surrender. This they might have done without detection through the gap to the northward, which was unwatched by Grant's troops.

The writer can never be brought to believe that Lee had less than 25,000 veterans—infantry, cavalry and artillery—men tried and true, ready to execute his will down to the very minute when he signed the act of surrender—besides those who got off or stole off and very numerous stragglers.

And this is the estimate of men who fought it out to the last against the Army of Northern Virginia, generals who kept the run of every day's occurrences, men who never misrepresented, whose statements, however disputed at the time, have been borne out by after-investigations and admissions.

Take the example of Humphreys' fight on the 5th February. His rough estimate of the force opposed to him, and its composition, was completely verified by Gordon's own admissions to Major-General McAllister; and yet subordinate Rebel officers claimed that Humphreys only fought brigades, where Gordon conceded divisions, with every chance in their favor. (Major-General McAllister's Statement, *Citizen*, 16, 9, 71.)

## LA MORT! THE VALLEY OF JESREEL!

"I am watching for the morning;  
The night is long and dreary.  
I have waited for the dawning  
Till I am sad and weary."

"An end is come, the end is come; it watcheth for thee; behold it is come. The morning is come unto thee." \* \* \* EZEKIEL vii. 6, 7.

"And the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the war desolations are determined."—DANIEL ix. 26.

In consequence of the difficulty of bringing forward the train with rations, it was eight o'clock, 9th April, 1865, before the combined Second-Third Corps resumed its advance. In fact, the troops had been in movement pretty much the whole night, striving to gain ground in spite of hindrances. Humphreys actually advanced five miles during the thick night, hoping to come up with the enemy; but finding his men falling out rapidly through fasting and fatigue, he was compelled to halt his First and Second Divisions about midnight. His Third, followed by the supply train, did not begin to arrive until about 4 A. M. (The [Third] Division was not up until 4 A. M., probably, and the supply train some considerable time later, perhaps 6 o'clock, or even later before it was *all* up.—A. A. H.) As soon as the rations could be issued the troops moved forward again with alacrity.

It is broad daylight by 5 A. M. at this time of the year, when the weather is clear, as the writer well knows, as he has often seen the morning break after a night spent in work upon this pamphlet. Colonel Paine notes in his diary that it was a "beautiful, fine, pleasant Sabbath morning." Richardson (483) says it "was damp and foggy." This involves no contradiction, for there is often fog on the bottom-lands, when it is perfectly clear upon the ridges. \* \* \* As at Thrasimene!

All at once, three or four miles away to the front, a vigorous cannonade and interchanges of musketry, sounding to the experienced ear like a pin drawn sharply across the teeth of a comb, only a thousand times louder, in thunder-crashes, nigh at hand, and duller and more ominous when heard at a distance. Hearing this, every one shouted, "Sheridan is there! bully for Sheridan!" As related in a previous chapter, the combined Second-Third Corps had sunk down in their first bivouacs (8th-9th) to the rough music of the same horse-batteries. So they shouted with knowledge. It was the last convulsion of the Rebel Army in its death throes! its condition, what a contrast to the season, day, and weather, and the awakening Sabbath!

At 9 A. M. Humphreys notifies Webb: "The head of my column is now about ( $1\frac{1}{2}$ ) one and a half miles from the halting-place (during the night) and near to the rear of the enemy, according to the report of a negro who came from Lynchburg yesterday morning (Saturday, 8th April). Our troops were then three miles from Lynchburg. He passed through Appomattox Court House about sunset. The fighting there was then going on. It was resumed this morning and is still continuing. About daylight he passed the last of the enemy, and then lay in the woods some time, coming in to us when he thought it was safe. He was told as he passed through Lee's army that the troops would move again about midnight (8th-9th April). We are about (10) ten miles from Appomattox Court House."

Few questions caused greater trouble than the discovery of what Union troops this negro could have referred to. No applications to headquarters furnished any satisfactory clue; but on turning to the *Army and Navy Journal*, of the 22d April, 1865, it appears from Major-General Stoneman's report that it was a portion of his command. "Major Wagner, after striking the railroad at Big Lick, pushed on toward Lynchburg, destroying on his way the important bridges over the Big and Little Otter, and got to within four miles of Lynchburg." This is confirmed by Major-General Cullum in his "Biographical Register," II. 162, §§1304, wherein he states that Stoneman was engaged in the "Destruction of the Lynchburg and Bristol Railroad, April 3-7, 1865" (compare the "Last Ninety Days of the War," p. 197). This exactly corroborates the statement which the negro fugitive made to Humphreys.

At 11 A. M. the combined Second-Third Corps came up with the enemy's skirmishers, in front of the entrenched position, hereinbefore described. Up to this hour, if not an hour later, Lee had been in command in Humphreys' front. When news came to him that Gordon's attempt had failed, Lee mounted his horse and started for the rear, saying, "General Longstreet, I leave you in charge; I am going to hold a conference with General Grant." (Richardson, 483.)


Finding the Rebels in force, in defensible positions, and strongly entrenched, Humphreys made immediate dispositions for a fight, if fight there was to be. They were as follows: Humphreys' right, his First (Miles') Division (old Second Corps), was *à cheval* (or astraddle) the Plank and Turnpike Road, with one brigade in line to the right or north of it, and one to the left or south of it, while the other brigade was in column to the north of the road, supporting Miles' right. The Second (Barlow's) Division (old Second Corps) on the left, was disposed in



the same manner, having two brigades deployed in the front line and a third in reserve opposite the centre and the interval between them. His Third (de Trobriand's) Division (old Third Corps) also presented two brigades deployed in the front line, and one in support to the rear of the centre interval of the first line of battle of the corps.

Accordingly (says de Trobriand, II., 481) our division was massed to the right and left of the road. Half an hour afterwards the troops were notified that the truce had been prolonged up till 2 P. M. As the watch hands pointed to the hour of two the Old Third commenced to move forward again, but the First Brigade, wearing the Red Diamond Badge, or "patch," had not advanced a hundred yards when a new order directed it to halt. Before the Union troops stretched a thin curtain of wood. Beyond this an open space alone separated the "blue coats" from the "gray-backs" whose pickets remained perfectly quiet. This locality is known on the map which the writer has examined as Clover Hill. On pointing this out to Colonel Paine, he stated (21, 8, 71) that this name is applied to a cleared elevation to the left (*i. e. S.*) of Humphreys' front and somewhat in advance, *i. e. W.* of it—*i. e. S. W.* of Humphreys' left. Scarcely two maps agree as to the position of "Clover Hill," and the Secretary of War's map makes Appomattox Court House and Clover Hill synonymous. (See Bates' History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, ii., 706.)

If the map first cited and Brevet Col. W. H. Paine are correct, there is a curious significance in this. The official badge of the combined Second-Third Corps was a Trefoil, or Three-leaved Clover; and now it was the badge of a commander whom the Third Corps honors as honest, impartial, true; in every sense one of themselves. That which some of them might deny to his next two predecessors—to the first from one motive, to the second from another—all would willingly concede to Humphreys. There are many other curious unions of the two symbols, the Diamond of the Third and the Trefoil of the Second Corps. Napier, in his "History of Florence," alludes to one, and another might be cited. When the Medici, especially Giuliano, the real *Peuseroso* of Michael Angelo, formed two companies of youths to associate these Florence youths in friendly [manly] games and exercises, he joined those wearing the badge "*il Diamante*" (the Diamond) and "*il Broncone*" (the Branch, or Trefoil). The last array in arms of the Trefoil or Three-leaved Clover (and the Diamond) was thus curiously made on the field of Lee's surrender, "Clover Hill," and in front of Lee's "peculiar" was the Diamond Badge. Diamonds were trumps!



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#### APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

POSITIONS OF THE COMBINED SECOND-THIRD CORPS, UNDER MAJ.-GEN. ANDREW ATKINSON HUMPHREYS, 9TH APRIL (PALM SUNDAY), 1865, M. AND P. M.,  
AT THE EPOCH OF THE SURRENDER OF GEN. R. E. LEE  
AND THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.



It is another curious fact that Colonel Whittier, A. A. G. on Humphreys' staff, makes "this claim, that the last hostile bullet fired by the army of Northern Virginia was at me," an old combined Second-Third Corps man.

LA RETRAITE PRISE! AD LEONEM!

Thus the organized and more or less disorganized constituents of Lee's command were completely enveloped. "The once proud array of the Army of Northern Virginia now presented this sorry spectacle," &c., &c. (Swinton, 619.) It is impossible to comprehend why Northern writers will seek to depreciate the number and condition of this Rebel Army, to lessen their own people's triumph, and glorify the enemy, as bitter and unforgiving in their enmity as ever. It has been herein stated that one of our major-generals present at the surrender calculated that Lee still had, on the 8th-9th April, from 30,000 to 40,000 men. Although this has been gone into quite fully on previous pages, the following calculations from Richardson's tables (491-492), "compiled from the official reports," are worthy of consideration. He says that Lee's "effective force, on the 20th March, 1865, must have been fully 70,000 men." Two chiefs of staff, Army of the Potomac, and one corps commander, all three agree about as to this estimate. Lee lost at Fort Steedman, 25th March, 2,783, and from the 29th of March to the 9th April, 18,979, together 21,762. This leaves 58,238. Of these, "Two brigades of his cavalry escaped before his surrender;" likewise, according to "Pickett's Men" (172-173, 175), a battalion, and certainly one battery of artillery, which got off to Lynchburg. How many more escaped? "No one familiar with armies in the field will need to be told that the number of stragglers on such a campaign must have been very large. Ten thousand men seems to be a moderate estimate for the stragglers and the two brigades of cavalry. This leaves in round numbers 48,000 effectives. Concede 8,000 killed and wounded, and there remain 40,000. Still there is one element of strength which has not been credited to Lee. On abandoning Petersburg-Richmond, Lee dragged off with him every military organization, local or otherwise; so that our major-general, after all, may have been nearer the truth than any one else. But, taking the other view of the case and conceding that Lee had not over 8,000 to 10,000 men "up to the mark" in fighting condition, then no one possessed the right, in justice to the North, to accord the terms on the 9th, which were even too lenient for the 7th or even for the 3d April. Some men ought to have been made examples of, and, from the following extracts from the *Army and Navy Journal* [ii. 545 (2)], it would

seem to the writer that the *Tribune*, in publishing the remarks in ¶ 2, must have held different views at that time from those since and at present held by its senior editor.

"When, however, it was known how completely the enemy had been in our power, some of the troops were a little distressed at the magnanimity of the terms offered.

"An Associated Press dispatch of the 12th says :

(1.) "The final arrangements for the surrender of Lee's army were completed yesterday, and to-day they are at liberty to proceed to their homes, or elsewhere, as they choose. The terms granted were certainly of a very liberal character. A large number of officers, together with thousands of the men of this army, express their dissatisfaction, not only at the unprecedented liberality granted to the Army of Northern Virginia, but at the manner in which they were paroled and allowed to go their way, without our men being permitted to enjoy the results of their long struggle in the passage through the lines of General Lee and his army ; but it is claimed that this would have been humiliating to General Lee and his officers, and that it is not the wish or desire of our government or commanders to act toward them in any way that would tend to irritate their feelings or make their position more intolerable than it actually is. The policy pursued may have been for the best, and our soldiers will submit, as they always do, to what is judged most wise. During Sunday night and Monday large numbers of the Rebels, as well as some of the officers, made their escape from the lines and scattered through the woods, many no doubt intending to return home. Our camps last night were filled with them, [hand icon] begging something to eat, which, of course, was freely given. These men, when asked if they had been paroled, invariably replied, "No; but we are allowed to go where we please." [hand icon]

"A letter to the *Tribune* on the same subject says :

(2) "The intelligence that negotiations were pending on Saturday for the surrender of the enemy was hailed with joyful demonstrations by our men, but when the terms of the capitulation became known their feelings were those of disappointment and chagrin. Ewell, Pickett and several other officers of distinction, deserters from the United States service at the beginning of the war, it was claimed, had no right to expect the treatment accorded their more honorable brethren in Rebellion. [hand icon] The brutal murder of the thirty-nine men hung by Pickett in North Carolina, is still remembered and still awakens a spirit of resentment among the men. [hand icon] No formal surrender took place, and our troops were consequently not gratified with a sight of the ragged remnants of Lee's once great and formidable army,



except as they confronted each other in battle. Both armies lay hidden from each other, for the most part in dense woods, and although many of our men afterward straggled into the enemy's camps, they were not favored by the coveted glimpse of the whole strength of Lee massed in a compact body."

That the enemy were in the woods, is corroborated by Paine (21, 8, 71): "Humphreys' last stand was in a piece of open ground the enemy were sheltered [as usual] in the timber!" "Before us," are de Trobriand's words (II., 382), "beyond a thin curtain of woods stretched an open space, which alone separated us from the enemies' pickets, which did not budge." This locality is styled "Clover Hill." The United States Engineer maps show dense woods in every direction in front of Humphreys.

For Lee's forces, however—were they more or less numerous—"the toils were set and the 'Stag at Ten' (La Royale!) was to die at bay." Stopped in front to their left by Sheridan's cavalry, *backed* by the infantry of the Army of the James, they were shut in upon their right or north flank by the Fifth Corps (see extracts from reports, *Citizen*, 16th and 23d December, 1871), with their rear closely pressed by the combined Second-Third Corps, supported by the Sixth Corps, which had gradually closed up and was now in contact, and finally brought to a stand by the obstacle of the James [Appomattox] River, whose elbow put an effectual barrier on the W. and W. by N., the only possible avenue of escape [*Army and Navy Journal*, ii. 569 (3)] towards the goal of Lynchburg, now less than twenty-one miles distant in the same direction.

Gordon had received imperative orders to cut his way through (examine a curious coincidence, II. Kings, iii., 26) Sheridan's cavalry by a supreme effort of despair. He made his desperate dash, thinking he had only cavalry in his front. His attack was made with all the wonted Rebel fire. The cavalry, who had dismounted to arrest his plunge—like that of a bull upon a picador in the amphitheatre—had to give ground. Then our troopers were drawn aside like the front-sliding-scene in a theatre, revealing the unexpected presence of our blue-coated infantry.

[There are numerous instances of this masking of infantry, the strength of an army, with cavalry, to delude and induce an attack. Cassius, in the Parthian War ("*Military Ends and Moral Means*," 271, 272, &c.), having ranged his cavalry in a front line, with his infantry in a second line behind them; then, by the sudden retiring of his cavalry, drew the Parthians into the snare which he had prepared for them. At Wattignies, Jourdain masked the presence of field pieces with infantry. The footmen "skillfully wheeling back portions of their line to allow the light

battery to fire" through the intervals thus opened. The Spaniards used such an identical manœuvre in street fighting against the Hollanders in the sixteenth century; and Henry IV., in one of the combats preliminary to or near Arques, in 1589, employed a similar strategem. Having masked two heavy couleuvrines (16 pounders?) with cavalry, he invited a charge of the Chevaliers of the Duke de Mayenne, who, when they expected to encounter only horsemen, like themselves, were astonished to see the opposing ranks open and found themselves overwhelmed with an artillery fire. This new and prompt method of employing heavy artillery is said to have been the idea of a Norman naval gunner, named Charles Brise, who, after long service at sea, brought his varied experience to the aid of the King of Navarre.]

The result was a perfect theatrical winding-up. It paralyzed the Rebels. They caved in at once! The end had come! Meanwhile Sheridan's troopers, with uplifted sabres, were only awaiting the trumpet-blast to spur in and drown out the Rebellion in its own best blood. Each horseman grasped his sabre with the determination of Custer, or of Alp in Byron's "Siege of Corinth."

It is a pity, perhaps, for the peace of the country, the reorganization of society down South and a warning to treason for the future, that every arm had not been permitted to realize Byron's simile throughout:

"Swifter to smite and never to spare."

The writer has always thought it an error of judgment that Sheridan was not allowed to "go in," as he is said to have wished to do, and "finish up those people." Fiery Phil in such matters, if reported correctly, had common sense and honest enthusiasm;—red blood, not white blood; such seldom, if ever, make mistakes.

All this is mightily well told by "A (Union) Staff Officer," in "With General Sheridan" (pages 210–217), and by (Confederate) Captain J. C. Gorman, in "Lee's Last Campaign" (page 21, &c.)

As to the influence of the cavalry upon this decisive result, there is much to be said for and against.

For instance, "An officer in the Sixth Corps" (*Army and Navy Journal*, 29th April, 1865, II., 562, 3) "writes that he is a little disgusted at the cheeky way in which the cavalry assumes to have accomplished so much. For example, after the fight at Little Sailors' Creek, Sheridan reports that he 'went in' with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, &c., &c. But he omits to state the not unimportant fact, that, before the arrival of the Sixth Corps, he had 'gone in' and been whipped off the ground in the very quickest sort of way. Indeed, the same thing usually happens when the cavalry attempts to carry works without infantry. The

very last action—the final skirmish in which Lee's army was engaged—was with McKenzie's cavalry division, and it was just sent kiting, with the loss of two guns. Such trifles as these it is sometimes convenient not to report." \* \* \*

"But, with regard to the capture of Ewell and Custis Lee at Sailor's Creek, the former has stated over his own signature that he surrendered to the Sixth Corps, in a paper on file at the headquarters of the corps."

Let us loyal men fervently pray that the mistaken magnanimity shown this day towards an adversary even more wickedly inexcusable than Ben Hadad, may not be brought home to us through the shortsightedness of those in authority on this occasion, and the North realize in the near future the ominous warning spoken by the prophet to the victorious but mistaken Ahab. (1 Kings, xx. 42.) "*Because thou hast let go out of thy hand a man whom I appointed to utter destruction, therefore thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people.*" (1884!) (Compare II. Kings, xiii., 14-19, and 22; also Jeremiah, L., 2, 13, 14, 15.) "Some of the troops (Union) were a little distressed at the magnanimity (?) of the terms offered." [*Army and Navy Journal*, II., 445 (2.).] It is a pity that those who had the control gave occasion to this "distress" at the time and to greater distress, at the consequences, soon after, and thenceforward until now, April, 1872. (November, 1884.)

There was one man in the Army of the Potomac who saw all this clearly, and spoke out in trumpet tones—Maj.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright. He has not been mentioned in the course of this corps-biography more than was indispensably necessary, because the writer was desirous of avoiding any side issues, but by no means because the noble commander of the Sixth Corps was not appreciated at his full and great value. Were it necessary to cite proofs of the nobility of soul possessed by the "Burster into Petersburg," one would be almost sufficient to demonstrate the man, viz.: his dispatch to Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, of the 15th April, 1865, in connection with the death of Lincoln:



HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

April 15th, 1865.

"MAJOR-GENERAL WEBB, Chief of Staff:

"With deepest sorrow the dispatch announcing the assassination of the President of the United States, and the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State, is received, and I advise that

every officer of the Rebel army, within control of the Army of the Potomac, be at once closely confined, with a view to retaliation upon their persons for so horrible an outrage.

H. G. WRIGHT, Major-General."

\* \* \* \* \*

Any one who takes a sufficient interest in the truth and will compare Paine's Field Map, as reduced in Harper's "History of the Great Rebellion," and several other narratives of the Union Civil War, will be convinced—despite all the mystification, intentional or unintentional, with which partial, interested or prejudiced pens have invested or involved the story—that Humphreys, with his combined Second-Third Corps, was the chief agent in the happy result of this festival. They, it was, and his "tried and true," who all the time clung to Lee's army, proper, and while suffering as much, if not more, than any other corps or arm, so impeded his retreat by their very weight—as a sail towing behind a clipper frigate clogs her way and enables a duller squadron to overhaul her—and hourly harassed it, so as to enable the cavalry, the Fifth Corps, the Twenty-fourth Corps and Twenty-fifth Corps to finally head off the enemy at Appomattox Station and Court House. It may be argued that the part which fell to Humphreys was the result of *luck*. The writer does not believe in luck as affecting great events. With him, luck is God, who puts the right MAN in the right place—when something is to be achieved which affects human rights and human progress. (See J. Fennimore Cooper's "Oak Openings, or the Bee Hunter," Chap. XXVIII., p. 425). Other men had equal opportunities with Humphreys, and were never up to time, could never be brought up to time; morally, could never be made to face the music—in a word, with far greater means accomplished comparatively nothing. When Humphreys found the trace; when he struck the scent; he was like the *sleuth* or *lime* hound, as vividly described by Somerville. (Book I., pp. 21 and 23.)

Following Lee step by step, never losing trace of him, even if temporarily losing sight of him, hitting him, pressing him with bayonet in his reins; thus, for seventy-six hours, and a distance of sixty to seventy miles, Humphreys never let him slip away. Finally, where do we find Humphreys on the morning of the 9th April? At New Hope Church, near Appomattox Court House, confronting on this sunny—sunny in every point of view—Sabbath morning, the bone and sinew of the remaining organizations of Lee's old army. New Hope Church!—title of happy omen for us—"Devil's Creek," to the north, overcome and *passed* "by queer coincidence" of nomenclature)—and "Pleasant Retreat!"

about as inappropriate a term for Lee's situation at this time as well could be imagined. These he, Humphreys, now supported by Wright, held so tightly, pressed so closely, that Lee could not have strengthened Gordon to operate against the Fifth Corps, the Army of the James and the cavalry, however much he might have been so minded.

Without exaggeration, was there anything like Humphreys' prescient advance, persistent pressure, unrelaxing pursuit or incessant combat, exemplified on any other previous occasion during the war? Did he not utilize "the golden hours" and the "diamond minutes" so often lost, so frequently thrown away? "Ask me," exclaimed Napoleon, "for anything but time!" There is nothing like the fighting of the 6th April in our records. It comes up to the pursuit after Ulm; after Jena. Not a moment lost, not an opportunity neglected. And then at Cumberland Church, what perfect tactics! Butting an inexpugnable front, how admirable his flanking! Even although the first attempts were unsuccessful, where, after being reinforced, does the critic find Humphreys when night set in? Ready for the renewal of the enveloping assault of the morrow, menacing the enemy's sole line of retreat, his sole avenue of escape. No glancing off, as day after day, from the Rapidan to the James, allowing the foe to fall back from one strong position to another, to renew the same unsatisfactory sacrifices; but a "rubbing out" as unremitting as the regular succession of the hours, and of the sunrise and the sunset. And so it went on, from Amelia Salt Sulphur Springs, on the morning of the 6th, until the noon of Lee's surrender.

Why the popular mind has been so beclouded, and why the conspicuous merits of the man and his men have been so lost sight of, is one of those curious questions affecting the popular distribution of military credit in this country, that can only be explained by the willingness of the general public to accept the flowery in diction, and the superficial in examination, for the less elegant, but infinitely more precious results of investigation and close comparison of facts; which last are absolutely inseparable from true military criticism and the enduring commentaries of war.

\* \* \* \* \*



## LA RETRAITE PRISE! SURRENDER!

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"Sweet April, many a thought  
Is wedded unto thee, as hearts are wed;  
Nor shall they fail."—LONGFELLOW.

"The hounds of war shall turn from our fair fields,  
The cannon shall become a trump of praise.

"NAPOLEON FALLEN: a Lyrical Drama," by ROBERT BUCHANAN, London, 1871.

The Army of Northern Virginia surrendered!

The white flag appeared! General Grant received a message from Lee requesting an interview, which was granted, and the two generals repaired to the neat brick dwelling of William or Wilmer McLean, at Appomattox Court House.

The memorable interview between Generals Grant and Lee took place at a little after 2 P. M., in the "town" of Appomattox Court House. The town, according to description, had little indeed to recommend it for the scene of so great an event as the pacification of a continent. It might boast, indeed, its public building, the Court House, but it consisted solely of one street, and one end of that was boarded up to keep the cattle out. Such was the little place upon which fame, for centuries to come, was suddenly thrust, this Sunday afternoon, 9th April, 1865. The best house in the street was lent for the occasion by its owner, Mr. Wilmer McLean. It is an old-fashioned structure, with a long verandah in its front and a flight of steps leading up to the entrance thereon. "Appomattox Court House boasted five dwellings. The largest—a square building of brick, with a yard smiling with roses, violets and daffodils—belonging to one Wilmer McLean."

Lossing states that this McLean resided in a dwelling on a portion of the first battlefield of the war, between the Confederate "Army of Northern Virginia," under Beauregard, and the Union "Army of North-eastern Virginia"—under the accomplished but unlucky McDowell—which was the nucleus or embryo of the "Army of the Potomac." Beauregard had his headquarters in McLean's house, which was situated to the right or south of the Centreville road, about equidistant from Mitchell's, Blackburn's and McLean's Fords. McLean, having seen enough, as he thought, of war, removed to a spot whereto he was confident war could never come, but whither the fighting did come, after a lapse of three years and nearly nine months, in its circle of blood and fire. And now, on this bright Sunday, 9th April,

1865, his household gods were tottering to the roar of the same fire-throats which had shaken them on that other sultry battle Sabbath, 21st July, 1861.

If McLean had ever delved into the earliest English dramatists, he may have had the lines of worthy Christopher Marlow on his lips :

“ The northern borderers, seeing their houses burned,  
     \*       \*       \*       Run up and down cursing——”

the hour “ he lent ” his house, “ the best on the street,” “ for the occasion ; ” for, if Richardson (484) is correct, he “ was moving wildly about, nearly driven out of his senses by the great events of the day ” and the subsequent forcible purchase of his furniture. (*Ibid.*, 485-6.)

This “ circle of events ” presents a curious coincidence, but more curious than many others which incontestably prove that there is no escaping *Schicksal*, “ the inevitable ”—the “ Fortune or Chance ” of Catherine de Medici, Turenne and Suworow ; the “ chance or good luck ” of the astute observer, Montaigne ; the “ lot ” and “ chance ” of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes ; the “ Fate ” of the Romans and the Greeks ; the “ Accident ” of the scoffer and unbeliever ; the “ Providence ” of the devout ; but, in *very truth*, “ immutable (or ‘ unflexible ’) Law,” the unalterable decree of the GOD OF BATTLES and the LORD OF HOSTS. As Sir Walter Scott observed : “ Fortune will fly her flight, let man hallo himself hoarse.” Indeed, it is true, “ *Man denkt, Gott lenkt*, ” “ Man proposes and God disposes ; ” or, as the Tuscan reads, “ *L'uomo tepe, e la Fortuna trama*, ” “ Man sets the woof and Fortune throws the warp.” This acknowledged fact runs through all time and teaching. Lord Kames says, “ *a delusive sense of liberty* is wisely implanted in the mind of man, which fits him to fulfil the ends of action to better advantage than he could do, if he knew the *necessity* which really attends him.”

Some of the names of the battlefields, even, are significant, and not the least so is the fact that this surrender occurred on Palm Sunday. Palm Sunday is the next before Easter, the beginning of the “ Great Week,” the “ Holy Week,” when the “ Prince of Peace ” made his triumphant entry into the “ possession or inheritance of peace,” for such is the translation of the word Jerusalem, the multitude strewing his path with palm branches. How appropriate the surrender on this Palm Sunday, 9th April, 1865, when a “ chosen people,” in arms, entered through the gate of victory into the possession of peace, which they had purchased with half a million of lives and an expenditure of money almost appalling in its aggregate of public outlay and private munificence,

As soon as General Grant accorded this meeting to Lee, an order was promulgated (Paine's Diary), suspending hostilities for an hour.

"Our skirmishers are within range of the rearguard of the enemy. The enemy has developed a picket line, which indicates a stand."

"Sunday, 9th April, 12.20. A cessation of hostilities proposed by General Lee was rejected by General Meade, who was still pressing on, when word came that a truce of one hour was granted by General Sheridan, to which General Meade submitted. General Forsythe came from General L——, through the enemy's lines, under a flag of truce."

It will be remembered that Colonel Paine was on Humphreys' front on the eventful day up to noon; Lee himself had been with the troops confronting the combined Second-Third Corps—all that remained of the Army of Northern Virginia, except Gordon's command, in contact with Sheridan, Ord and Griffin—nearly or fully up to the same hour, 12 M.

When, in the course of the morning (9th), Humphreys' troops began to overtake Lee, the Rebel general sent to Humphreys at least two earnest requests (verbal) by a staff officer and flag of truce, not to press forward upon him but to halt; that negotiations were going on for a surrender. Humphreys did not deem himself authorized to comply with Lee's requests, since he had not received such information and authority from General Meade or from General Grant as would sanction it, and so replied to General Lee, and continued to press forward. Humphreys was at the head of the column. When the request was made the last time, Lee's staff officer was very urgent, so urgent that Humphreys had to send him word twice that the request could not be complied with, and that he must withdraw from the ground at once. He was in full sight on the road, a hundred yards distant from Humphreys. (The ground was wooded.) As soon as Humphreys' staff officer reached him, Humphreys himself began to ride forward. A mile beyond this, as the skirmishers of the combined Second-Third Corps were closing in on Lee's—the Union troops being within fighting distance—Meade overtook Humphreys, and soon after informed him that a truce had been granted until a certain hour of the day. (2 P.M., Reb. Rec. XI., 643, 1.) At this time, according to Meade's report, the combined Second-Third Corps were within three miles of Appomattox Court House, to the eastward. Humphreys remained on the line of battle near the road with his staff about him, and as the hour for the termination of the truce approached, he took out his watch and held it in his hand. Exactly as the hands pointed to the

hour of 2 p. m., Humphreys mounted and gave the order to advance; but his troops had scarcely moved "twenty paces," or "one hundred yards," when a message from General Meade informed him that the truce had been extended "until further orders," and he halted the corps in the position marked on the United States Engineer Map, "Appomattox Court House," close up against Lee. Before long the notice of the surrender of Lee was received, and he had to issue orders at once to the skirmishers, now become pickets, to prevent his officers and men from passing over into Lee's camps.

"General Humphreys' engagement on the night of the 7th (at Cumberland Church) was the last fighting of any importance"—said Brevet Col. W. H. Paine, (26, 6, 71)—"if I recollect aright, and *I think General Humphreys was only prevented from almost annihilating the enemy, by the truce on the day of surrender.* (9th April.) I was on his front at that time."

\* \* \* \* \*

While the conditions of the surrender were under discussion, the troops became impatient, and impatience grew to a fever heat. The soldiers—who, as a rule, always saw farther than the run of the leaders, whom policy, not propriety, had given them—deemed that the delay was only another Confederate stratagem to throw us off our guard; that underneath the color of treating, Lee intended to play us an Antietam trick. "Let us finish up the matter," they cried, "before night comes on again. If they do not intend to surrender, let us go in at once."

#### LA CURÉE!—SPOLIARIUM!

———

"C'est moins que la guerre, c'est la CHASSE, c'est la CURÉE."—MICHELET.

"Our troops were just commencing to advance again (reads Paine's Diary), when they were again halted by authority from General Grant. It was during this truce that General Lee surrendered, of which we were soon apprised (a memento of which I secured by tearing a strip from the lower edge of the white cloth which served as a flag of truce, which the bearer allowed to trail while he was resting, partially asleep). General Meade, not feeling well to-day, was in his carriage at the front, but was obliged to return on horseback, the road was so crowded with troops. An officer had just passed down the road announcing the surrender, as General Meade passed, followed by his staff; everyone crowded forward, leaving scarcely room for the horses to pass, jeopardizing their lives and limbs, cheering, and making the most frantic demonstrations of joy."

All at once a tempest of hurrahs shivered the air along our front. "Lee has surrendered!" Without having actually distinguished the words, the whole Union army, present, comprehended their import. The wildest acclamations rolled like peals of thunder over the field, through the woods, along the road, echoed and re-echoed, prolonged in solemn mutterings of hurrahs among the trains which followed, at a distance, the Sixth Corps. Hats and caps filled the air. The flags waved and saluted, unfurling to the caresses of the winds their tattered fragments, glorious attestations and relics of nearly four years of battle, of over a hundred first-class stricken fields—

"Flag of the brave! thy folds shall fly,  
The sign of Hope and TRIUMPH, high!"

\* \* \* \* \*

"There shall thy Victor glances glow,  
And cowering foes shall sink beneath  
Each gallant arm that strikes below  
The lovely Messenger of Death!"

and all the bands poured forth to heaven—which answered with the sympathetic smile of unclouded sunshine—their accompaniments of rejoicing, either in the lively notes of "Yankee Doodle" or the majestic strains of "Hail Columbia."

"The wildest excitement prevailed (Paine's Diary again); everyone was cheering to the extent of his power. Every band was playing its loudest, drum corps vying with each other, while artillery lent its aid. The very horses entered into the spirit of the occasion and pranced proudly. Flags waved, hats, haversacks and canteens were raised on muskets or thrown along the route of the general and staff. Trees and fences were climbed along the route, and in the most perilous positions were soldiers and, even on horseback, officers were seen embracing each other in delirium of joy; nor did this decrease in intensity until the general had passed through the whole line and gone to his camp, when the demonstration became less concentrated, but still pervaded the whole army, and was lost only in the darkness of the night."

"On the evening of the 8th April and morning of the 9th," to quote a letter (29, 8, '71) of Lieutenant-Colonel Schoonover, commanding the 11th New Jersey Volunteers—"the air was full of rumors about the surrender of Lee and his army. Flags of truce had been passed back and forth. We were moving slowly along on the morning of the 9th, when the column was suddenly



halted. This looked favorable and strengthened the reports wonderfully. Every one put on a significant look. The men took it for granted, and, as if they could not wait for the announcement of the news, shouts were heard on every side. How anxiously we waited and how eagerly we listened. We caught up everything. Nothing was too good nor too great. About noon it was known that the generals of the two armies were in conference and the result was impatiently awaited. About four o'clock in the afternoon General Meade and staff came in from the front. His Chief of Staff, General Webb, preceded him, and announced to the troops that lined the road on either side, that General Lee and his army had surrendered. It is useless to attempt to describe the scene that followed. The very ground seemed to shake with the cheers and yells of triumph that burst forth from that memorable field. A thousand hats went up at once. The men seemed almost wild with joy. General Meade and staff rode through the dense mass and imagination would now tell me that he was obscured from sight with the shouts of a thousand mouths and the waving and hurling of as many hats."

[Major-General McAllister at this point makes an observation which would seem to imply that the old Third cheered rather the event than any one man. "The men cheered him (General Meade) as they never did before."]

"Officers and men grasped each others hands in wild delight. The old war-worn and battle-stained colors seemed to wave expressions of joy. Our men gathered around General McAllister, who spoke to them amidst continuous cheers. America never saw such a scene before, and I never expect to witness another. That day the fate of the Rebellion was sealed and the soldier knew and felt that the shot and shell from that army would never again sweep a comrade from their side. All who were there felt proud of it, and rejoiced that they had been participators in the grand closing scene."

The writer's "labor of love" is finished with the war, for the war terminated with the surrender of Lee. Every succeeding shot was nothing more than the distant and dying echoes of the thunderbolt which burst between the Appomattox and the James. There, as when the clouds first gathered, the rattle of the Third Corps musketry and the roar of their guns blent with the awful uproar which ushered in and which terminated the great American Conflict. Oh, glorious body of heroes! how grateful the duty of commemorating your achievements, which demonstrated in fire and attested in blood the truth of your claim of having ever been

"FIRST IN ATTACK, LAST IN RETREAT, THIRD ONLY IN  
NAME!"

About seven years [this was originally published in 1872] have elapsed since the last organized Confederate force submitted to the Union administration. Not only has Nature healed the scars inflicted by the struggle; not only has industry effaced the damages occasioned by the most terrible engines of war; but even the bones of the fallen—whether washed out of their shallow graves by the rain, or thrown up by the frost, or uprooted by the beasts of prey—have disintegrated and dissolved, mingling with their kindred clay, until not a vestige remains of the sanguinary convulsions upon the various battlefields, moistened with the blood of hundreds of thousands of victims, and fattened with the corpses of half as many thousands of the slain. Under these circumstances, since nature, art and industry are so rapidly effacing every memento of our civil war, it behooves the government and the historian not to lose a single moment in their endeavors to rescue from the darkness of oblivion the achievements of those gallant men consigned to the gloom of the grave by their unselfish patriotism and voluntary immolation for the preservation of their country and its institutions.

As it has been observed by one of our most popular writers, Longfellow, in his "Gleam of Sunshine,"

"Let me review the scene,  
And summon from the shadowy past  
The forms that once had been."

Even so, let the pen of the poet and the historian plant their own peculiar flowers over the tombs of the fallen, to grow, bud, blossom and flourish in amaranthine beauty and freshness, that their odor and charms may keep in everlasting remembrance the devotion and the glory of the illustrious dead, and perpetuate the remembrance of the living who emulated their virtues, partook of their labors, shared their sufferings and participated in their dangers. Among these last the prominent figure in this little Memorial is the commander of the combined Second-Third Corps, MAJ.-GEN. ANDREW ATKINSON HUMPHREYS, the best soldier, according to the Greek understanding, of the War: "Thus everybody who commands a [large] force [of armed and disciplined] men, is indeed commonly called a *general*; yet, he who is able, in a crisis, to collect himself and see his way through, *he* is the REAL GENERAL; *the other is a mere general-officer.*"

Lecourbe, the faithful lieutenant of Masséna at Zurich, and

of Moreau upon the Rhine, was "an incomparable *general*, at once an intrepid soldier and a highly enlightened *officer*, who united to a rare sagacity in regard to the knowledge of localities, very uncommon audacity and an admirable tact." How aptly these attestations apply to Humphreys, wonderful in his power of seeing what had to be done and in doing it promptly—a consummate handler of troops. Colonel Paine, "the PATH-FINDER of the Army of the Potomac," who served beside and under Humphreys while the latter was chief of its staff, said a very handsome thing of his superior, in making the following analysis of his character, which tallies exactly with Dumas' estimate of the upright Lecourbe: "For general, as well as intimate, acquaintance with the country in which he [Humphreys] was operating, and the troops against whom he was engaged—in fact, the general relative situation of affairs—Humphreys was second to no other Union general. \* \* From his usual quiescent suavity he was metamorphosed into the impersonation of enthusiasm, in action."

[NOTE.—After the consolidation or combination of the Third Corps with the Second (one of the most flagrant injustices of the war) Birney's Division (First of the old Third, and now Third of the combined Second-Third Corps) headquarter flag was *white*, with a RED (Kearny, *original*) diamond in the centre. Mott's Division (Second of the old Third, and now Fourth of the combined Second-Third Corps) flag was *blue*, with a WHITE (Hooker, *original*) diamond in the centre. The flag of the consolidated divisions (First and Second of the Third Corps, and Third of the combined Second-Third Corps)—at the close of the war commanded by Mott, and finally by De Trobriand—was a swallow-tail, blue, with, in the centre, a combined red and white diamond; or a white diamond within a red diamond, to recall both the former First and Second Divisions (Kearny's and Hooker's) of the original old Third Corps. The inner diamond was white, upon a larger diamond red, so that the latter should show like a red border around the former; in the centre of the inner, the white diamond, was a small blue trefoil, the badge of the Second Corps. This is the statement of Major-General Mott (4, 5, 72), correcting the previous description of his Aid, Captain Demarest, published as note †, in the *Citizen* of 17th February, 1872.]

## FARMVILLE, BRIDGING AND FORDING.

The Battle of the Heights of Farmville, or at Cumberland Church. 7th April, 1865.

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In a series of articles, which comprise reproductions of diaries, reports, &c., published in the *New York Citizen and Round Table*, and in a series of pamphlets (I. to VI., VII. and VIII.), were presented the gist of the labors of about three years, and a great deal of additional information interwoven. The latter appeared between 1872 and 1874, and met with the full approbation of Major-General A. A. Humphreys and other officers, prominent actors. The first-named, on page VI. of the Preface to his "Virginia Campaign of 1864-65," makes this allusion: "I am also indebted to Major-General de Peyster for the valuable information contained in his elaborate work, "La Royale," published at his own expense for private circulation, and for the aid I have derived from his correspondence with Confederate officers."

Of all the men esteemed great whom I have met in quite a long life, the two who made the strongest impression of unqualified superiority were Major-General George H. Thomas and Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys. None others approached them; Thomas was the grandest and Humphreys was the most learned or scientific. Greater intimacy than existed between Humphreys and the writer could scarcely be. Again, and again, and again, in discussion, Humphreys expressed the strongest indignation in regard to his not having been reinforced on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865, and he indorsed, in the completest degree, the utterances and decided judgments published in "La Royale," No. VIII.

Nothing could surpass the astonishment felt on reading in Humphrey's book a concession that the river was "not fordable for the infantry," was "impassable." He had not visited the spot in the meanwhile, *i. e.* since he had fought there, and he must have relied on the statements of others. I have had the river examined, and if a regiment of generals were to rise up and maintain the contrary, it would not shake my belief that it could have been rendered passable for any Arm, for all the Arms in about

two hours. I have seen too much of the wonderful results of the application of practical labor in the case of railroad accidents and private enterprise not to feel perfectly certain on the subject. An attempt will now be made to prove the correctness of the opinion that any stream about one hundred feet wide and from three to six feet deep, without a violent current and with abundance of material handy, should be bridged so that troops could be passing, platoon front, in about two hours. The object of this article or chapter is to prove such to be the fact.

It would, perhaps, be no exaggeration to claim that no writer on military subjects ever devoted more thought, time, labor and even personal expense to the consideration of an operation in war than the writer bestowed upon the pursuit of Lee from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House. Every incident of the flight and chase was investigated with the greatest care, with the assistance of every available authority in manuscript or print, and the help and advice of Colonel W. H. Paine, "the Pathfinder of the Army of the Potomac," Major-General Alexander S. Webb, and Major-General A. A. Humphreys, who commanded the combined Second and Third Corps, which did the bulk of the fighting, and persistently clung to and impeded or prevented the escape of the enemy. In the course of this pursuit a problem presented itself which proved unsolvable, and now must ever remain so, because the only one who could have furnished the solution is in his grave. It has always seemed incomprehensible why Grant did not reinforce Humphreys at Cumberland Church or Heights of Farmville, send across the Twenty-fourth and Sixth Corps, and keep Crook's cavalry on the north side of the Appomattox and finish up the business before the night of the 7th April, 1865, instead of continuing the pursuit forty to fifty miles as the roads run, and thirty-six to forty hours. Even if Lee had got away in fragments from Cumberland Church on the night of the 7th-8th April, 1865—that is supposing the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Corps had crossed to the north side to the assistance of Humphreys—there were still the Fifth Corps and Sheridan's cavalry on the south side to head him off—as they afterwards did at Appomattox Court House. One of the excuses made for not reinforcing Humphreys was that the Appomattox was "impassable" at Farmville. The answer to this is clear; Crook's cavalry did get across by fording or wading, belly deep, and, according to Gen. Tremain, of Crook's staff, when across they got into a muddle, were roughly handled, repulsed, and repassed the river, fording or wading the stream a second time. No infantry attempted to cross until late at night, when they could be of no use.

In this article it is proposed to show that the Appomattox was



NOT "impassable" at Farmville; that it could have been bridged with ordinary diligence within about two hours, and that the only reason it was not crossed or bridged was because the will was wanting; on whose part who shall, or rather, can say; "shall," as a matter at this moment of sentimental excitement in favor of a far too highly estimated man; "can," because it is impossible to enter into the heart and brain of an impassive and reticent individual, there to discover reasons or motives. An opinion I have; and if any one, who has the right, asks me that opinion the answer is ready: no one has a right to publish an opinion as a fact when only circumstantial evidence, indirect, however similarly corroborated, can be presented.

When Gustavus found some military works which he had ordered to be made had been delayed, and among other excuses brought forward for the tardiness was the frost in the ground; the King answered: "The harder the ground the harder they should have worked," and that "A good will would have surmounted all obstacles;" and then, to show what good will can effect, a few days afterwards cow-cribs and stable-racks, obtained from the neighboring farms, supplied the want of scaling ladders. On these they mounted to the assault and took a fortress (Frankfort-on-the-Oder), within whose walls there was an army rather than a garrison. (Exact parallel. LARPENT, I., 5-6. Wellington's novel scaling ladders.) The Thirty Year's War is the best horn-book for a soldier wherein to learn what energy, courage, capacity and real cavalry can effect.

There is a very curious parallel to the operations of the 7th, 8th and 9th April, 1865, in those narrated by Koch, in his "History of the German Empire during the reign of Ferdinand III.," Vienna, 1865. II., 261-263. Baner was retreating after his attempt to surprise Ratisbon, with the sole thought of saving his army. Fighting was continuous between the pursuers and pursued, and Baner only escaped destruction by being a half-hour ahead. He got through the Pressnitz Pass just sufficiently in advance to avoid the ruinous effects of a very smart and energetic attempt to outflank him and cut him off on the part of the Imperial commander-in-chief, Piccolomini, who was at the head of forces far superior in efficiency to those of the Swedes. The circumstances, if duly examined and weighed, were very similar to those at Farmville on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865. The Swedes had suffered a great loss (similar to that experienced by the Rebels on Sailor's Creek, Proper, and "Little;" the latter where Wright's Sixth Corps and Sheridan fought) and were sharply pressed and clung to by the Imperial General Geleen, playing the very part of Humphreys during Lee's retreat.

Now comes the point, Geleen was doing all that man could do and hammering at the Swedish rear-guard, holding and delaying, so to speak, the retreating forces at Pressnitz, as I am convinced was the case at Farmville. Piccolomini, in our case Grant, could have finished Baner (Lee) there. By some writers Piccolomini's action was excused as an error; by others it was imputed to intention. The latter held that Piccolomini was determined that no one but himself should enjoy the honor of capturing Baner. Those who take the part of Piccolomini explain his conduct on the plea that he found Baner in such a strong position that he turned aside to Kaden. This is exactly equivalent to Grant's not reinforcing and assisting Humphreys, and, instead, pushing on to Appomattox Court House where Sheridan was to reap the greater part of the glory; whereas, if Grant had reinforced and assisted Humphreys at Cumberland Church, the lion's share of the credit must have fallen to that officer. In our case, in April, 1865, Humphreys was roughly handling the enemy all the time, and pressing him at Cumberland Church, just exactly as an Imperial corps commander was giving no respite to Baner; and roughly handled the Swedes at Mies, in the same way that Humphreys, at the very least, might have inflicted a defeat on Lee on the Heights of Farmville. Humphreys never got over the temporary suppression or withholding of his telegrams on the 6th-7th, by which the credit which belonged to him remained unknown to the public and inured to the glory of others. I have always maintained, and nothing can convince me to the contrary, that a close examination of the facts will show, that if opportunities had been utilized as they had been on other occasions, but as they only were to the full, and as advantage was taken of them only once, and then by Thomas after Nashville, under far more difficult circumstances, Lee's fate would have been decided on the 7th April, P. M., 1865, and not unnecessarily postponed to the 9th M., forty miles farther on.

[NOTE.—In Note 1 to pages 53 and 54, Lieutenant Owen, in his "In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery of New Orleans," states that "Colonel Walton was at once appointed by General Beauregard Chief of Artillery of the 'Army of the Potomac' (as the Confederate Army in Virginia was then called." This afterwards was Lee's "Army of Northern Virginia." At that time the embryo Union grand army of the Atlantic zone was styled the "Army of North-eastern Virginia," which became the famous "Army of the Potomac," and as such, alone, will live in history. This statement of Lieutenant Owen is new to almost everyone; but it is not more novel that there were two Third

Corps in the Union Armies in Virginia in 1862, although there was only one, in unique grandeur, THE Third Army Corps, Army of the Potomac. There were two corps recognized as Third in the summer of 1862; one "*the Old Fighting Third Corps as we understand it*," of which the First and Second Divisions (in reality all that remained of the original Third Corps, commanded by Heintzleman under McClellan on the Peninsula, and afterwards under Pope) were consolidated with the Second Corps, and the Third Division, an entire stranger to the old Third and added to it after Gettysburg, which was consolidated in the spring of 1864 with the Sixth. This disruption or assassination of the Third Corps was one of the most unjust and morally unauthorized actions of tyranny done during the war. The other Third Corps, in the Army of Virginia under Pope, was commanded by McDowell, who previously had what was known as the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac. This double enumeration has led to misapprehensions, because, in the summer of 1862, there were two corps known as the Third, one under Heintzleman, one under McDowell, the latter entirely distinct, serving under Pope.]

Over three years (repeating to emphasize) was occupied in collecting information in connection with the last six months of the career of the two armies of the Potomac. At that time no idea was entertained that the Official Records of the Rebellion would ever be collected, collated and published. At the rate they are printed, it will be years before the transactions of the spring of 1865 can be expected to appear. Consequently, without them, any narrative must be based on what is accessible; the inaccessible cannot be taken into account. The plans which appear with this battle were prepared with great care, under the supervision of Major-General A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A., for a work which was published in eight parts in 1872 and 1873, entitled "La Royale;" or "the Grand Hunt of the Army of the [Union] Potomac." To this General Humphreys alludes, and cites it as an authority in the Preface of his "Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865," published in 1883, issued by Charles Scribner's Sons, as the concluding number of their War Series. No expense nor labor was spared in preparing "La Royale," and the author is greatly indebted to a number of individuals for assistance in the shape of communications, statements, diaries and reports, and likewise the loan of pamphlets and rare books which he was not able to purchase or even to hear of except by accident. If any errors have occurred they are the result, NOT of prejudice, but of accident.

The other two maps or plans likewise appearing in this con-

nection were prepared under the supervision of General Humphreys. The writer is also in possession of the, or an original, map of Colonel W. H. Paine, "Pathfinder of the Army of the Potomac." It is on a very large scale and all the movements or marches of the Union or loyal columns were marked upon it by Colonel Paine. The writer had also a number of small maps or diagrams, as well as those published in rough or in detail. The dispatches and telegrams were copied from the collection made for and in the possession of Major-General Alexander S. Webb, during the winter and spring of 1864-5, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, or from copies furnished from Washington. The reports cited are from copies made at Washington. All possible assistance to render the result correct was furnished by different officers of the combined Second-Third Corps, and other friends and acquaintances who participated in the events under consideration.

Why Lee made any stand at all at Cumberland Church, or the Heights of Farmville, seems inexplicable. The only troops harassing him after he had got across the Appomattox were the combined Second-Third Corps, under Humphreys, which had followed him across High Bridge, and Crook's cavalry, which had fired into his stragglers; but this cavalry had been stopped by the burning of the bridges at Farmville, which occurred under their noses [Tremain]. A time-table of events would be very instructive. Adjutant Owen, in his book, "In Camp and Battle" (page 377), says that Longstreet's command, including that formerly under Hill, reached Farmville early this morning, and the Washington Artillery "went into park to rest." "Provisions were distributed for the first time."

[A comparatively small stiffening of infantry, such as both Pleasonton and J. E. B. Stuart had at Brandy Station, would have either made Gregg's charge effective or else saved him from the panic which ensued, as Tremain admits, and have enabled him to hold his ground. To get this infantry across, if they were unable to imitate the fording by Humphreys' troops through Flat Creek, just about as wide as the Appomattox at Farmville, eighty to one hundred feet (376), with the water up to their arm-pits (378), while bridges were built in an incredibly short space of time for the passage of the rest of the infantry and of the artillery and ambulances, "a temporary bridge might have been improvised with wagons loaded with stones at intervals instead of trestles." When the militia under General Robert van Rensselaer, in October, 1780, in pursuit of Sir John Johnson, refused to ford the Mohawk River, "the wagons were driven into the river, behind each other, and the troops passed from one to the other by wading on the



tongues." The Mohawk is great deal wider, fully as deep, if not much deeper in the channel near Fort Rensselaer, and much more rapid than the Appomattox at Farmville. This method of fording is quoted from the proceedings of a court martial and the testimony of Major Lewis R. Morris.]

Owen is brevity itself, but he seems to refer to Lee's general's dispositions to make a stand. Lee had gained sufficient upon Humphreys "to intrench strongly." This looks like as if hours had been thrown away and the gain of a few hours would have brought his van to Appomattox Station in time for his infantry to have saved the train of cars which were captured by Custer. About 1.20 P. M. Humphreys again struck Lee, and made such an impression that he claims to have got in among the Rebel batteries, which were afterwards silenced by his own. About the same time the head of the Twenty-fourth Corps, to which a pontoon train was attached, was at Farmville. At 2.20 P. M. Wright's Sixth Corps was in Farmville. Humphreys had asked the direct support of the Fifth Corps, which was most handy and which might have followed him straight, without delay or difficulty, across High Bridge.

Consider the situation. The Army of Northern Virginia, whatever was its real strength, was at Cumberland Church in a strong position, strongly entrenched, with every apparent intention of making a decided stand. Humphreys had two divisions, twelve thousand nominally, and, within three miles, Barlow's division, six thousand men. Deducting stragglers, &c., he may not have had two-thirds of that number in hand. At Farmville, four miles away, was the Twenty-fourth Corps, say ten thousand, allowing for straggling, besides a portion of the Twenty-fifth Corps; in fact, Ord's Army of the James, immediately with him, over fifteen thousand men; the Sixth Corps, eighteen thousand men, and Crook's division of cavalry, five thousand men. The Fifth Corps numbered about seventeen thousand; it is impossible to arrive at actual strength, for very large allowances must be made for stragglers and malingerers and honestly used up men. Deduct one-quarter or more from the returns on paper and there were forty to forty-five thousand effectives, gradually piling up and piled up in Farmville before, at, and after noon, 7th April, 1865.

Lee, according to Humphreys, was in his presence until 8 P. M., and how much longer he could not tell. What was being done, except by Humphreys, between 1 P. M. and whatever hour Lee moved off in the darkness, by the Union infantry—nothing. Meade, to his credit be it chronicled, was urging energetic action and promising support and assistance to Humphreys, which was not given. The cavalry forded belly-deep; no hour is given. Adju-



tant Owen (378), says it was in the afternoon, which may mean any hour after midday. At 2 p. m. the Twenty-fourth Corps ought to have been marching across the river; the Sixth Corps at 4 p. m., on improvised bridges. That Lee had not budged, is plainly shown that late in the afternoon (4.30 p. m., A. A. H.) Miles undertook to make a flank attack in reverse and was bloodily repulsed, although the Rebel attempt to follow up their success also came to grief.

Now turn to the maps. The main road to Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox at Farmville, and runs from a mile to a mile and a half in the rear of Lee's position—that is to the west of Cumberland Church. Adjutant Owen admits that, if the Union cavalry had not been repulsed, Lee might have been taken prisoner. These are his words (379): "It was fortunate that we were there just on the nick of time, for had Gregg obtained possession of the road, he stood a good chance of cutting off General Lee and staff and capturing them."

If any of the cavalry and infantry who were on the south of the Appomattox had crossed it further up, west of Farmville, and there were several fords in that direction and a bridge at Sand's, they could have struck the Lynchburg road in the direction of Concord Church (Court House?) or certainly at New Store, which was reached by the Rebel forces in the course of the night of the 7th–8th. For this inaction, inertion, Meade certainly does not seem to have been to blame in the least until towards night, when he appears to have given up in despair; for he telegraphed to Humphreys: "You will have to take care of yourself." Meade had been right and Grant wrong at Amelia Salt Sulphur Springs on the early morning of the 6th. Grant himself was at Farmville somewhere between four and five o'clock on the 7th, because Wright telegraphs the fact at the latter hour.

It may be sacrilege to the masses to criticise Lee in this retreat, or Grant in following him up, but Lt. Mangold of the Prussian Artillery, in his consideration of the Army of Virginia in August, 1862, makes use of an expression in regard to Pope which is not inapplicable to whoever is responsible for what was done and what was not done at Farmville on the 7th April after twelve o'clock. "He did not appear to have had the ability to think himself into the situation." In regard to Pope, far be it from the writer, who is his friend, to endorse the opinion that that this remark applies, or is just, to Pope.

When the great object of a three years' struggle, the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the opportunity was so promising and near at hand at Cumberland Church, what was the use of postponing it a day and half or two days, and thirty to fifty

miles (according to writers) farther on, to occur at Appomattox Court House.

Quite an able, bold, highly educated soldier and author wrote an article for the *Galaxy*, entitled "Broken Idols," and he certainly proved his case if correct in his facts, and as facts are yet established, he was right and did so. Lee was one of the "Broken Idols," and he proved himself so by losing so many precious hours at Cumberland Church. It is true that Humphreys was close upon his heels, and had torn him sorely and bled him severely on the preceding day, never relaxing the pressure. Lee was in a very bad spot at Antietam when McClellan let him go, although McClellan can shift a portion of the blame on the shoulders of very bad counselors. Lee was in a worse place at Williamsport and Falling Waters. Meade let him escape, although it has been asserted that Lincoln telegraphed to him to attack, and if failure resulted to show that the President's orders as his complete exoneration, and if he triumphed to destroy the dispatch and assume all the glory. In other words, Lincoln was willing to assume the whole responsibility of failure and to relinquish every claim of credit for success.

Compare the pursuit by Thomas after Nashville with that made by any other Union general after a victory. Thomas had to get everything ready to profit by a success to follow up a victory. He had to mount his cavalry as well as to organize his troops; to gather up the reins after he had harnessed the team. To make his own command complete Sherman had depleted Thomas, and yet, when the army which fronted Thomas before Nashville had been defeated, the following it up left nothing but scattered wrecks, resembling the shattered timbers of a mighty ship which had struck a mightier rock, and the sea is covered with fragments to reward the bold wrecker who amid the tempest puts forth to harvest them. Had Sherman left Thomas the pontoon train which the latter asserted belonged to him, he could have crossed Duck River once, and then there would have been nothing left of Hood but chips.

It is all true. Lee broke away on the 2d-3d April, 1865, and the casting about, search and pursuit, in many senses, began on the 3d; but the real hunt, the chase, with all the excitement of catching sight of the magnificent game and again losing sight of it, and following the tracks and droppings and scent, did not begin until the 6th, when Humphreys, always vigilant, alacritous and ready, took in the whole revelation of Lee's apparition and movements at a glance, and never lost track or hold, more or less strong, until noon of the 9th, when nothing but orders prevented the combined Second-Third Corps, supported by the Sixth,

from settling the question, as it should have been settled, not by *muchas palabras*, but *vi et armis*—destruction, as it should have been. "*Pauca verba*, Sir John;" or "*pauca pallabris*," as Shakespeare reads in divers places.

So much eulogy has been expended on the following up of Lee, and Grant has been declared a greater general than Frederic the Great, or Hannibal, and that perhaps he equalled a Julius Cæsar, it may seem like sacrilege to question the sagacity of even his most insignificant movements. Why, however, Julius Cæsar was placed ahead of Hannibal is difficult to conceive, since Frederic the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, and a number of other competent judges unite in the decision that Hannibal—Montesquieu's "Colossus of Antiquity"—was the greatest captain that ever appeared on this planet.

General Humphreys, the soul of energy or strength and despatch, was always of the opinion that, after the victory of Myles, if he had continued his march in force towards Sutherland's Station, pursuing the enemy by the Claiborne Road, instead, as ordered, of leaving the work to Myles' Division alone, it is probable that the whole Rebel force would have been captured on the morning of the 2d April. As it was, Myles gained a brilliant little victory; but the majority of the enemy retreated and moved up the Appomattox toward Amelia Court House, where they arrived about midday on the 4th April. As it was, the combined Second-Third Corps was recalled towards Petersburg, and in the unnecessary movements to and fro Lee gained a start of twenty hours. Sheridan seems to have coincided in this view.

Lee's second loss of time was on the 5th, when he actually made a movement towards Jetersville with a view of attacking Sheridan. This involved another of those night marches which were more wearing on his tired troops than even the want of provisions, on which so much stress has been laid. It is utterly impossible in this summary to go into anything like details, but the facts will be found on pages 374-'90.—Owen's "In Camp and Battle."

Thus it will be seen that Lee's tergiversations or delays were as suicidal and fatal to his escape as any retarding was to the other side, whoever may have been to blame. Still, as the chief got the glory, he ought to bear it; at all events, it is easy enough to add and subtract. Lee lost hours of inestimable value on the 5th, and again on the 7th. To compensate for this involved night-work—most telling on well-fed men and absolutely killing to fasting mortals, when no rest was afforded on an ensuing day. Without the delays which can safely be set down as at least equivalent to a day's march, if Lee had kept straight on

he would have reached Appomattox Court House by noon of the 8th, at latest. From Petersburg to that point is not over one hundred miles by the longest route; which, to get over, certainly does not require more than three days of forced march, equal to that made by the Sixth Corps hurrying on to Gettysburg, or of the Fifth Corps and of the Ninth Corps hastening to Appomattox Court House.

[NOTE. MARCHING.—Simply to exhibit what infantry can do with their legs, General Crawford brought up “3000 fresh troops” to join Wellington on the battlefield of Taleveira, 29th July, 1809, “having passed over, in regular order, sixty-two English miles in the preceding twenty-six hours” (Alison, III., 321 [2]); and Lord Lake, with the English cavalry, 1st April, 1805, made a forced march to surprise the Mahratta horse, came upon them unawares, utterly routed them, dispersed them, slew one thousand, and returned to his camp the same day, after a march, in twelve hours, of fifty miles (A., III., 169 [1]). Even this was exceeded by Lord Lake’s pursuit and defeat of Holkar at Furrackabad, when the greater part of the English cavalry had ridden seventy miles within twenty-four hours, besides fighting and routing the whole of those horsemen which had been the terror of that region. [*Ibid*, 166 (2).]

“Nicholson’s Indian Mutiny” (374-5): “The splendid, admirable and effective Punjab Guards, says Wilson in his ‘Zanskar, or the Abode of Man,’ half foot, half horsemen, marched (at the outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny) from Mudan six hours after it got the order, and was at Attok (thirty miles off) next morning, fully equipped for service. This legion was pushed on to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles or thirty regular marches, which they accomplished in twenty-one regular marches. After thus marching twenty-seven miles a day for three weeks, the Guards reached Delhi on 9th June, and three hours afterwards engaged the enemy hand to hand, every officer being more or less wounded.”

Lynchburg is one hundred and twenty miles W. S. W. of Richmond; Appomattox Court House, as stated, less than one hundred. In view of the tremendous marches made at different times by troops, and kept up day after day, six days of energetic progress would have carried Lee to Lynchburg without necessitating any of the fighting to which he was subjected. [Farmville to Appomattox Court House twenty-five miles in a bee-line, Petersburg to Jetersville forty miles, Jetersville to Farmville about twenty.] On the 6th the combined Second-Third Corps marched and fought from Jetersville to the mouth of Sailor’s Creek, 6th. They



were on the move from early morning to dark night, fighting all the time over fourteen miles, having already moved from their camps in the morning three or four miles before they struck the enemy. It has been called one hundred miles in round numbers from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House by the routes followed. Perhaps the most direct march would have greatly shortened the distance, but, at all events, Lee had from the night of the 2d-3d to the early afternoon of the 8th to do the distance, and at that time no Union troops whatever were there to annoy him, to stop him or to gobble his trains of provisions.

"*Livre de Guerre Moderne a l'usage des Militaires de toutes les Armes et de tous les Pays*, par César L. D'Albeca, ancien officier supérieur d'état-major, ingénieur civil, &c. Londres: Berlin: La Haye: Paris: St. Petersbourg: Rome: Turin: 1872."

In the above work, pages 261, &c., Section "Military Bridges," a great deal of information will be found pertinent to the circumstances under treatment. M. D'Albeca, speaking of the employment of casks as floats, omits to mention that large [tobacco] hogsheads [of which there were plenty in Farmville] might have been used instead of trestles, filled with stones or any rubbish, as piers; as we have seen that the Appomattox is not over one hundred and twenty feet wide, five such piers would have permitted the use of beams from houses of the most ordinary size. Perhaps this would have been the handiest and most substantial way of building a strong temporary bridge, to give strength to the piers which would have required the placing of the hogsheads in tiers. They might have been simply girded with ropes, with no use of anchors, because there was no freshet in the river at the time. In fact I received a letter from Farmville, in answer to questions in regard to Ford, stating that, owing to the dam above the railroad bridge, the water does not deepen in the spring.

General Humphreys perfectly agreed with me as long as I continued to write and publish on this subject, and I was astonished to find in his "Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865" (page 388) the following paragraph: "The bridges were burnt and our troops concentrated about Farmville during the day were, with the exception of Crook's cavalry, prevented from crossing, as the river was not fordable for infantry, and barely for cavalry."

[There seems to be little use, then, of discussing the matter of Fording and Bridging the Appomattox, 7th April, 1865. Troops recruited from brave peoples or races, disciplined, and well officered, have never failed to respond to the will and wishes of a chief in whom they have confidence. Ever since the noted day on which Perdiccas forded the Nile to attack Ptolemy Soter, and his



brave troops fought breast deep in that river, B. C. 321, no stream four to four and a half feet deep has ever stopped troops determined to get across. According to Tremain, Crook's battery animals forded with their owners; under such circumstances infantry sufficient to stiffen the cavalry could have waded or have been carried across, "*en croupe*," behind the troopers. Much as I have studied and talked upon this matter, one fact has been overlooked until this very day (17, 3, '86) which disproves the impassability of the Appomattox by infantry and cavalry.—At page 17 of his "War Memoranda," part II, published herewith, Tremain mentions LORD'S BATTERY *as being with the cavalry that waded or forded*, and among the "Errata" noted by Tremain himself, under date 17th December, 1885, he says "this line [that is a new line of battle to meet the victorious rebels] was formed, and READE'S BATTERY put in position under his [Tremain's] personal direction, while Crook was rallying Gregg's brigade." General Tremain is a lawyer of high standing and experience, and therefore perfectly acquainted with the force and effect of language and testimony, and until anyone can disprove his personal evidence, the fact remains incontrovertible *that the Appomattox at Farmville was NOT "impassable," but was passable for cavalry and their pack trains and artillery, and THEREFORE fordable for infantry.* Here rests MY case as to FORDING at Farmville, 7th April, 1865.]

Why General Humphreys altered his opinion I could never understand. His book was published in 1883, and he died in the ensuing winter, so that there was no opportunity of discovering his reasons for the above paragraph. We were in constant correspondence, exchanging letters once a week as a rule, sometimes oftener, much oftener. Humphreys was a very affectionate man, very determined at the moment, none more so; but very easily influenced by those that he loved, and he was particularly fond of Wright, who (the latter) was worthy of any man's love. Although an immense amount of information had been accumulated, I was determined to obtain facts which could not be controverted, and Mr. C. M. Bissell, Superintendent of the Hudson R. R. R., wrote to the Superintendent of the Norfolk and Western R. R., and the latter kindly sent, not only a plan, but answers to various queries.

Between the piers of the railroad bridge at Farmville the distance is one hundred and four to one hundred and eight feet, and the length of the wagon-bridge one hundred and nineteen feet, out to out. The banks of the river are low about six to eight feet over ordinary water, soil sandy, and the depth of the stream at ordinary stage of water two and one half to three feet. It will be remembered that Mr. Hooper stated that the water, if

not affected by freshets below the dam, and there was no freshet in the river at the time now treated of. Superintendent Sands, N. & W. R. R., says there is no ford near the town. Does this mean at this date, 1885? because the statement directly contradicts several letters written from the spot by other parties twelve to twenty years ago. Maps and facts. One of the facts is, Crook's division of cavalry forded belly-deep, five-thousand strong, heavily laden battery animals, and batteries; some of the Sixth (?) Corps artillery forded, also infantry. While dictating this very paragraph a neighbor, who served in the Nineteenth Corps, told me that this very day he drove a loaded wagon through a ford two feet and nine inches deep, clay-bottom and rutted, and that for personal and peculiar reasons he measured the depth. Thirty-three inches is more than belly-deep ordinary horses.

Conceding that the Appomattox is one hundred and twenty feet wide wide out and out, and thirty to thirty-six inches deep, these measurements exactly accord with the conditions established by the work—"The Book of Modern War"—in regard to military trestle bridges, which says that they are proper for rivers less than fifty yards across, between twelve and thirteen feet deep, with a current equivalent to about four miles an hour; maximum height of trestles twelve to fifteen feet; the bottom ought to be firm and comparatively level. In extreme cases a depth of ten to twelve feet justifies the use of trestles if the current is not strong. In river of little depth and not rapid the body of the bridge supports may be constituted of wagons and gun-carriages.

When General van Renselaer was following up Sir John Johnson, in the autumn of 1780, he improvised a bridge with ordinary country wagons across the Mohawk, near Ft. Renselaer, and the Mohawk, except after long droughts, is a wider and more rapid and difficult stream to ford than the Appomattox, or at all events was so over one hundred years ago—yes, forty years ago; but since the piers of the railroad bridge were standing, and there were any quantity of large trees and buildings in close vicinity to furnish material, a cantilever bridge, even supposing that there had to be a single support or pier in the centre, could have been immediately thrown.

William H. Spanburgh, now Superintendent of the Hudson Bridge Works, has done a great deal of work in the region around my home. He enlisted as private in the 159th Regiment N. Y. V. I., was wounded five times, four times in one battle, and was promoted to a lieutenancy. He is a practical man, prompt boss, and able mechanic. He came on a place with five men and, with ordinary lumber, in half a day—about four hours working time—built a temporary bridge across a ravine eighty-four feet

wide, sufficiently strong to bear the transportation of the iron-work for the permanent structure. Some of the supports had to be about twenty feet high. With such an example the matter can be reduced down to a simple rule of three. If five men with material brought to them as they worked could put up a viaduct which would enable men to cross with very heavy weights in four or five hours, how long ought it to have taken veteran engineers, after several years of active service, with an unlimited supply of practiced laborers and adequate material, to bridge the Appomattox at Farmville so that a couple of corps, with their guns and trains, could cross?

The feasibility, or impossibility, of Bridging or Forging the Appomattox was not an insoluble problem, but one based on facts demonstrable then, as now; the ordinary depth of water is given by scientific testimony.

A resident, an eye-witness, wrote there was no freshet in the stream at that date. Crook's cavalry, wading or fording it backwards and forwards, verifies these statements. Over and above this fording by the cavalry, certain localities are designated on the maps as fords.

If infantry and artillery could not ford, the river was not so deep but that workmen could wade in and place trestles.

The span of the railroad bridge is 109 feet; that of the wagon-bridge 119 feet. There are five hundred buildings in the town. There are few buildings which will not furnish beams 20 feet long. Concede the greatest width of the stream 120 feet. Five very strong, ten strong trestles would have been sufficient, and they could have been put together, placed, ballasted and secured in an hour. Meanwhile the rest of the material could have been selected and brought to the spot, and another hour would have more than sufficed to have completed a bridge over which fifteen men could have marched abreast, eight mounted men, or two equipages. A division of cavalry, however, did pass to and fro, having forded belly deep—this is incontrovertible proof of depth and condition of stream, and therefore it could have been forded again by other troops.

Four or five mechanics came on my place under a boss who had been an old soldier. One team brought the materials, and in half a day they built a structure in some places twenty feet high, over which they were enabled to carry with safety the iron for a permanent bridge strong enough to permit the passage of heavily-loaded teams; a bridge which was guaranteed to permit the passage of 33 cwt., and they said that they made the guarantee far below the actual carrying power.

Reduce these facts to a simple rule of three. If one team and five men could construct a temporary viaduct in half a day, what ought not the thousands under the direction of military authority and scientific proficiency, with ample materials at hand, have accomplished in one hour. My bridge was 84 feet long; the bridge of Farmville would have been less than half longer; the supports of my bridge had to be twice as high. The fact that the men at Farmville had to work in water up to their waists is a consideration not worthy of being taken into account; railroad rails would have answered for beams and ties, simple boards crisscrossed would have constituted a roadway capable of sustaining any weight. All the difficulty would have been the trestles, or cob-piers. Ingenuity would have found no difficulty in making and placing them. The will and the directing mind was wanting. Why? Echo answers, why! and the echo would be repeated by every effort at investigation.

In regard to bridging, Captain James Chester, Third United States Artillery, in "Correspondence," page 276, September, 1855, number of the *Journal of the U. S. Military Service Institution*, says that yesterday [23d June, 1885], I attended the Military Exhibition in Agricultural Hall. "I saw two *trestle bays of a bridge laid by pontooniers, and a piece of artillery driven over it inside five minutes.*" As no figures are given it is impossible to be definite, but in the *Aide Mémoire*, published in England, 22 feet is given as the length of the main beam, and thus five trestle bays would have sufficed to bridge the Appomattox at Farmville, and if two bays—all the appliances prepared and ready at hand—were laid and artillery passed in five minutes, certainly five bays ought to have been improvised with all kinds of material in abundance, and any amount of labor disposable. There was no absolute need, however, of constructing a trestle bridge. It appears the railroad bridge piers were there, plenty of trees, lumber, &c., for a cantilever bridge. If Suworow, when the arch of the Devil's Bridge on the St. Gothard's route was destroyed, leaving a chasin 30 feet wide, and Suworow was able to improvise a bridge out of trunks of trees lashed together with the sashes of his officers, practical Americans ought to have been able to bridge the Appomattox without a moment's delay. I am not engineer enough to use technical terms, but educated officers ought to know that there is exactly such a method of laying a bridge described as would have been precisely applicable to the case of Farmville. Prolonges spliced would have been amply sufficient for hauling and for lashing, shoving out long timbers from either pier with what it would seem are termed "end-ties" in the centre.



[In England they hold what are called Royal Military tournaments, in which all the different Arms exhibit their efficiency. In the "Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine" for October, 1885, Vol. 3, No. 16, are two illustrations: 1. "Royal Engineer Bridge Equipment, or Field Wagon;" 2. "Royal Engineers Constructing a Flying Bridge over a River protected by Artillery and Infantry," with a text in explanation which is hereinafter presented. If a bridge could be thrown over a stream fifteen feet wide in four minutes, a bridge at that rate ought to have been thrown over a stream one hundred and five feet wide in twenty-eight minutes; allowing for ignorance of the depth and bottom double the time, and then it would take fifty-six minutes; this with a simple detachment just sufficient to handle the material. Take into consideration, as on the 7th April, 1865, no necessity of any preparations for protection, a redundancy of materials, close at hand, and a positive superfluity of disciplined labor; and double that time, two hours, ought to have sufficed for the construction of means of crossing a stream one hundred and five feet wide and fordable by cavalry, "belly deep," in less than two hours.

"A fairly representative stream being laid down, fordable by infantry, but impassable for guns, a mixed force essayed to cross with artillery, and storm a work on the other side. For the first time, a body of Royal engineers and infantry had a chance of showing their ability before an audience at the Royal Military Tournament. Covered by the fire of artillery and infantry, the Royal engineers threw a bridge over a stream fifteen feet wide in less than four minutes. The infantry, having first topped a twelve-foot wall "like birds," kept down the fire of the fort until the bridge was completed, then rushed the bridge, followed by the guns, and escalated a "practicable" wall with great dash and vigor. Of course, many things were taken for granted. Real rivers, real enemies, and real bullets are not to be found in the arena at Islington, but, as a military spectacle, the infantry display of 1885 marks a fresh advance in the work of the Royal Military Tournament. The gymnastic training of the infantry, the technical skill and speed of the Royal Engineers, and the protective and covering work of the fire of infantry and artillery, were as well illustrated as was possible in their space available. All branches of the service are having a fair turn, and all efforts are in the direction of persistent and continuous improvement."]

What makes me dwell upon this subject and repeat with so much emphasis, is the incapability of understanding how it was that when there was every chance of ending a terrible struggle of four years within three or four miles and with amply sufficient



numbers to make the attempt then and there almost a certainty, and a surplus of numbers to send ahead to make the matter a certainty somewhere else, Grant did not see it. Grant never saw anything he did not choose to see. These facts, which appear to be susceptible of perfectly clear proof, have always awakened questions as to the Why no really strenuous effort was made to finish on the afternoon of the 7th, and Why the tremendous strain was kept up for the further distance of thirty or forty miles and forty-four hours.

Imagine the scene and the idea of a large army collected on the south shore of a small stream, watching the smoke and hearing the rattle and roar of a battle which could decide and terminate a long contest, not crossing or being allowed to cross to the assistance of their comrades engaged within three or four miles. It was almost the same aggravating case as that of the battle of Prague, 6th May, 1657, when the whole division or column of Prince Maurice were prevented from crossing by the want of sufficient pontoons to bridge the Moldau. The famous cavalry General Sedlitz was so excited that he attempted to ford or swim to the assistance of his comrades. He spurred his horse into the Moldau, became entangled in a quicksand, and was with difficulty extricated. There is a vast difference between the Moldau and the Appomattox; and in the latter case there was a ponton train present, and if it had been absent plenty of materials to build a bridge. Moreover, there was a ford by which cavalry crossed "belly deep," with their pack-teams and artillery. (Study up Alexander on the Hydaspes, B. C. 326, and his method of crossing in the face of the army of Porus.)

All military histories, as a rule, are perfectly unsatisfactory on the subject of Bridging and Fording. They deal in generalities, and not in details. They are as blank in this respect as Cæsar in regard to the hygiene of his camps, or sanitary measures, which led almost every writer to declare that there was no medical provisions or organizations in the Roman armies.

Under practical, energetic and audacious generals, with intelligent troops, improvised bridges have been thrown, which render the usual excuses almost ridiculous. Throughout reading and study, most extensive and careful, sufficient examples were discovered to prove that in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred, where a stream proved any obstacle, it did not exist in nature, but in the general which it stopped. If the curious reader takes up a book to learn the rules of fording, he will find set down: "A ford should not be more than thirty to thirty-six inches in depth for infantry, and forty inches for artillery; though there are many examples of fords having been crossed, which

were four feet in depth ; but, in such cases, there must be hardly any current." (Jervis' "Manual of Field Operations," page 381.) Forty inches never stopped any one whose personal interest beckoned him across. Captain Leopold von Orlich, Prussian Army, in his "Notes in India," speaking of the Ravee River, gives its breadth as 200 feet, "with a depth of three and-a-half feet, so that it is fordable at many places." I know a farmer who is accustomed to ford with loaded team through a measured depth of three and-a-half feet, and never considered it a matter of any more than inconvenience.

How often have troops forded up to the waist, up to the arm-pits, up to the shoulders, up to the chin. Humphreys' infantry forded Flat Creek arm-pit deep on the morning of the 6th April, 1865.

It is very remarkable, and almost unaccountable, how little is related in detail of many extraordinary cases of improvising bridges and fording of streams and rivers. Even technical works are strangely silent on such important subjects, dealing in generalities when and where they should be most attentive to particulars. One of the best examples of bold and successful Fording is related in H. B. McClellan's "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," at pages 323, 324. "It had been necessary to halt the command several times since the 25th June, 1863, to graze the horses, for the country was destitute of provisions, and Stuart had brought no vehicles with him, save ambulances. Upon reaching Dranesville, Hampton's Brigade was sent to *Rowser's Ford*, and made the passage early in the night ; but the Potomac was so wide, the water so deep, and the current so strong, that the ford was reported impracticable for the artillery and ambulances. Another ford in the vicinity was examined, under circumstances of great danger, by Captain R. B. Kennon of Stuart's staff, but it was found to offer no better prospect of success, and Stuart determined to cross at Rowser's, if it were within the limits of possibility. *The caissons and limber-chests were emptied on the Virginia shore, and the ammunition was carried over by the cavalrymen in their hands.* The guns and caissons, *although entirely submerged* during nearly the whole crossing, were safely dragged through the river and up the steep and slippery bank, and by three o'clock on the morning of the 28th the rear-guard had crossed, and the whole command was established upon Maryland soil. No more difficult achievement was accomplished by the cavalry during the war. The night was calm and without a moon. No prominent object marked the entrance to the ford on either side, but horse followed horse through *nearly a mile of water, which often covered the saddles of the riders.* When the

current was strong the line would unconsciously be borne down the river, sometimes so far as to cause danger of missing the ford, when some bold rider would advance from the opposite shore and correct the alignment. Energy, endurance and skill were taxed to the utmost; but the crossing was effected, and so silently that the nearest neighbors were not aware of it until daylight." Extract from pages 323 and 324 of McClellan's "Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart." Boston, 1885.

"When the cavalry reached Columbia [middle of March, 1862] the bridge over Duck River was found in flames and the *river at flood stage*" [bridges were constructed and thrown and completed on the 30th]. On the same day the river became fordable. "General Nelson succeeded in getting part of his division across by fording on the 29th." Most of his troops crossed by fording on the 30th. Buell was up at Shiloh, 6 P. M., distance ninety miles from Columbia; say eighteen miles a day. —Major General Don Carlos Buell in *Century*, March, 1886 (pages 751-2), "Shiloh Reviewed."

["His (Wellington's) clearness of judgment in military matters was wonderful. It was shown once by his observation that two villages stood directly opposite each other on either side of a river, and consequently some means of communication must exist between them. His guides declared there was no ford, but his determined will told him to look for himself; he found a ford, crossed, and won the decisive battle of Assye. Wellington was a typical Englishman in his tenacity of purpose."—Page 105. "The Will Power," by J. Milner Fothergill, M.D. London, 1885.]

Pertinent to fording where there was no opposition, as at Farmville, according to Note from my Knapsack, "Putnam's Magazine," vol. 4, April, 1854, page 372, 374, the United States dragoons found no difficulty in fording the Rio Grande, where the river was 272 yards wide and 51 inches deep, with a rapid current; it is true the bottom was hard.

"When the Mail in which I [Godfrey T. Vigne, who traveled in the United States in 1831, and wrote 'Six Months in America,' published in America in 1833, page 100] was traveling, arrived at the North Branch of the Potomac, we found it so swollen by the late rains that a passage seemed not only dangerous but impracticable. The coachman, however, a cool and determined fellow, crossed over on horseback; he then returned, placed one of the passengers on the near leader, and resolutely drove his four horses into the running torrent, which was sixty or seventy yards in width, running like a mill-race, and so deep that it reached nearly up to the backs of the horses. I was with him on the box. The inside passengers pulled off their

coats and prepared to swim. The water forced itself into the coach; but we reached the opposite bank without disaster. On the preceding evening the coachman had only prevented the mail from being entirely carried away, by turning the horses' heads down the stream, so that the coach and horses were swimming for nearly thirty yards."—Page 107. "Six Months in America," by Godfrey T. Vigne, Eng. Philadelphia, 1833.

As to fording arm-pit deep, shoulder or neck deep, and even chin-deep, by infantry, there are plenty of examples. Ewell's corps, or division, escaped in that way on the night of 13th–14th July, 1863.

Parkman, in his "Montcalm and Wolfe," 1, 412, states, August, 1756: "Early in the morning Montcalm had ordered Rigaud to cross the river with the Canadians and Indians. There was a ford three-quarters of a league above the forts, and here they passed over unopposed, the English not having discovered the movement. The only danger was from the river. Some of the men were forced to swim, others waded to the waist, and others to the neck; but they all crossed safely, and presently showed themselves at the edge of the woods, yelling and firing their guns, too far for much execution, but not too far to discourage the garrison."

Another remarkable case of fording was that of the Elbe, near Tangermund, by the Swedish cavalry and artillery, under Gustavus. ("Harte," I., 363). "The bare recital of this act of intrepidity, for nothing was lost, but here and there an empty wagon, amazed Tilly beyond measure, as the stream in that part was not supposed to be fordable."

"A few days after, when the Swedes took Havelburg by assault, Winkel's Blue Brigade advanced to the attack through the Havel, though the water reached up to the men's shoulders ("Harte," I., 364). When Gustavus captured Frankfort-on-the-Oder, on Palm Sunday, 1631 (Festival of the surrender of Lee, 1865), Monroe's regiment, assaulting, crossed the wet ditch among mud and water, which came up to their gorgets" [throat deep, and won the bastion].

In 1572, during the war fought against Spain for the independence of the United States of Holland (Watson's "Philip II.," New York Society Library copy, 1–315–16) "Tergoes was relieved by fording the Hondt or Western Scheldt, seven miles across, by the Spanish, German and Walloon troops."

"On 28th of September, 1575, as soon as it was dark, and the tide had begun to retire, Ulloa entered the water [the Ford between the islet of Philipsland and Duveland] at the head of his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were fol-



lowed by two hundred pioneers; and the rear-guard was formed by a company of Walloons, commanded by an officer of the name of Peralta. They could march only three men abreast, on the top of a ridge of earth or sand, and were often obliged to wade up to the shoulders, and to bear their muskets on their heads to preserve them from the water. They had advanced but a little way when the Dutch and Zealanders approached, and began a furious discharge of their small arms and artillery. And not satisfied with this, many of them leaped into the water, and with hooks fastened to the ends of long poles laid hold of the soldiers oppressed with the weight of the elements through which they toiled; massacring some, and plunging others in the waves. Nothing but the darkness of the night, which prevented the two squadrons of the enemy's ships from acting in concert, could have saved the royalists from destruction. But, notwithstanding the difficulties under which they labored, they persisted, bold and dauntless, in their course, exhorting and assisting one another; and without quitting their ranks, repelling the enemy, and defending themselves as well as their desperate circumstances would allow. Their calamities increased as they approached to the opposite shore. For besides that their vigor was impaired, they had deeper water to pass, and the enemy's ships could come nearer to the ford. At last, however, they reached the land in time to save themselves from destruction. The banks were lined with a numerous body of troops, and if these troops had behaved with an ordinary degree of resolution, it is impossible that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water, and exhausted with fatigue, could have stood before them. But unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their commander was killed by an accidental shot of one of his own men. Consternation seized his troops and they fled in a most dastardly manner before an enemy unable to pursue."—("Watson's" History Reign Philip II. of Spain, Vol. II., page 164. London, 1813.)

In October, 1651, Admiral Blake, in the service of the Commonwealth, was ordered to make a descent upon the Island of Jersey (Dixon's "Blake," 148). \* \* \* \*

"At eleven o'clock at night, Carteret, the Royal Governor, could no longer keep his men together. They had been under arms three days and two nights, during which time the rain had fallen without intermission; they had made several marches and counter-marches over bad roads and broken ground; and they stood the fierce though intermittent fire from the enemy's ships. At sunset he allowed them to depart for the neighboring villages in search of refreshment and repose; he himself with a few dragoons alone remaining on the beach, along which, how-



ever, he had all the camp fires lighted. The weather changed in the night. The rain ceased, the wind died away, and the swell of the sea abated; but not a star was visible, no moon arose to tell the tale of preparation; for years, the pitchy darkness of the sky that night was recollected as the omen of disaster. The fires along the shore appeared to warn the Admiral that his endeavor to throw Hayne's regiment on shore at that point would be attended with other difficulties than a threatening sea and a rocky coast on a dark night. Yet nothing could check his ardor. So long familiar with success, he despised obstacles; and towards the close of the Civil War even the Roundhead soldiers had learned to feel that contempt for Cavalier prowess, which at an earlier period the Cavaliers had affected to feel for the valor of tailors and serving-men. At eleven o'clock at night the boats were again lowered, and by a desperate and gallant effort were run ashore. Holding their arms above their heads, the men leaped into the surf, many of them up to the neck in water, and pushed for land. While struggling to obtain firm footing and to free themselves from the returning surges, Carteret rode down furiously with the hope of forcing them back into the sea, but, forming his men in the dark midnight, Haynes led them to the charge, and after a conflict of half an hour, he drove the Cavalier horse from the field, and pursued them inland more than a mile."—Page 148. "Robert Blake," by W. H. Dixon. London, 1855.

In 1812, 8th November, Colonel Delfante with his grenadiers forded the Wop, waist-deep, and wagons followed, and even artillery. This was a very difficult ford, because the channel was far below the neighboring ground, and the banks were steep; moreover the river was half frozen and full of accumulated ice. Nevertheless the troops did pass. Waist-deep is equal to from forty to fifty inches, which is more than belly-deep for horses. Crook's cavalry forded or waded belly-deep, and as this fact is admitted, and the Rebel infantry did ford the river below Farmville, everything seems to demonstrate that the existing impediments did not depend upon natural obstacles and causes.

As to prompt bridging there is no end of examples, and with the most incongruous, and apparently the most incompatible material. It was not until a question arose which aroused feeling that the writer in reading began to note down examples of improvised or rapid bridging, and referred to various accessible works. Unfortunately he had given away to different institutions hundreds, perhaps thousands, of military works in which illustrations of this subject occurred. On turning to Major-General J. G. Barnard, U. S. A., article on Bridges, published in "Johnson's

Cyclopædia, some very interesting information will be found. One remarkable example of rapid construction is first worthy of citation :

"In the month of February, 1862, a pontoon bridge, composed of about sixty boats of the reserve train, was thrown across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. The river was then a perfect torrent, the water being fifteen feet above the summer level, and filled with drift wood and floating ice. The greatest difficulty was experienced in pulling the pontoons into position, and it was necessary to make use of ship anchors and chain cables to hold them in place. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances the bridge was completed in about eight hours, and the corps commanded by General Banks, with all its trains and artillery, passed over it without accident or delay."—"Johnson's Cyclopædia," 1,626, 1 and 2.

The famous bridge across the Chickahominy cannot come under the head of improvised bridges, but when its magnitude is considered in connection with the time occupied in its construction, it becomes apposite in this connection. It was begun during the forenoon of the 14th June, 1864, and was completed by midnight. Brigadier-General Weitzel located the position and prepared the approaches. Brigadier-General Benham laid the bridge, and the following is a description of it :

Johnson 1,626-4. "On reaching the James River, a bridge was laid opposite Charles City Court House (at a point selected by the writer of this article) about two thousand feet in length. The water was so deep and rapid that the pontoons could not be held by their own anchors, and it was found necessary to attach their cables to schooners anchored above and below the bridge.

"For the next forty hours a continuous stream of wagons passed over the bridge, from 4,000 to 6,000 wagons, some said fifty miles of wagons, and nearly all the artillery of this Army, and by far the larger portion of the infantry and all its cavalry present, and even to its heads of 3,000 or more of beef cattle—the most injurious of all—without an accident to man or beast."—*Report of General Benham*.

"The length of the bridge was made up of 200 feet in trestle work and 2,000 feet in pontoons (one hundred in all); depth of the river, 85 feet."—"Johnson," 1,626-2.

Now, do a simple rule of three. If a bridge 2,200 feet in length, capable of *any* strain, was thrown across a rapid river 85 feet deep within the hours of a long working day—say between sunrise and sunset, fifteen hours,—how long ought it to have taken to have thrown on a mild April day, one or even two or three bridges adequate for the passage of a corps and its ma-

terial, or several corps, across a stream from 100 to 120 feet wide, and not deeper than the Berisina, where the pontoniers had to work up to their shoulders in freezing water with a rapid current buffeting them with continual fields of ice brought down by that rapid current.

To the possible objection of inadequate materials the answer is pertinent, in accordance with the motto of a Scotch family of note, "*Forti non deficit telum*," which, without perverting the meaning, might be thus paraphrased: "Materials are never wanting to resolute or energetic men." This recalls the anecdote of the great painter who, when a young artist, regretted that he could not produce an effect without proper materials, caught up a stick and dashed off a very effective head with some dark-colored filth on a shutter or the wall.

Major-General Barnard gives the following illustrations (Johnson, 1,625):



"The Austrians, after satisfactory trials in the passage of the broad, deep and rapid current of the Danùbe, adopted in 1841 a system named from its inventor, Colonel Birago, of the Austrian Imperial Engineers.

"This equipage has fixed and floating bridge-supports, the former consisting of abutments and trestles, and the latter of pontoons of one to six pièces, assembled together according to the requirements of the bridge for the passage of infantry, cavalry or artillery, and whether designed for one, two or three distinct roadways.

"The Birago trestle is composed of a *cap* and two *legs*, to the lower ends of which *shoes* are attached to increase their bearing surface, and to give greater stability to the trestle.

"*Each pontoon division* is complete in itself, containing all the material necessary for constructing a bridge of eleven bays, or 225 feet in length."—"Johnson," 1,627.

"During the campaign of 1864, trains composed of fourteen pontoons and two trestles accompanied each of the three army corps of the Army of the Potomac."—"Johnson," 1,626 (3).

"Previous to the battle of Gettysburg, a ponton bridge over the Potomac at Harper's Ferry was destroyed, the pontons being scuttled and set adrift above the rapids. About three weeks after, the water having fallen, the boats were recovered,  repaired with pieces of hard-bread boxes obtained from the commissary,  and used in constructing a bridge at Berlin, over which the entire army passed into Virginia."—"Johnson," 1,626.

Substitute for hard-bread boxes, hogsheads, wagons, timber and lumber of buildings at hand which could have been torn down; large trees standing close at hand, and what becomes of

every excuse for inaction. Oh wise Bible, wisest of common-sense books! *See verses as to sluggish or half hearted action!*

"Very few citizens who have not served with an army in the field have an adequate idea of its *impedimenta*. On February 13th, 1863, there were with the army of the Potomac two (2) bridge trains of forty-four (44) boats, in charge of four (4) companies of the Fifteenth New York Engineers, located about two miles from Falmouth, one-half mile west from Falmouth to Stafford Court House, and four miles from Headquarters of the Army. To this train were attached 551 animals, two bridge trains of forty-four boats in charge of six companies of the Fiftieth New York Engineers, in the same locality, with 591 animals. One train of thirty-two boats mounted, but without teams, was on its way to a place on the right hand of Muddy Creek, about three miles from Seddon's place, and two miles from Headquarters; one bridge of twenty-two boats, without wagons or teams, and at Belle Plaine thirty boats afloat. A requisition had been made for 226 more animals. These wooden boats weighed 1,570 pounds each. The ponton and trestle wagons had eight animals and two teamsters each; the other wagons six animals and one teamster each. The canvas ponton boats laid by Captain Comstock at Kelly's Ford, came afterwards, twenty from Washington and sixty from New York, and weighed 640 pounds each."—Note in *American Magazine* (page 377), April, 1886, "History of Chancellorsville," by William Howard Mills, late Major U. S. A.

In using the expression *improvised bridges*, the term may almost be considered technical, scientific, "L' Encyclopedie (1751) C. Suppt." styles bridges such as are thrown over water-courses or streams from ten to twenty metres in breadth, "*Ponts-à-coup-de main*" A metre is 39.368 American inches, or about 1 1-12 yards, so that twenty metres about accords with the breadth of the Appomattox at Farmville, between the piers or abutments of the railroad viaduct. Bardin, in his Military Dictionary, admits that as late as 1779 there was, as yet, no treatise on Military Bridges and their application. The digested "Dictionary of the Sciences" shows how circumscribed were even the theories of throwing bridges. Only a single work had been conceived on the subject, due to a M. de Guille, a French general of brigade who served in the war of 1741 under Marshal Saxe; but this treatise was never printed. Nevertheless, in spite of instruction, pontoneering works were ably done during this war. In 1745 three bridges of boats were thrown opposite Piacenza, across the Po, where it is 1,200 to 1,500 feet wide (wide as the Rhine at Mannheim), and very deep in places, and in spite of the rapid

current the work was finished in seven hours. In 1757 Brigadier de Guille rapidly established two bridges over the Rhine, opposite Wesel, some 2,000 feet in width.

If there is any truth in the statement accepted as trustworthy, of the restoration of the Devil's Bridge by the Russians of Suworow, on 26th September, 1799, there is no excuse for not bridging the Appomattox at Farmville, 7th April, 1865; and farther, it is totally unsusceptible of explanation why the pontoon trains were not up simultaneously with the artillery of the pursuing columns. One pontoon train, that of the Twenty-fourth Corps, was up, and that it was not thrown in time cannot be understood except by those who know the secrets of the war. Accepting, however, as the supposition that the pontoon train was delayed, that was no reason for not bridging the Appomattox at once, conceding (simply for argument sake) that it was not fordable, although the contrary was demonstrated both by the Union cavalry and by the Rebel infantry, and by the testimony of those who were acquainted with the stream.

Where there is a will there is a way. If there were no other ropes to be had, there were sufficient prolonges at hand to drag large and handy trees to the abutments of the old railroad viaduct and haul them into position to form a cantilever bridge strong enough for elephants to cross; because those same prolonges could have been used as lashings for the main timbers and neighboring buildings would have furnished ample supplies of ties or cross-beams, braces and flooring stuff. Any practical mechanic who was not devoid of positive comprehension of the most common details of his trade could, by utilizing the natural and manufactured material within a few hundred yards have constructed a bridge all-sufficient for the heaviest wheel-carriages and the loads that they would carry. It is utterly useless to argue to the contrary, and it may be emphatically asserted that the failure to construct a bridge all-sufficient, if not elegant, wide as the piers of the old railroad viaduct, or for two or even three equipages to cross abreast, or a column at least twelve men front, was due to some unknown reason or invisible cause.

No! the plum—the ruin of Lee—was not to fall into the mouth of Humphreys, and if all the theorists on the face of this earth were to argue to the contrary, practical mechanics sufficiently numerous to outweigh their book-knowledge could be readily found to establish the feasibility of adequately bridging the Appomattox for the passage of an army, its guns and its trains, within two hours. There is too much corroboration of this fact in military history to disprove this positive charge. The



same spirit which ruled the course of the whole operation, beginning with the miss-moves of the 3rd, left Humphreys unsupported on the 7th, and deferred the culmination and left it doubtful until midday on the 9th. After consultation with a scientific officer who has built bridges with comparatively very feeble means, it was decided that two thousand men, such as our troops, ought, under existing circumstances, to have bridged the Appomattox "in about two hours."

"General P. B. Porter, of Black Rock, to whom the public are indebted for the construction of this bridge [across the Rapids above Niagara Falls to Bath Island], informed me that its erection was not effected without considerable danger. Two large trees, hewed to correspond with their shape, were first constructed into a temporary bridge, the butts fastened to the shore, with the lightest ends projecting over the rapids. At the extremity of the projection, a small butment of stone was first placed in the river, and when this became secure, logs were sunk around it, locked in such a manner as to form a frame, which was filled with stone. A bridge was then made to this butment, the temporary bridge shoved farther out and forward, and another butment formed, until the whole was completed. One man fell into the Rapids during the work. At first, owing to the velocity with which he was carried forward, he was unable to hold upon the projecting rocks; but through great bodily exertions, to lessen the motion by swimming against the current, he was enabled to seize upon a rock, from which he was taken by means of ropes."—Extract from "The Journal of a Tour in the State of New York in 1830," by John Fowler, at page 145. (Notes). (London, 1831.)

Any reader who has the slightest conception of military matters, who will take the trouble of examining, with care, the maps accompanying this little work, will at once perceive how strongly Humphreys had hold of the Army of Northern Virginia at Cumberland Church; how easily he might have been supported, and if so, in time, how the whole affair might have been ended then and there with augmented glory;—that is, if any one from Grant down, in command at Farmville, had acted with energy and celerity. Humphrey's hold was that of the bull dog; the clutch of the eagle's talons with which Humphreys held the enemy in his front. He kept pressed up close against him, feeling his rapier, ready to thrust or parry; the position of the experienced master-at-arms, attent and with eye, ear and hand ready for every movement. Humphreys was the completest general, except Geo. H. Thomas, the war evolved. He would have crushed Lee in the fall of 1863 had he been Commander of the Army of the Potomac (instead of Chief of Staff, with a temporary superior

unequal to comprehending his plans or act upon them). Colonel Fletcher, the British historian of the Rebellion, is the only writer who ever alluded to this understandingly.

From Farmville two roads led almost directly north, slightly diverging. The easterly one to the Cumberland Court House road, bisected the Rebel position (at Cumberland Church), which, in miniature, exactly resembled the Union dispositions at Gettysburg—strangely so—the other, the Old Plank Road, which, some two miles away, bifurcated, both forks continuing on for a mile and a quarter to a mile and a half in the rear of Mahone's (afterwards Lee's) headquarters at Cumberland Church, on this occasion located about the same, relatively, as those of Meade on Powers' Hill, 3d July, 1863. The road from Farmville to Cumberland Court House fulfilled about the same relation to Lee's lines 7th April, 1865, as the Taneytown road did to Meade's 3d July, 1863, and the Old Plank Road nearly the same as the Baltimore Pike to the Union position at Gettysburg. After Humphreys' fight at dark at Perkinson's Mills at the mouth of Sailors' Creek, Wright and Sheridan's engagement on Little Sailors' Creek, late on the afternoon of the 6th, the Rebels fell back during the night and early morning of the 7th across the Appomattox. The only remaining direct viaduct across that stream was High Bridge, which, after they had taken advantage of it, the Rebels fired. Humphreys' celerity and audacity saved this structure, so that it was soon made available. Gordon had crossed it, but Fields' division forded the river, perhaps, at Venable's Ford, some three miles below Farmville, where Longstreet passed over the bridge at that place, and then burned it.

One fact which will hereafter be more strongly emphasized was proved. The Appomattox was fordable for infantry at more than one point between High Bridge and a mile above Farmville.

Humphreys with his first division, Miles, and his third, de Trobriand, followed up the enemy on the dirt roads from High Bridge over five miles to Cumberland Church. He had about 9,500 men. He found the Rebels already entrenched in a strong position and their forces concentrated, amounting to about 25,000 men, not including the cavalry (*La R.*, vii., 76). Mahone was on the left, thrown back, and thence their lines curved, presenting a convex front continuously on the crest of elevations (from which the ground sloped E., like a glacis), for about two miles from their extreme right, over two miles, to opposite Farmville. Their line was not solid, but was occupied. Humphreys' Second Division, Barlow's, 5,000 strong, pursued along the railroad from High Bridge towards Farmville.

Humphreys' Chief of Artillery claims to have succeeded in



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BATTLE OF CUMBERLAND CHURCH, OR THE HEIGHTS OF FARMVILLE.  
 THE COMBINED SECOND-THIRD CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, UNDER MAJ-GEN.  
 A. A. HUMPHREYS, PITTED AGAINST THE ARMY OF NORTHERN  
 VIRGINIA, UNDER GEN. ROBERT E. LEE.  
 7TH APRIL, 1865, P. M.



silencing the battery, Poague's, on the Rebel extreme left-centre, and that the leading Union troops acquired temporary possession of the guns. Mahone's veterans, aided by a portion of Gordon's division under Grimes, recovered the cannon and drove out the Unionists. A second attack likewise failed. Humphreys becoming satisfied that the Army of Northern Virginia, entire, was in his front, felt that he was altogether too weak to do more than hold the attention of the enemy until he was reinforced, and he recalled Barlow, who had found a strong force in his front about a mile and a half to the south. When Barlow got up, and late in the day (4.30 P. M.), Miles tried to flank the Rebel wing under Mahone, and was repulsed with loss. The attack failed on account of the difficult nature of the ground, broken by numerous sharp ravines, which prevented an orderly advance. The enemy undertook to make a counter attack, but were quickly repulsed.

William Swinton, the first in point of time of the historians of the war, makes Lee come off with flying colors as victorious, whereas he simply held his own, and inflicted upon Humphreys a loss of 571, not 671. This general, who was truth itself, says that these figures are erroneous; that his First Division lost 424, the Second 121, and the Third 16—571. (B. S. B., 189).

All day long Humphreys was anxiously expecting reinforcements from Farmville, where Union troops had been piling up all the day. If two corps had crossed they could have taken the road to the Coal Pits, got in Lee's rear and settled the matter then and there. The excuse alleged for not doing so is that the bridge was burned and the Appomattox not fordable. All this has been distinctly stated and argued out in "La Royale," part VII., and the whole demonstration would be reproduced in this pamphlet if it did not require too much space. An analysis of the telegrams and despatches will settle the truth of all this. As an excuse for not crossing troops to the assistance of Humphreys, it was alleged that the Appomattox was not fordable, and that a bridge could not be built in time. Immediately after the war General Humphreys was decidedly of the opinion that the Appomattox could not only have been forded (Crook's cavalry proved the fact), but *peremptorily* bridged.

There is a boss-carpenter, in the neighborhood of the study in which this was prepared, who was once in railroad employ and lost his situation from bad temper and habits, whose services were invaluable at crises. That man with an ordinary powerful wrecking-gang would have bridged the Appomattox in an hour, with the physical force disposable to handle his materials. He would have laughed at such an obstacle arresting progress nearly ten hours, a day's working time. Col. W. H. Paine, U. S. Vol.



Engineers, agrees with me in these opinions. I know from my personal experience with material and mechanics, that if I had unlimited command of human labor and teams with timber close at hand, as it was on the 7th April, I could have constructed a bridge over the Appomattox all-sufficient for the heaviest artillery and trains within two hours. It might not have been an elegant or even a respectable piece of work as to appearance, but for practical purposes the troops, horse and foot, artillery and wagons could have marched and rolled over it with safety and expedition.

"Woodsworth in his sonnet, "In the Pass of Killicranky," considering the victorious effects of audacity, celerity and address, due to the hero, Claverhouse, Viscount of Dundee, concludes with these stirring lines:

*"Oh for a single hour of that Dundee,  
Who on that day the word of onset gave!  
Like conquest would the Men of England see,  
And her Foes find a like inglorious grave."*

Humphreys might justly have groaned out, on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865, "Oh for one hour of Blucher," "Marshal Forwards," that nothing stopped. General Von Muffling, in his "Passages from my Life," states, page 377, that during the battle of Leipzig, 1813, Blucher resolved to force the Parthe. "The first portion of infantry encountered no other difficulties in crossing at Mockau than having to wade through the water up to the waist. A very imperfect flying-bridge was subsequently formed of barn doors, gates, &c." Again, during the pursuit after Leipzig, Blucher was in reality hunting (not escorting—as was Lee escorted out of Pennsylvania in 1863)—the French out of Germany when he came to the Saale (Von Muffling, 384), he "summoned the carpenters of the town to construct, with the utmost speed, a bridge of boats or rafts to enable him to cross over before evening. There was no lack of wood—the whole river was covered with rafts and planks. There was an old master carpenter in the place, who, as apprentice in 1757, had helped to build the bridge by which Frederic the Great had crossed at Weissenfels before the battle of Rossbach. He proposed to place the bridge on the same spot, promising that it should be ready in a few hours. The man kept his word, and the whole army was [across] on the left bank of the Saale in the evening."

A cantilever bridge might easily have been engineered with the great trees, of which there were plenty in the vicinity, and the cross timbers and planking derived from the buildings of the neighboring town. When Gustavus was preparing for his

bridge over the Leck he found himself compelled to pull down all the gentlemen's houses, farm and village buildings around him in order to procure useful and solid timber. The same determination, not sparing even consecrated buildings, saved the French forces under d'Oyssel in Scotland, in January, 1560, when from Leith they crossed the Firth and made a raid on the north shore of the Firth, and burned and wasted to their hearts' content. The arrival of the English Admiral Winter deprived the French of their provision ships, and the country afforded nothing but drinking water. They seemed in extremity. "Queen's Ferry was commanded by Winter [with his English fleet]. There was a bridge at Alloa, across the River Firth (thirty miles W. N. W. of Edinburgh), but William Kirkaldy promptly broke it; and so satisfied were the congregation that d'Oyssel could not escape, that they left him, as they believed, to starve, and proceeded at their utmost leisure to call their men about them to receive his surrender."

The *Gazetteer* of Scotland (1856) tells this story somewhat differently. "It was in the month of January, and at the breaking up of a great storm, William Kirkaldy, of Grange, attentive to the circumstances in which the French were caught, took advantage of their situation, marched with great expedition towards Stirling, and cut the Bridge of Tullibody, which is over the Devon [a furious torrent after storms] [ $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile north of its confluence with the Firth], to prevent their retreat. The French, finding no other means of escape, took the roof off the church, and laid it along the bridge, where it was cut, and got safe to Stirling. It is generally believed that this church remained in the same dismantled state till some years ago" [about 1850].

"The French had now an opportunity of showing what disciplined troops could do in the face of tremendous difficulties. They were beyond the Leven [outlet of Loch Leven?] when they discovered their situation. In their first consternation they rested for a night in the field. In the morning, wet, chilled, and hungry, they commenced their rapid retreat. Not a loaf of bread could they hope to touch till they crossed the water. The tempest broke again, and the western gale drove the rain into their faces as they struggled across those melancholy moors. On the evening of the third day, they reached Alloa to find the bridge gone and the river, it is likely, pouring down in a [as well known it would after a great storm] winter flood.

D'Oyssel was a man of prompt expedients. In an instant the nearest parish church was unroofed; the timbers were dragged to the water-side and laid across the piers of the broken arches. The army itself brought the news of its escape to Stirling, and

once there, they were safe. The Congregation were loitering at Glasgow, congratulating themselves over a victory which they had allowed to slip through their hands. D'Oyssel refreshed his famished but gallant little force, and fell back at his leisure into Leith." (Froude, vii., 192-3.)

People, superficial as a rule, even thinkers, prattle a great deal about the efficiency of Napoleonic and Frederician administration, but there was more practical soldiership, engineering and generalship evinced during the Thirty Years' War than in any since, except in our great conflict, in which the rank and file could always supply mechanics fit for every occasion. It is pretty certain that more valuable lessons can be learned from the details of the operations of the Thirty Years' War than any other of which authentic details are known. Again and again were impetuous rivers crossed, and retreating and flying armies saved by improvised bridges. One of the most remarkable of the achievements of Gustavus Adolphus was the passage of the Lech, a very furious stream (so violent no dam can be made to stand its fury) during freshets as at no time, 5th April, 1632, in the face of an entrenched veteran army equal in numbers to the assailants. This torrent, rather than river, was one hundred and ninety feet across, with very high, steep banks with bad ground beyond, and very deep; of different depths. What is more, the bridge was constructed under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry ("Harte," II., 197). In the space of a few hours the bridge was fixed, trestles with legs of an unequal length (*Ibid.*, 198-202), the surface planked and roughened and the sides guarded, which happened to be effected the more speedily as the king's Finlanders could all exercise the business of carpenters, as in their native country each man was his own mechanic." Doubtless, if detailed reports were accessible, there would be numerous instances found of the successful peremptory bridging and fording of rivers and the particulars of the methods by which success was achieved. The fact that such things were done, and well done, is indisputable, but of very few among them are any of the measures dwelt upon.

Chapman (308) describing the Bridging of the Lech by Gustavus Adolphus in 1632, says the trestles had stones and other weights attached to their legs to sink them and keep them in position, and the length of the legs varied (bridge-floor just above surface) from a maximum of 4 yards, 12 feet. The Finnish horse *fording*, not swam, just above bridge.

[NOTE.—In the course of very extensive military reading, numerous instances were found of Fording by large bodies of troops at such depths that an increase of an inch or two would have render-

ed it impossible for men of ordinary stature. These memoranda were carefully noted at the time, but, now, when it has become necessary to use them, the note-books are not accessible. The remarks upon Fording, and even upon Bridges in Military Treatises, are inexplicably meagre.]

In order to relieve Tergoes, the Spanish general actually marched 3,000 picked troops, Germans, Spaniards and Walloons, loaded with food and military stores, over six miles through an estuary considered unfordable at low water, on account of the miry bottom and the channels of several rivulets, and in spite of every danger and difficulty absolutely succeeded through the very audacity of the attempt. On the night of the 28th-29th September, 1575 (*Ibid* II., 163. 165), the Spanish General, Requesens, authorized a still more audacious enterprise for the purpose of subduing Zealand.

The English army determined to make a desperate attempt to retrieve their affairs in France in 1450. About 6,000 strong had been collected for a vigorous attempt to relieve the beleaguered town of Caen, and were opposed by superior forces of veteran French. They landed on the peninsula of Cotentin, so famous for the fortified port of Cherbourg, and took the town of Valognes. The most difficult task, however, was forcing the dangerous fords of the River Douve, and afterwards those of the Vire. Nevertheless they succeeded. Like Perdiccas (B. C. 321), they fought even in the water, but with better fortune, for they drove back the French and established themselves on the right bank, and, in spite of their fatigues, fought the battle of Formigny (18th April, 1450), a town about twelve miles from Bayeux, and nearly inflicted upon the French a defeat which, ending in a slaughter, was such a complete disaster that, although small in comparison to numbers engaged, it deserves to rank with the greatest of the English reverses on the soil of France.—Oman's "Art of War in the Middle Ages," pages 113, 114, Von Kausler's "Wortenbuch der Schlachten aller Volker," IV. (2), 1146-7.

At Aughrim, 1691, the British had to struggle through a *marsh* waist deep to get at the enemy behind defences: and at Blenheim, 1744, the English cavalry had to flounder through the Nebelbach and its morasses to reach the French on firm ground; yet in both cases the bold assailants were victorious.

In November, 1645 (18th October?), the British General Cust states that Turenne, not finding the River Rhine fordable near Wimpfen, the whole army swam across it—the horses carrying the foot on their cruppers. Such examples might be multiplied, but the whole question could be summed up in a very few words. Troops in force should have been crossed to the assistance of Humphreys, since the Appomattox was fordable. Meade's

telegram (16) states that "the cavalry has forded belly-deep," which is not too deep for infantry, and Tremain confirms this in his narrative ("War Memoranda"), pages 14, 15 and 18, *supra*.

If there had been no ford, a perfectly sufficient bridge should have been constructed in two hours. A collection of dispatches between Generals Humphreys, Wright, Meade and Grant furnishes a basis for a time-table, and also confirmation. The secret history of the war has never been told, and may never be told. It is not the interest of those who won the prizes to have it told. I had to stop writing my history for fear of injuring the prospects of the living by quoting the revelations and documents furnished for it, by friends since deceased. During the pursuit of Lee, Humphreys and Wright have never received the credit due to them. Humphreys never could get over the suppression of one of his telegrams or dispatches which, even when it was allowed to become public, he claimed, did not appear as he sent it. It seems as if it was predetermined to whom the glory of the last days should inure, and it was so. On the 6th, the day of the Sailor Creek and Little Sailor Creek fights, Humphreys and Wright deserve the credit; on the 7th all the credit belongs to Humphreys; on the 8th Humphreys did more than any one; on the 9th he did as much as any other, and might have done more, and marvellously, if he had been let alone. All the opinions hereby presented are founded on consultations with General Humphreys, my dearest friend, his letters, and evidence of other officers.

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COPIES OF DESPATCHES BETWEEN GENERALS HUMPHREYS, WRIGHT,  
MEADE AND GRANT, FRIDAY, 7TH APRIL, 1865.

HIGH BRIDGE, HD. QRS. A. P. }  
April 7, 1865. }

1.  
Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant:



Major-Gen. Humphreys about 9 A. M. crossed the Appomattox at this point driving in the enemy's rear-guard-skirmishers. The enemy abandoned (8) eight guns on this side of the river and (10) ten [guns] are reported as left on the other side. Humphreys has advanced four miles on the railroad towards Farmville and will continue to press them on that road. Wright is moving towards Farmville on this [the south] side of the river. I understand Mahone's Division is between him [Humphreys] and Farmville, and that he is after him. Griffin is moving rapidly [south side of river] to Prince Edward's Court House. He will pass through Rice's Station. You will find him on the road if necessary to leave him orders. GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General.



2.

APRIL 7 [1865], 12 M.

Major-Gen. Meade:

So far as my information goes Wright, at Farmville, *would be in supporting distance*. I have sent Barlow up the railroad to Farmville. He is quite close to it and is skirmishing with the enemy there. Supposing the enemy would attempt to reach Lynchburg by the road from Farmville on the north side of the Appomattox, I have moved Miles and de Trobriand and the artillery to that road. They will strike it about *three miles from [north of] Farmville*.  A column of *our cavalry* [Crook's] *on the south side of Appomattox, which I am moving, will reach Farmville about the same time as Barlow* [on the north side].  Artillery cannot move along Barlow's route.

A. A. HUMPHREYS, M. G.

I will advise you promptly of any further information or change of condition.

A. A. H.

3.

HD. QRS. 6TH A. C., SANDY RIVER, }  
April 7, 12.15 Noon. }

Maj.-Gen. Webb:



The officer sent toward Farmville has returned, and reports that that place is not taken. I shall therefore move at once towards that point. General *Griffin* [5th Corps] *is now here*, and the head of his column nearly up. He is going to Prince Edward's C. H.

H. G. WRIGHT, Maj.-Genl. Comdg.

4.

HD. QR. 2D. A. C., 1.20 P. M. }  
April 7th. }

Gen. Meade:

I have come up to Mahone's Division. I am with Miles and de Trobriand's Divisions, about four miles [north] from Farmville, and shall attack.  *If Griffin or some one else can strike Farmville [i. e. cross to my support] they will cut off Mahone's line of retreat.* 

A. A. HUMPHREYS, M. G.

5.

HD. QRS. 6TH A. C. FARMVILLE, }  
April 7, 2.20 P. M. }

Brevet Maj.-Gen'l Webb:

I am at *Farmville, which is occupied by the 24th Corps*, and, from all I can learn, the Rebel forces on this side of the Appomattox passed through the place. If this be true, it would seem the enemy is moving on Lynchburg, where it is possible he might intend forming a junction with Johnson, instead of effecting it at Danville, as I have hitherto supposed he intended

to do. ☞ There are so many troops and trains now here in my front, that it would be impossible for me to advance now, even if it were desirable to do so. I will therefore await instructions.

H. G. WRIGHT, Maj.-Gen'l. Command'g.

6. HD. QRS., A. P., April 7, 2.30 P. M.  
Maj.-Gen'l Humphreys:

Wright is moving on Farmville. I have sent him your dispatch and urged him forward. Do you think the enemy is making for Lynchburg or Danville? G. G. M.

7. HD. QRS. A. P., April 7, 1865, 2.30 P. M.  
Maj.-Gen'l Wright:

I send you a dispatch just received from Maj.-Gen. Humphreys. ☞ You will see the necessity of pushing vigorously for Farmville. If there are any troops on your left communicate with them and urge them forward. G. G. M.

8. HD. QRS. 2D A. CORPS, }  
April 7, 3 o'clock P. M. }

Maj.-Gen'l Meade:

From the prisoners I have, it appears that Lee's army is moving from Farmville to Lynchburg, and ☞ *Wright and Griffin should come up to the front near the Farmville and Lynchburg road, at a distance four miles [north] from Farmville [i. e. attack Lee in reverse and cut off his retreat].* I have but two divisions here, but have sent for Barlow, who is on the railroad near [north of] Farmville. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Maj.-Gen'l Comd'g.



9. HD. QRS. 2D A. C., April 7, 3.20 P. M.  
Brt. Maj.-Gen'l Webb, Chief of Staff:

We have Heth, Mahone and, I believe, the rest of Lee's army here in my front, moving towards Lynchburg. *They are intrenched in too strong a position* for me to attack them in front, and their flanks extend further than mine. They are extending their flank to my right. I have sent for Barlow, but I don't know at what time he will be up. ☞ *I have just received a dispatch dated 1.20, saying that Farmville was in our possession,* that the cavalry was moving through it.

A. A. HUMPHREYS, Maj.-Gen'l Command'g.

10. HIGH BRIDGE, April 7th, 3.40 P. M.  
Maj.-Gen'l Wright, commanding 6th Corps:


The Major-Gen'l commanding directs that, in case you are not called upon by Gen'l Humphreys for assistance, you halt at

Farmville and endeavor to hurry up your trains.  In that case, or in any case, put yourself in communication with the commanding officer of the 24th Corps troops, and let him know Gen'l Meade's views and intentions as urged by your movements, and *that you are retarded by his being in your road.* 

ALEX. S. WEBB, B. M. Gen'l, C. of Staff.

HIGH BRIDGE, HD. QRS. A. POTOMAC, }  
April 7, 3.50 P. M. }



11.  
Maj.-Gen'l Wright:

Gen. Humphreys reports that he is confronted by *Lee's whole army*. They are moving to outflank him.  If you cannot move at once to his assistance order up the 24th Corps in Gen'l Meade's name. Gen. Lee is intrenched.

ALEX. S. WEBB, B. M. G. & C. of Staff.



HD. QRS. ARMY POTOMAC, }  
April 7th, 4 P. M. }

12.  
Maj.-Gen'l Humphreys, Comd'g 2d Corps:

I informed you this morning your movements should be governed by your own security with your own forces. I have made every effort to get the 6th Corps forward, *but  the road has been blocked by the Cavalry and 24th Corps.*  *I have now sent orders to the 24th Corps, who occupy Farmville, to move up [i. e. cross] to your support.* If you are pressed you must withdraw to this position. (Sgd.) GEO. G. MEADE, M. Gen'l.

13.  
Maj.-Gen'l Webb:

3 P. M. RECEIVED (4.40 P. M.)




Your dispatch of 2.30 P. M. by Major Bache is just received.  *I reached Farmville at 2 P. M. and immediately sent the dispatch to you by Major Farrar.*  Gen'l Grant passed here a short time since, and is now in the town. *He has directed me to remain massed until further orders.*

(Signed.)

GEN. WRIGHT.

HDQRS. A. P., 4.30 P. M., }  
April 7, '65. }

14.  
Maj.-Gen. Humphreys:


 I have sent orders to Gen. Wright to order forward in my name the 24th Corps from Farmville and to follow it with the 6th.  I fully indicated your position and the necessity of support being given you. Before my dispatch could have reached Gen. Wright I received one from him stating the Lieut.-Gen. was at Farmville.  *I have no doubt, therefore, troops will be hur-*

*ried forward* if not already moving. We hear artillery and musketry in a westerly (condition) direction from here, which is more to the left than your position, which I take to be about northwest. This may be the 24th Corps [it was Crook's cavalry fight]. When Barlow comes up if you hear firing on the left I would attack with the whole force, but of course I leave this entirely to your own judgment, giving you the best information I can get.

G. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen'l Comd'g.

15.  
To Gen. Webb :

— APRIL, 7, 5.10 P. M.

 Your dispatch of 3.50 P. M. ordering me to assist Gen. Humphreys in reference to affairs in front of Second Corps is received and I have shown it to Gen. Grant, who is here and who will direct in the absence of Gen. Meade. The pontoon train of the Twenty-fourth Corps has been ordered up [why not sooner?] and as soon as it is thrown I will cross and come promptly to the support of the Second Corps. Yours of 4.30 just received.

(Signed.) GEN. WRIGHT.

16.  
Maj.-Gen. Humphreys :



— APRIL 7, 6.15 P. M.

I have just learned that there is no bridge at Farmville and that THE CAVALRY HAS FORDED BELLY-DEEP. *You will have to take care of yourself.*

GEO. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen.

17.  
Maj.-Gen. Meade, Commanding Army Potomac :

— APRIL 7, 6.30 P. M. }  
HD. QRS. 2D. A. C. }

 Barlow is up and taking position on the right, so as to be ready to attack their left flank *at the instant an attack is commenced from the direction of Farmville.* The firing you heard was Crook's attempt from the direction of Farmville. Immediately upon hearing it I moved Miles and de Trobriand to the right to attack (Barlow was not up then), but the firing soon ceased. Miles attacked from his right, but without success. *The position they have is strong and it is intrenched.* We are across the State road from Farmville to Lynchburg, and from our right see a train of wagons moving about the West; some troops with it. It is so late that neither the Twenty-fourth Corps nor Wright can get up in time to attack this evening.  To-morrow the enemy will be gone. If they are not, I will attack understandingly with the troops from Farmville.

My position is about N.W. from High Bridge.

A. A. HUMPHREYS, Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS A. P., }  
April 7th, 7 P. M. }

18.

Lt.-Gen. Grant:

There has been heavy firing in the direction of Humphreys, but no report as yet. I send the bearer for any orders you may have for to-morrow. The Fifth Corps is at or near Prince Edward C. H., the Sixth at Farmville, and the Second across the Appomattox, across the road from Farmville to Lynchburg.

As far as I can judge the enemy is making for Lynchburg. Perhaps only making a greater detour than he originally designed to get around us, and he yet meditates going to Danville.

Since writing the foregoing the following dispatch has been received from General Humphreys: [Dispatch evidently omitted.]

*Had I been advised of the state of affairs at Farmville* I would either have crossed the Sixth after the Second, or retained the Fifth for that purpose. I never knew till 4 P. M. that the enemy had destroyed the bridge there; nor did I know till late this afternoon the causes of the delay in the advance of the Sixth Corps. Resp'y, &c.,

GEO. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen.

[Duplicate.]

HEADQUARTERS 2D A. CORPS, }  
April 7, 7.30 P. [A. ?] M. }

19.

Bvt. Maj-Gen. H. S. Webb, Chief of Staff:



Our last fight, just before dark [6th] at Sailors' Creek, gave us two guns, three (3) flags and considerable No. of prisoners, 200 wagons, 70 ambulances, with mules and horses to almost one-half wagons and ambulances. There are between 30 and 50 wagons in addition abandoned and destroyed along the road, some battery wagons, forges and limbers. I have already reported the capture of one gun, two flags and some prisoners, and the fact that the road for nearly two miles is strewn with tents, baggage, cooking utensils, some ammunition and material of all kinds. The wagons are in a great mass across the approach to the bridge, and it will take some time to clear it. The enemy is in position on the heights beyond with artillery. The bridge is partially destroyed, and the approaches to it on either side are soft bottom land. We can't advance to-night [6th-7th] in the same manner that we have been to-day. As soon as I get straightened up my troops a little (they are considerably mixed) I might push a column down the road and deploy it, but it is evident that I cannot follow rapidly during the night.

P. S.—I find that we have 850 prisoners this morning, in all 960 men, 30 officers.

A. A. HUMPHREYS, M. G.



20. HD. QRS. 6TH ARMY CORPS, April 7 [no hour], '65.  
Maj.-General Webb:

I have the honor to report that  the infantry of the Corps has crossed the river  and are now in camp, but owing to the difficulty in fording the stream the artillery and trains are obliged to wait until the pontoon bridge is laid. [Crook's artillery and baggage animals had crossed and re-crossed fording with his troops]. My Hdqrs. are near a small house in the vicinity of the Burnt Bridge [Farmville], and near the road.

H. G. WRIGHT, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

21. FARMVILLE, 9.30 P. M., April 7, 1865.  
Major-Gen'l Meade:

I enclose you a copy of a dispatch sent to you this evening by signal. The Fifth Corps is here. I will send copy of dispatch to Gens. Griffin and Wright. Sheridan with the cavalry is at Prospect Station. The enemy cannot go to Lynchburg possibly. I think there is no doubt but that Stoneman entered that city this morning. I will move my headquarters up with the troops in the morning, probably to Prospect Hill Station. Have the prisoners been sent to City Point yet? If not they should go at once under strong escort.

U. S. GRANT, Lt.-Gen'l.

HDQRS. ARMIES U. S., FARMVILLE, }  
April 7th, '65. }

22.  
Gen'l Meade:

Order the 5th Corps to follow the 24th at 6 A. M. up the Lynchburg road. The 2d and 6th to follow the enemy north of the river.

U. S. GRANT, Lt.-Gen'l.

N. B.—, *Italics*, and , and ¶ ¶ [ ], inserted by the copyist and editor to attract the attention of the reader.

It is a somewhat remarkable fact that, notwithstanding the importance of the subject, so little attention has been paid to digested statistical information in connection with the Marching of troops, especially extraordinary or exemplary marches; the length of road or extent of route occupied by a given force with its appropriate artillery and train, ordinary complement, and the time required by such an organization to pass from column of route into proper disposition for an engagement or deployment into line of battle. Sir Edward Cust, a general in the British army, who served and distinguished himself in the Spanish Peninsula, a voluminous writer of distinction on military subjects,

remarks in his "Annals of the Wars of the 18th and 19th Centuries," that Wellington stated that he had one rule by which he was always guided in regard to the moving of troops; that 5,000 men in the ordinary formation of two ranks—the regular intervals, &c., being understood—occupied one mile of front and, averaging time, it took exactly one hour to move 5,000 men one mile and get them into a new position, or the proper formation for a fight or into line of battle." These are not the exact words; but as a clearer presentation of the idea, when the question was presented to Major-General A. A. Humphreys, as to how long columns strung out, and what constituted a day's march, he replied: "The body of troops you mention, ten thousand men with thirty guns, with ammunition, subsistence and ambulance trains and medical wagons, such as are essential in our wooded and sparsely settled country [United States, speaking particularly of Virginia] should not, at the very most, stretch out a greater distance than five miles, and might be limited to three. The roads are supposed to be ordinarily good country roads. They could easily get over eighteen miles a day. In pursuit, from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House, which distance, putting it at one hundred miles (which is sufficiently correct), we [combined Second and Third Corps] were delayed the first day out (the 3d April, 1865,) materially by the necessity of bridging streams that were not fordable. On the 4th I made but a short march, owing to the cavalry coming in on the road and having precedence. My troops were put to working on the roads while the cavalry stopped us, to insure the trains following. We had but very few wagons with us; only some ammunition, ambulance and surgical wagons." *I fought over fourteen miles on the 6th April, having marched four miles at least before coming into contact with the enemy; then had to cross Flat Creek, build two bridges over it, and repair the road bridge before I could get at the enemy.* On the 7th, marched some twelve miles to Heights of Farmville in pursuit, encountering *the whole of Lee's force there* at 1 o'clock P. M. On the 8th, marched twenty-six miles, halting at midnight. On the 9th, by midday, was up with Lee at Appomattox. By looking at Appendix L. [XII. Scribner's Military Series] you will find the [combined] Second [Third] Corps, on the 31st March, had eighteen thousand five hundred and seven enlisted men of infantry present for duty equipped. Lost in action during the operations, about two thousand; straggled or fell out, between one and two thousand. [Major-General John Mitchell, British Army, calculates the proportion of stragglers as equal to about one-fifth, 20,000, out of 110,000, or, deducting casualties, 98,000.

Humphreys makes the ratio much less, Marmont says one-fifth, but Bonaparte increased it to one-quarter, including the honestly sick and otherwise actually temporarily disabled.]

"I see the [my] number of guns is put down at seventy, four of which were mortars, and therefore were not taken with us on the march. We had, therefore, eleven batteries, or sixty-six guns. I do not recollect the number of wagons that belonged to the corps, and I could only get at it by diving into a great mass of papers. With the exception of the fighting trains, the trains followed us at some considerable distance. From Fredericksburg to Gettysburg [Third Corps] there were so many halts for two, three, or more days, that they can give no average per day. The Sixth Corps marched over thirty miles continuously, getting to Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d July. The Second Division, Third Corps, marched from Rappahannock River (part of it were covering railroad crossing of that river), evening of 14th June, 1863, and reached Manassas Junction night of 15th, a march of twenty-nine miles, 15th, an excessively oppressive day. Again, on the 25th June, marched twenty-five miles to mouth of Monocacy, part of it in night, under a heavy rain on the canal towpath."

With all this and other instances before me, I repeat that with a most extensive military library in English, German and French, nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the works which pretend to treat on Marching. General Mitchell, B. A., already referred to, here again comes to the front with facts, not theories, in his "Fall of Napoleon." London, 1846, Vol. III. He says: "On comparing a great number of marches it appears that an army of 40,000 men requires about eight hours to traverse in average weather a distance of fifteen miles, which may be called an average military march. And if we make the necessary allowance for the length of cavalry columns—which are endless—for the lumbering trains of artillery, for the intervals between the corps and divisions, as well as for the openings that owing to the most trifling obstacles are constantly taking place, such an army will need thirteen hours before it can be formed into position, ready for battle—that is if it has been marching upon a single, moderately good road. Marshal Ney's corps [on the day of Quatre Bras] formed the left of an army [Napoleon's] of about 130,000 men, which divided into three columns, had performed two marches. Each column might be about 40,000 strong, but the centre column alone had traversed a good high road; the left and right columns had followed by-roads, one of which is described as having been very bad, while for the march of armies such roads are seldom very good. It is, therefore, no very unreasonable supposition to say that Ney's troops could not have reached Quatre Bras before the time specified."

The distances covered by troops infected by panic, flying from a lost field, seem almost incredible. Extracting from the exaggerated general statements to be found in various military works, the following are too well authenticated to be questioned; although, if investigation was carried back to the Thirty Years' War, the number might be greatly augmented. As, for instance, the flight of the Imperialists after the defeat of Tilly by Gustavus in 1631; that of the Duke of Lorraine from the field, back across the Rhine ("Harte's Gustavus," II., 76) in 1631; that of the troops of Wallenstein from Lutzen to Prague, over 100 miles, in 1632. One of the most disgraceful flights of a leader was that of James II. from the Boyne, 20th June, 1690, even across sea to France. Its effect justified the stress laid upon such a defection in the Bible, where the prophet Isaiah (X., 18) declares, 'they [soul and body] shall be as when a standard bearer fainteth.' From the battle field, which he watched from a safe distance, the bigoted Romanist, without faith in his own bigotry, spurred, without drawing rein, to Dublin, rested one night, and 'next morning he fled, though no man pursued him, and never rested till the ship, his [cowardly] foresight had provided, bore him in safety to France.' After the engagement at Prestonpans, 21st September, 1745, the English general, Sir John Cope, and his officers and fugitives reached Coldstream, forty to fifty miles, the same night, and after some repose continued their flight to Berwick, some twenty miles further. After Rosbach, 5th November, 1757, the Allies did not stop until they found refuge in Freyburg, and had put the Unstrut, ten or twelve miles distant, between them and immediate pursuit; many regiments not halting until they reached the Rhine, 200 miles away.' Nor let there be forgotten the flight and pursuit to the Waxhaws, in South Carolina, in 1780 (Tarleton covered over 100 miles in about 48 hours), or from Bull Run, first, in 1861.

"When, in 1758, the rapacious Duke of Richelieu was recalled, a churchman, the Count de Clermont, took his place at the head of 80,000 French. Clermont arrived at Hanover on the 14th February. At once Prince Ferdinand fell upon him and the French 'fled without pause or intermission (Cust, 2,2,45) across the snow-covered plains of Westphalia,' and 'by the end of the month' were all across the Weser, thirty miles to the S. and W. Brunswick and Hanover were successively evacuated, and within two months he was back 200 miles across the Rhine. The French abandoned their magazines, forgot, and thus lost a complete train of battering artillery and some 11,000 prisoners. It was like the breaking up of a rotten ice-dam in the spring—a complete dissolution." The Austrians had not done very much better after Leuthen or Lissa, 5th December, 1757, where Frederic with about



30,000 men defeated their 90,000, and hunted them out from Breslau in Silesia over the Giant mountains back upon their strongholds and fortresses in northeastern Bohemia, where it is claimed that, with difficulty, one-third of the numbers which had assumed the aggressive in November could again be reassembled after less than a few weeks' campaign of disappointed hopes."

"During the American Revolution, the presumptuous Gates, advancing, boasted he would crush Cornwallis at Camden, 16th August, 1780, with what he styled his "Grand Army," It was so completely shattered that it ceased to exist. Gates himself went off among the first runaways, and with almost the speed of an express rider, and 'scarcely halted till he reached Hillsborough [in N. E. North Carolina, 180 miles from the field of battle.]' ("Mercy Warren," II., 245.) Generals Smallwood and Gist, with a few of the regulars, succeeded in reaching Charlotte, N. C., 80 to 90 miles in 36 to 48 hours. The militia scattered and ran wildly, never stopping until they reached their homes, however distant. Never was anything more disgraceful, except the flight of some of the English troops during what was styled the "Castlebar Races," after their abandonment of a good position at Castlebar before an inferior number of French. Gordon (III., 390) states that some of the riflemen did not bring up until they reached Athlone, fear having given them such potent wings that they fled eighty miles in twenty-seven hours, as the roads ran."

But all these evidences of the influence of terror on what might be styled inexperienced troops is transcended by the flight of the veteran French from Waterloo. The British General Mitchell, in his "Fall of Napoleon," Vol. 3, page 153, furnishes a statement which is positively astounding. It was dusk, or, at earliest, just after sundown, when the French broke away, 18th June, 1815. "Between four and five o'clock in the morning [19th] we find the Emperor at Charleroi endeavoring to rally fugitives who had already reached that point, though twenty miles from the field of battle. Failing in his efforts to collect these men, he proceeded to Philipville, where fugitives again appeared, but as little inclined for resistance as before. He therefore proceeds to Laon, and on the following day [20th] is again haunted by the shadows of his vanquished host. Informed that a body of troops was seen advancing towards the town, he sent an aide-de-camp to ascertain what the appearance could mean, and learned that it was his brother Jerome, with Generals Soult, Morand, Colbert, Pelet de Movans and about 3,000 men, cavalry and infantry, who had gathered round them. Were it not attested beyond a doubt, the fact would seem almost incredible; for this was on the 20th, and Laon is nearly a hun-



dred miles from the field of battle—a space which these fugitives must have traversed in less than forty-eight hours. Like the sufferings of the retreat from Moscow, the speed of the flight from Waterloo stands altogether without parallel in history.”

☞ One thing is certain, the rebels, during the retreat from Petersburg, were never stampeded. Stupid from want of sleep, beat out through fatigue, exhausted from want of food, staggered by constant driving and defeated at every stand they may have been—but *stampeded, never.* ☞

[This concluding chapter is nothing more than facts *thrown* together. It was intended to be much more comprehensive, but I became too much disgusted with the blindness of mortals as to facts and with their subservience to assertions to deem it worthy the trouble of re-writing and digesting. The list of testimony might be swelled into a large volume, but with what good result? Very few would take the trouble to investigate and reflect. It is impossible to overcome the ingrained effects of ignorance backed by self-conceit and prejudice, the latter founded on caste, weakness, interest, or public opinion, the most fallacious of guides. The Bible, wisest of books, says: “The prophet is not without honor, *save in his own country* and house,” and “truth upon the scaffold,” is one of the proverbs which cannot be gainsaid. Had this article been subjected to the file, a great many of the opinions might have been modified, but not a fact. “The evolution of to-day” has come to the conclusion, “It was in mind, not in body, that God made man in His own image,” but this must be qualified by the pregnant remark of the wisest of kings, “God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions,” and the Love of Truth is certainly not one of the inventions they have sought after or out.]

Experts speak of the art of carrying on war. War is an art and a science, but there is something *requisite in* and far above it. A campaign, an operation, or a battle is not a matter of the application of mathematical rules, always keeping in mind a most important element, the qualities and courage of the troops, but of magnetism, the personal influence of the general commanding and his lieutenants. There is something in War far above all acquired knowledge.—Inspiration, Genius, that something which at once bridges the chasm that arrests Talent; before which Talent stands helpless, stupified or aghast. War depends on the physical and material, but far more upon the mental or moral; the first requires preparation, study, labor, and thought. It is a very great mistake to imagine that generalship was not perfectly comprehended in antiquity. Solomon certainly understood the basis of it, when he indited the proverb, “For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy

war." "Every purpose is established by counsel; and with good advice make war." "Where no counsel is, the people fall." The administrative services of the ancients were far better arranged than the vast majority can conceive, and its discipline perfect. Modern times know nothing like it, because they would not permit its savage application. Generalship, as far as it depends upon science and art, is not so very uncommon. Take one instance; the Duke of Berwick was a consummate "practical strategist"—expert in the art of carrying on war. Nevertheless he is scarcely ever cited as an exemplar. Inspiration is a direct effect through the individual upon the masses, especially in battle, from the God of Hosts and of Battles. Lucullus, a sensualist, in antiquity, cited by Frederic the Great, and Vendome, the same kind of a man, in modern times, were thus gifted; Spinola, the banker or merchant; Cavalier, the baker's apprentice; Suworow, the Cossack; Blucher, the liberator of Germany;—Turenne was talent incarnate; Conde, genius. Genius has never been restricted to any time or place. It is the child of circumstances and the mood. The six greatest generals of all time, those generally conceded as the "big sixes," Alexander, the Strategist; Hannibal, "the Collosum of Antiquity; Cæsar, the Expert; Gustavus, the Restorer; Frederic, the Non-parœil; Bonaparte, the Child of Destiny or Fortune: these six have been arbitrarily selected. *Nunc pro tunc*, there are others who are worthy to rank with them.—Epaminondas, Timoleon, Torstenson, Marlborough, Traun. The list might be greatly enlarged, but it would be piping to deaf ears to mention their names or allude to their deeds. "The world knows nothing of its greatest men." This country has produced three men who are regarded as the embodiment of the genius of war, whereas they were simply creatures of accident. Neither of them had the genius that bridges unexpected and unforeseen gulfs. They were what Kleber justly styled Bonaparte, "generals at six thousand lives a day." For instance, Grant did not display any genius in the Wilderness campaign. He did not do as well as Sherman, with Thomas as his inspiration and balance-wheel, did in the Atlanta campaign, or as Thomas, alone, at Nashville. And it would seem as if at Farmville, 7th April, 1865, he demonstrated his want of genius or perception in not reinforcing Humphreys as much as he did at Shiloh in neglecting to make the most of his position and provide against surprise and accidents. "Defensive battles [Lee's strong point] may be looked upon as *professional* battles. Offensive battles, *well prepared and delivered*, are [when so] the emanations of genius."—Marmont's "Spirit of Military Institutions."

[NOTE.—The question of Bridging or Fording the Appomattox to reinforce Humphreys, on the afternoon, 6th April, 1865, is a very curious one, and its comprehension involves a great deal of study and practical observation. Finally, it resolves itself into the simpler question rather of the exertion of will power than of physical ability. The proverb, "Where there is a will there is a way," holds good on almost every occasion in war. The Appomattox at Farmville is a comparatively small stream and it would not have taken very long to tear down a number of neighboring buildings and construct a temporary bridge, amply strong enough and enduring enough for the occasion. Besides being a railroad station, there were lots of material that could be utilized and there were woods in close vicinity. No enemy on the north bank was present or at hand to molest the work, which could have been prosecuted on both sides simultaneously, and the only difficulty in bridging the much broader and deeper Rappahannock in December, 1862, ceased the moment the rebel sharpshooters, on the right bank and under cover, were dislodged. Again, where was the pontoon train which should have moved with each corps and have been in readiness for instant use? Humphreys had shown, 6th, A. M., how rapidly bridges could be restored or constructed. On the morning of the 6th his men forded armpit deep and also bridged Flat Creek, about one hundred feet wide. It is no pedantry to instance examples in former days, because they always hold good from the first development of modern war, as when Gustavus Adolphus crossed the Rhine on a barn door, and Bernard of Saxe Weimar, imitating Maximin, A. D. 238, and imitated by the Germans in 1870, substituted hogsheads or beer barrels for pontoons, and threw bridges sufficient for all practical purposes in an almost incredibly short space of time. There are a great many curious examples of spontaneous engineering which demonstrate what energy or despair will effect. In 1560 D'Oysell made a raid into Fife, on the north side of the Firth of Forth, and found himself beset by superior forces. Before him lay a deep and broad stream, the bridge across which had been destroyed. His enemies thought he was entrapped. The experienced French commander did not hesitate a moment; he caused a church and other neighboring buildings to be torn down, and with the timbers, &c.; he constructed a bridge, to the astonishment of the Scotch, who thought they had him sure. As to fording, practice sets rules at defiance. Near, or at Farmville, Col. W. H. Paine, "Pathfinder of the Army of the Potomac," stated there was a ford used by those frequenting the mill, and a little above a crossing path over a tree, which had fallen or been felled so as to constitute a foot-bridge.]

It has been reported, and the story has never been contradicted, that when the French, in 1799, destroyed the Devil's Bridge, Suworow's troops restored communication by lashing trees together with the sashes of their officers. It is true that the span is only twenty-five or thirty feet, but the horrors of the situation more than made up for the narrowness of the gulf. What made it far worse, fighting was going on and the slightest disabling wound was equivalent to death. The effect on the mind made this bridging of twenty-five feet far more difficult and appalling than five times greater breadth of placid water. There are instances of making bridges by thrusting wagons into the stream in continuous lines across.

Where there are plenty of large trees and plenty of men to handle them, a cob or a cantilever bridge over a small stream does not present much difficulty. The writer has seen a great many curious pieces of *snap*-work done with celerity and success. The Røeliff Jansen, a large and furious stream, burst its bounds and nearly scooped out a village. No trouble was experienced in constructing a cob dam across the new channel, which, while it allowed the water to pass freely, constituted a bridge, as it were, to get the materials in place. Had it been planked, it would have been a bridge.

"Thirty-six inches for infantry, forty inches for artillery and cavalry," are the figures in books as the depths set down as rules for fording. Infantry have often laughed at greater depths. Ewell, in July, 1863, forded the Potomac shoulder deep; Humphreys, on the 6th April, Flat Creek arm-pit deep—that is, at least, from forty-eight to fifty-two inches. When Ginkel's grenadiers carried Athlone in the teeth of a sheltered defence, they forded the broad and impetuous Shannon under fire, cravat deep, which must have been from fifty-two to sixty inches, since grenadiers were men picked out for their height. At any time and under any circumstances it was considered "a dangerous ford." How deep cavalry can ford depends upon the horses, and if the rule holds good, as it is consistent with common sense, infantry can ford, not swim, through as great a depth of water as cavalry, if the bottom is firm, because horses deepen a ford with their shod hoofs, whereas infantry often pack it. A spirited horse will not ford quietly when the water is as deep as his back; he rises and wants to surge. The writer knows this by experience. Fifteen hands makes sixty inches, which would bring water over the seat of the saddle of average horses, and arm-pit or shoulder deep, say fifty inches, would bring water over the backs of average horses. Memory recalls at this moment Baner's infantry forded the Oder shoulder deep, dragging by hand their artillery after them.—"Decisive Conflicts," Gettysburg, 107.



On reflection it is astonishing how often such feats of audacity have been attempted and succeeded. At the passage of the Boyne, 1690, the English, in fact the whole infantry of their centre, struggled through the river up to their arm-pits in water, under fire, to attack an enemy of equal force in position and to some extent protected by artificial defences. At the capture of Cork by Marlborough, 1690, four English regiments advanced through the Rape Marsh up to their shoulders in water. At Athlone, 1691, William's troops plunged, up to their cravats in water, into the Shannon, running not only deep but strong, forded the river under fire, and captured strongly occupied works. Numerous other instances might be cited; the most remarkable, Villar's advance through an inundated country, in the spring of 1706, to the capture of fortified towns and strongly occupied works. On this occasion the French infantry charged about a mile through water up to their shoulders, and the horses of the cavalry were in many places compelled to swim (Moret's "*Quinze Ans du Règne de Louis XIV.*" [1700-1715], II., pages 149-151). In the operations around Savannah, and after its capture, 1864, on more than one occasion (according to letters received) short men had to swim for their lives.

Meade telegraphed to Humphreys, "7th April, 6.15 P. M., the [Crook's] cavalry has forded *belly deep*." [The writer had his mare measured, and with her belly deep was equal to thirty-four inches, and, under the saddle, back deep was equal to about sixty inches, equal to about arm-pit deep of a man standing five feet ten in his boots. This argument, showing that the Appomattox should have been crossed some way or another to the support of Humphreys, was fortified by measurements received from Farmville a number of years ago, which are doubtless among the writer's papers at home far distant, and at present inaccessible. Communications have been addressed requesting duplicate information, but as yet have met with no response.]

[(FORDING AND FIGHTING IN THE WATER.)—"These fords [those of the 'most easterly branch of the Nile, the Pelusaic'] [which 'may be forded on horseback when the Nile is at the lowest, or even by men on foot if they do not mind being wet to the waist'] the troops of Perdiccas bravely attempted to pass, in the face of the first Ptolemy's army. One [branch or arm] they crossed, but were routed at the second, *while fighting up to their breasts in the water*."—Bartlett's "Forty Days in the Desert." London, 1862. Page 24.]

"Several different systems for a Ponton Equipment have been adopted in different countries, and it is therefore still a matter for military study as to which of them is best, in whole or in part, or what improvements or substitutes can be suggested for all.



“Pontons of ordinary shape are not exclusively applicable for forming a bridge; when insufficient for that object they may be used as boats or in rafts to convey bodies of troops across a river; the horses being made to swim with their heads held up by their bridles at the sides of each ponton; the artillery in such cases being carried over on rafts. Indeed, it was in this way that, in 1814, a preliminary footing was rapidly established on the right bank of the Adour, about three miles below Bayonne, capable of resisting the strong sortie sent out from that garrison to oppose it.

“Of numerous similar instances of the service which even an extemporized pontoon-train has rendered to an army, I will select only the following one, recorded by Captain Connolly in his *“History of the Royal Sappers and Miners,”* Vol. I., page 254:

“A reinforcement of thirty men, under Lieutenant Rutherford, R. E., arrived at the Cape of Good Hope on the 24th of July, 1819. In consequence of hostilities with the Kaffirs, the detachment marched seven hundred miles to the south-eastern frontier. It traversed a wild and thickly wooded country, where there were neither bridges nor roads; and, in the absence of soldiers of the Quartermaster-General’s Department, facilitated by their exertions the progress of the troops. In places where civil artificers could not be procured at any rate of wages, they executed various services and works of defence for the security and tranquillity of the settlement. On one occasion they constructed a temporary bridge, of chance material, to span one of the principal rivers of the country, which was swollen with floods and rendered deep, rapid, and dangerous. The bridge was thrown in six hours, and the whole of the force, about two thousand horse and foot, a demi-battery of guns with ammunition wagons, about one hundred baggage wagons with commissariat supplies, camp equipage, &c., crossed in perfect safety in three hours.”—Extract from *“The Royal Engineer.”* By the Rt. Hon. Sir Francis B. Head, Bart. London, 1869. At pages 36 and 37.

“As soon as this [Lassoo] experiment was concluded and the drivers had reattached themselves to their wagons, the whole train was ordered to advance in file—that is, one ponton carriage, &c., guarded by its sappers, following another. After they had proceeded in this shape for a short distance, Captain Micklem very sharply uttered the word of command: ‘Form for defence against cavalry,’ and in less than two minutes, by a movement exactly the reverse of that described by the lines:

‘These are Clan-Alpine’s warriors true;  
And, Saxon,—I am Roderick Dhu!’

he, his horses, his drivers, and his sappers, became the invis-

ible garrison of a fort or polygon of twenty sides, formed by his pontoon and covered wagons, drawn up so close to each other that, in several instances, they almost touched, and in others left an interstice or embrasure of about a foot or eighteen inches on the outside.

"As I rode around and close to this rapidly constructed fort, wherever I came to an interstice a sapper on one knee, with his sword in bayonet form attached to his firearm, with two others standing one behind the other above him, each and all looking direct, at me, nearly together snapped their Sniders in my face. Others beneath the wagons shot at me from between the wheels; and I have no hesitation in saying that the officer's word of command was so completely carried into practical effect that the rampart formed by his wagons was totally impenetrable, not only to cavalry using swords, but also to lancers."—Extract from "Head's Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At pages 44 and 45.

"Fortification is the art of enabling a small body of men to resist, for a considerable time, the attack of a greater number."—Extract from "Head's Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At page 155.

"Now, to obliterate [Impossible!] that word from future engineering proceedings, the 'trench-railway' has been invented, or, as there is really nothing new in its principle, it would be more correct to say that the ordinary railway of the firm of Stephenson, Brunel & Co. has been at Chatham adopted and adapted to the parallels and approaches of a siege.

"The facility with which it can be so adapted has been demonstrated by the fact, that during last summer a squad of twenty-five sappers, who had been duly instructed in the work, with the assistance of twenty-five fatigue men, laid down four-hundred yards of line in instruction trenches, at Brompton, in twenty-five minutes, so that the trollies or trucks for carrying guns, ammunition, &c., were able to pass along the iron road. The materials had been previously prepared and brought up, but the whole of the laying of sleepers and rails, and spiking down the latter were, it is alleged, done in the time mentioned. And very nearly at that rate I myself saw the work proceed."—Extract from "Head's Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At pages 156 and 157.

"A certain number of barrels, usually the ordinary ones used by the navy or commissariat for provisions and rum, according to their size and power of flotation, are firmly lashed together side by side, and in this form take the place of the piers of an ordinary permanent bridge or of the pontoons of a floating bridge.

"The seventy barrels I witnessed would enable an army without pontoons, with its cavalry, field artillery and infantry, four

deep, to cross a river fifty yards broad. The wooden cases lined with metal, used for carrying on board ship ammunition for the new heavy guns, can be adapted by the pontoon train for this purpose."—"Royal Engineer." By Sir F. B. Head. London, 1869. At pages 56 and 57.

"ROYAL ENGINEER ESTABLISHMENT.

"CHATHAM, 186-.

"1.—Lieutenant ———, Royal Engineers, will prepare a project for a military bridge of piles, to support twelve-pounder Armstrong guns, to be made of Fir poles, 8" diameter and length as required, over a river one hundred yards wide and six feet deep, with tidal rise of five feet, banks and bottom of river of solid clay. Reports to describe how the poles would be driven, no boat being available; pile-engine to be made on the spot; monkey 13" shell roadway to be covered with fascines, as no planks are available.

"2.—A general description of the proposed bridge, and of the method of constructing it, with an abstract estimate of the men, tools, materials and time required for its formation.

"3.—A practical analysis of the data, showing the load to be borne, and its action upon the constituent parts of the bridge, the width of roadway required, &c., with a detailed examination into the powers of the parts of the bridge to resist the forces, &c., to which they will be subjected.

"4.—A detailed description of the arrangement and construction, and of the method of putting together and securing the parts to the bridge.

"5.—A detailed description of the subdivision of the work and the organization of the working parties, with separate estimates of the number of men and tools, of the quantity of material, and the length of time required for each successive operation in forming the bridge.

"6.—A general plan, with the necessary sections and elevations of the bridge, accompanied by drawings on a larger scale of those details which cannot be clearly explained otherwise.

"The dates of beginning and ending the project to be written on the plan and memoir."

"[Signed,] SUPERINTENDENT OF FIELD WORKS."

"Royal Engineer." By Sir F. B. Head, pages 168-9. London, 1869.

According to the report of Edward Maguire, Lieutenant U. S. Engineers, in his "Exploration and Survey in the Department of Dakota," 30th June, 1877:

"While in the field the attention of the detachment was


devoted to topographical work. \* \* \* In addition to topographical work I was engaged in the superintendence of the BRIDGING and CROSSING of streams and in such road-making as was found to be necessary in order to allow the passage of the train [page 1337]. The next morning (18th May, 1876) the command moved again, crossing Heart River. The Heart at this point is about thirty yards wide, three feet deep, with a fairly firm sandy bed and a slight current. The water was clear and good. A great deal of work was required in corduroying the bank to enable the train to cross, and it was only after a delay of three hours that the head of the column commenced its march for the Sweetbriar [page 1341].

"The next day's march of thirteen and a half miles brought us to Crow's Nest, or Buzzard's Roost Butte. The first portion of the route lay over an exceedingly rough country covered with drift. After struggling over a distance of one and a quarter miles, we arrived on the banks of the Sweetbriar. It was found to be a rushing torrent fully fifty feet wide and much over ten feet in depth. To cross it with the means at hand was impossible, so it was determined to go southward and turn the stream. This was done, and skirting the valley we passed out into an open, flat and marshy prairie, in a north-westerly direction towards Crow's Nest. The ground was very soft, and interspersed with fragments of slate, and the last four and a half miles were passed over a swamp, double teams being necessary for each wagon. At noon a terrible storm arose—the rain came down as in sheets, while, for twenty minutes, hail five-eighths of an inch in diameter descended with great violence. \* \* \*

"Crow's Nest consists of two peaks, the eastern one being considerably taller than the other. It is so called from the fact that large numbers of crows formerly built their nests and brooded there. Twin Buttes are plainly visible from the eastern peak.

"The only water at this camp was that in 'coulées' and 'buffalo wallows.' There was no wood easily accessible, and the grass was poor. The bridge was laid once during this march [page 1341]. The flowers were very beautiful, and as they were crushed under the horses' feet they gave forth a protest of the most delicate and welcome odor [page 1342].

"These Indians were bold enough to assemble on the bluffs on the south side of the Yellowstone, and dare the troops on the other side to an encounter [page 1344].

"It is thought that a few remarks in reference to one serious defect in the organization of the columns operating in the field during the campaign will not be out of place.  That defect was the absence of a good bridge train. On leaving Fort Lincoln

there were placed, under my orders, two wagons containing tools and some one and a half inch pine plank, and some, two by four and three by six, pine pieces. \* \* \* though simple it was of incalculable benefit, and shows how useful and valuable a small canvas ponton train would have been. I am free to say that I think no supply-train should be sent into that western country without at least two trestles, four canvas pontons, and the accompanying bridge material. Four pontons are estimated, because a substantial raft could be made of that number for crossing the larger streams. If these could not be obtained from the regular Engineer depot, the Quartermaster's department should be called upon to construct them in accordance with proper plans and specifications.

"Last season the material mentioned above saved the column many miles of hard marching and great loss of time; but, unfortunately, the supply was soon exhausted and it then became necessary to resort to the long, tedious and uninteresting operation of filling in the bed of the stream to be crossed. It is thought, also, that there should accompany each column a detail of men whose sole duty should be to construct and care for the bridges. Much time would be saved by thus having men who would be familiar with the work, and who would take a greater interest in it than can be expected of those who are detailed from day to day.

"The wagon train made fifty-nine crossings in all, and the average time consumed in making these crossings was forty minutes each. As a matter of interest, there will follow a description of some of the methods of crossing streams, which have been or can be employed by our troops in the western country.

"1st.—By filling in the bed of the stream or ravine with logs, covering these with a layer of brush, and in turn covering the brush with a thick layer of sod or earth. It is very seldom that the time can be allowed for carrying this structure high enough, and consequently the approaches must be cut quite deep; and experience has shown that there is not more than one teamster in twenty who will not let his team run down the slope of the approach and strike the causeway with a heavy thud, thus breaking through the roadbed and requiring constant work of refilling. The brush used may be sage, willow and young cottonwood. The sage is by far the most easily manipulated and the most enduring. Logs, to act as side-rails, should be laid, and the roadway should be at least fifteen feet broad. The axes of the approaches and the crossing should be in the same plane, perpendicular to the axis of the stream. This would seem a trivial remark, but it was observed last summer that, unless closely watched, the men would, unconsciously, deviate from the proper



direction, and the crossing would be oblique to the stream. Whenever that happened, there was trouble with the teamsters.

"2d.—By making a crib-work of spare wagon-tongues, and laying others covered with sod to form the roadway. The wagon-pole is of oak, and ten and seven-tenths feet long.

"3d.—By employing the bull-ropes or fifth-chains as suspension cables, and laying at the bottom of the catenary three or four wagon-tongues to act as a species of girder. The flooring is laid with other wagon-tongues, and the whole covered with sod. To prevent swaying, lariats may be fastend to the ropes and anchored to the shore. This method is, of course, limited to timbered streams and to those which are a little less in width than twice the length of a wagon-tongue, or twenty-one feet. [This is something on the principle of Tressilian's telegraph wire suspension bridges.]

"4th.—By employing floating piers, each consisting of a wagon-body placed over the number of empty water-kegs that can be confined within the body. The roadway, as before, is formed of wagon-tongues. Lariats can be used as anchoring cables for the piers.

"A keg is capable of sustaining a weight of 458.69 pounds.

"The interior dimensions of the six-mule army wagon-body are as follows: depth, 2 feet; length, 10 feet; width, 3.58 feet.

"Fourteen ten-gallon kegs will about fill a wagon-body of the above dimensions; and hence each set of kegs will virtually sustain a weight of fourteen times 458.69 pounds, or 6,421.66 pounds. Subtracting from this the average weight of the body, 423 pounds, we shall have 5,998.65 pounds as the weight which can be borne by each pier.

"The dimensions of the wagon-tongue are as follows:

" Length of tongue, . . .	10.7 feet.
Breadth at point, . . .	$B' = 2.5$ inches.
Depth at point, . . .	$D' = 2.5$ "
Breadth at butt, . . .	$B'' = 3.88$ "
Depth at butt, . . .	$D'' = 2.75$ "
Mean breadth, . . .	$B' = 3.19$ "
Mean depth, . . .	$D' = 2.625$ "

"Supposing the tongues not to lap on the piers, we shall have for the length of the tongue between supports, 7 feet, 12 inches:

"The average weight of the army wagon is 1,800 pounds, and assuming the weight of a mule as 1,000 pounds, we shall have 7,800 pounds as the weight of the wagon and six-mule team. Assuming, now, the average weight of the load to be 4,000 pounds, we shall have 11,800 pounds as the weight on the bridge.

The total length of bridge occupied by wagon and team is forty-nine feet, and consequently the load per running foot is 241 pounds, nearly. Referring to the breaking weight of the tongue, we see that four tongues laid as balks are sufficient; forty tongues will be required for flooring, if laid close. There will then be in all forty-four tongues, weighing twenty-eight pounds each. In other words, each bay, exclusive of the piers, will weigh 1,232 pounds, or 115.1 pounds per running foot. We have, as the weight of forty-nine feet of bridge, with load, 11,800 pounds plus 115.1 pounds, x 49, or 17,440 pounds, nearly. This weight will be borne by at least five piers; but we have seen above that each pier will support 5,998.66 pounds, and consequently five piers would support 29,993.3. In other words, the bridge would have nearly double the strength absolutely necessary. It is also to be seen that any field-battery can be crossed on such a bridge. A similar bridge can be constructed by using simply the kegs, lashed together, for piers; but the other method is preferable, as the wagon-body keeps the kegs together, besides furnishing a level bed on which to lay the balks.

"5th.—By felling four trees, which, with the butts resting on the banks, will [Cantilever], by crossing each other two and two, form supports for a girder, and then laying a flooring. They should either be spiked or lashed together where they cross.

"6th.—By forming rude trestles, which may be either simply notched, or, what is better, spiked with lariat pins. The girder timbers can be squared off on the upper side and the stringers be notched so as to hold better. The main pieces of the legs may be anchored to the shore by lariats. A tripod trestle-bridge can be formed of simple tripods connected at the bottom by braces. A bar is lashed or pinned across two legs of the tripod, and on this rests the cap-piece, as in the Figure 6.

"7th.—By various combinations of saplings forming what are termed single or double lever bridges.

"A small work on field fortification, by Major W. W. Knollys, F. R. G. S., Ninety-third Southerland Highlanders, contains a very good description of such bridges.

"A single-lever bridge is composed of two frames which lock into each other. A full sized section of the stream or gap should be first traced on the ground. The line representing the breadth should be bisected. Two standards should then be laid down on the section and on them marked the places where the main transoms, the fork transom, and the ledges will come. The frames should then be constructed. These distances should be between standards at the transom, nine feet six inches, and at the ledger ten feet six inches. In the other frame the distances should be

eleven feet and twelve feet, respectively. As the frame lies on the ground with its butts toward the stream, the transom should be under and the ledger above the standards. The diagonal dimensions of the frames are measured to ascertain whether the positions of the pieces of the latter have not changed. Of the diagonals, one is altogether above the frame, the other has its butt over and its top under. The diagonals are lashed to each other where they cross, and also to the standards. The frames are raised and lowered into their positions by means of foot and guy ropes. The pickets for the foot ropes are driven into the ground about two paces from the edge of the bank and four paces on each side of the centre of the frame. The foot ropes are attached to the butts and passed twice around the pickets. The pickets for the guy ropes are driven in about twenty paces from the bank and ten paces from the central line. The fore and back guys are fastened to the tips, the ends of the fore guys being thrown across the stream and those of the back guys being passed twice around their respective pickets. The frames are then raised by hand and carried to the edge of the bank. The butts are then gradually lowered into position, one frame being hauled over till it is a little beyond the perpendicular, in which position it is secured by fastening the back guys to their pickets; the other frame is dealt with in a similar manner. Both frames are then lowered till they interlock. A spar is laid across the fork formed by the crossing of the standards, to serve as a support to the road beams. The roadway is composed of balks lashed to each other, and covered with planks, spiked or rack-lashed down, or by fascines covered with loose brushwood, earth or heather. The ends of the balks should be attached to a beam or stout spar, half buried in the ground and picketed down, its direction being perpendicular to the length of the bridge. It is desirable to place rails or breast lines at the edges of the bridge. At each transom the road beams should be all tips or all butts, and the ends of each pair should be lashed together. It must be noted that the frames should not make a greater angle with each other than  $120^{\circ}$ .

"A double-lever bridge is formed in a manner similar to that in which a single-lever bridge is constructed, with the exception that the two frames do not cross each other, but are connected by means of a second frame, which has no diagonals. Double-lever bridges are suited for openings of forty feet. Even openings of sixty feet have been spanned by a double lever bridge.

"Another combination can be made by forming a lever truss bridge. The frames are made as in the case just cited, but an extra support is given to the roadway by the rope at the centre." The figures annexed explain themselves. (*Ibid.*, pages 1354-1358.)

[F. B. Tressilian, a young officer who suggested the idea of constructing *improvised suspension bridges over streams not over two hundred feet wide, using telegraph wire for the cables*, was one of the brightest and most original men I ever met. He had all the expedients of war at his finger ends. Like Korner, he was a soldier-poet. One of his lyrics, jotted down on a shingle, while on duty in the trenches before Vicksburg, which he also set to music (in the same way that Roget de L'Isle composed the words and notes of "The Marseillaise"), was like a trumpet peal, worthy of Tyrtæus. He afterwards became a Fenian, and started from New York, with other noted bloods, in a schooner, intending to land in Ireland and organize armed resistance against the British Government. After hovering around the coast for some time, and finding nothing could be done, he returned, and suddenly turned up in New York again—then disappeared.

An article, which he partly jotted down in his Diary and partly related to me, I furnished to *The Historical Magazine*, for August, 1869, pages 89-97. It is entitled, "IX.—Incidents connected with the History of the 'Army of the Tennessee.'" From the Diary of one its officers. [The author of the following Diary was Captain (afterward Lieutenant-Colonel) F. B. Tressilian, U. S. V., Aid-de-Camp and Engineer on the Staff of Major-General John A. Logan. He was a man of uncommon ability and courage; never at a loss for expedients; and competent to produce great results with what, to ordinary men, would have proved utterly insufficient means. He was a very warm friend of the writer; and, as a memento of his regards, copied out the following from his Diary to oblige Major-General de Peyster, who has never neglected an opportunity to collect such reminiscences of the great American conflict. It is almost a misfortune for the future historian that Colonel Tressilian did not at least set in order his recollections of the decisive battle of Shiloh, but more particularly of the siege of Vicksburg, in which he played a conspicuous part—actually *converting Stumps into Mortars*, and on another occasion *BUILDING A BRIDGE OUT OF TELEGRAPH WIRE, when military professionals were nonplussed at the absence of what they deemed suitable or necessary material.*] This Diary is most interesting. It terminates abruptly with the disembarking of the Union troops at Pittsburg Landing [Shiloh], 1862. Tressilian's opinion of the position was anything but favorable. It is a great loss to history that his graphic Diary, with its practical observations, was never printed in full. If there ever was a genius, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, Tressilian was eminently such a one.]

[“The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre (near Port Gibson, 1st May, 1863). At this time the water was high and current rapid. What might be called a raft bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, &c., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely.—XXXIV, 485. See Map to face page 466. “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, 1885.”]

[Every battle or engagement has its fellow or parallel, either in whole or in part. At Prague, 6th May, 1757, if Prince Moritz could have got across the Moldau at Branik, a little south of Prague, the Austrian army might have been annihilated. Prince Moritz was three pontons short, and the Moldau was not fordable; whereas there were more than sufficient pontons at Farmville, and the Appomattox was fordable. In assaulting the Austrian lines Prince Henry waded through a soft marsh waist-deep, which is about forty-four inches, or nearly back-deep for a horse. Belly-deep for ordinary horses is not much over thirty inches. From the utter impossibility of getting over or through the Moldau, Prince Moritz was compelled to stand idly by and see the Austrians, thoroughly whipped, withdraw and find refuge behind the fortifications of Prague, or march off to reinforce Daun and win at Koltin. At Farmville abundant troops, which could easily have got across, left Humphreys to take care of himself, and allowed Lee to escape, affording him another chance to get off, and necessitating a terribly harassing pursuit of about forty miles in about as many hours, just the unsatisfactory case of Prague followed by the necessity of another fight within a few days. This was exactly Blucher's idea of the folly of not profiting by every opportunity, especially of the defeat of an enemy.]

[“The rates of march, for Russian troops, under good conditions of weather and roads, are as follows, per hour :

For Infantry, . . . . .	2 $\frac{2}{3}$ miles.
For Foot Artillery, . . . . .	3 $\frac{1}{3}$ “
For Cavalry and Horse Artillery, at a walk, . . . . .	3 $\frac{1}{3}$ “
For Cavalry and Horse Artillery, alternately at walk and trot, . .	4 $\frac{2}{3}$ “
For Horse Train, . . . . .	2 $\frac{2}{3}$ “
For Ox Train, . . . . .	2 “

The length of a division of Infantry on the march, in column of double files or sections, is from 3,000 to 4,000 paces; and including its wagon train, from 9,000 (21,000 feet) to 13,000 (17,000 feet) paces. The length of a Cavalry division on the march,



in column of threes, is from 4,000 to 5,000 paces, and including its train, from 9,000 to 10,000 paces."—"The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877 and 1878." By F. V. Greene. New York: 1879. Page 136.]

COPY OF AN INSCRIPTION APPENDED TO A PICTURE IN THE OLD WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING, IN WASHINGTON, WHICH HAS DISAPPEARED. IT IS PERTINENT TO FORDING.

General Geo. Rogers Clarke was born in Albemarle Co., Va., in 1752, but spent the greater part of his life in Kentucky and Indiana. In 1778 he raised a small volunteer force in Virginia, crossed the Ohio, reduced nearly all the British posts between the Mississippi and the Great Lakes, and arrested the incursions of the Western Indians. His MARCHES through the pathless wilderness were so rapid that he generally took the enemy by surprise, his prudence so great that he rarely lost a man, and his daring has never been surpassed. *In attacking Vincennes in February, 1779, he was five days in wading his army across the valley of the Wabash, flooded with melted snows for a breadth of six miles, generally waist deep, and sometimes up to the shoulders, an exploit that parallels Hannibal's crossing of the Thrasymene Marsh.*

General Clarke was variously employed by the State of Virginia and the United States up to 1786, in maintaining possession of the Western country and suppressing Indian hostilities. He died in 1818, near Louisville, Kentucky.

This conquest and armed occupation of the Northwesten Territory by General Clarke, was made the ground on which the Count de Vergennes and the American Commissioners obtained for the United States, by the treaty of 1783, a boundary on the line of the Great Lakes instead of the Ohio River.

I have become so thoroughly disgusted with the wilful or unintentional perversion of facts recently published, or special pleas presented as histories of the American Rebellion by first hands, politicians, flatterers, partisans, parasites, perverters, or purveyors for the diseased public taste, that I have not attempted to concise or correct this chapter on Fording, &c., but give it just as I found my notes, some of them long since jotted down, others studied shortly after the occurrences on which they bear as testimony, corroborative of opinions then expressed. They were submitted to one of the bravest men I ever knew, and also to one of the most honest men I ever met. The one is where "the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest," but the other survives to bear witness to the correctness of the foregoing statements and deductions, and herewith, to attest the fact, his letter,

one of a number of similar communications received from him, is published, and immediately follows.

DEAR GENERAL DE PEYSTER: NEW YORK, April 23d, 1886.

\* \* \* It was not until last evening that I succeeded in finishing the reading of the papers you gave me. I am very sorry that all of my memoranda concerning army matters are for the time being locked up in a storehouse and not conveniently accessible. *My recollection of the events narrated corresponds fully with the account as you have it. You have given Humphreys that just credit which was his due, a credit which he himself did not strive or ask for, being so absorbed in that intelligent, energetic and fearless performance of all that not simply duty, but the highest patriotism, combined with military ability, led him to attempt and to perform.*

At one time I wrote you in regard to some fords above, one at a mill; also of a place where a fallen tree served as a foot bridge. Also of the fact of the river being fordable at ordinary stages in many places; of guiding and accompanying Hon. E. B. Washburn from General Meade's headquarters to and across the river by a ford the next night after leaving Farmville. The proximity of large trees near the left bank, and buildings on the right bank, all of which would have furnished materials for a bridge.

I ought, and perhaps did, mention that Gen. Meade, who remained for a time where Gen. Humphreys crossed [High Bridge?], received reports that the engineers were constructing a bridge at Farmville, in consonance with his instructions, and not until quite late in the day [7th April], did he learn that that was not being accomplished as he expected.

Where Gen. Humphreys crossed, the bank and bluff was very steep and abrupt, the wagon road making quite a detour to reach the bottom. The slope on the opposite side being less steep and farther from the stream. There was originally 35 spans in the R. R. bridge, 100 feet each in length; earth had been filled in, shortening the bridge to 29 spans, if I recollect right, of which two or three had been injured or partially destroyed by the enemy when we arrived. Gen. Humphreys' route diverged to the right over a gradual rise, but coming to a very rough, broken region just before reaching the place [Cumberland Church] of his engagement with the enemy. After reaching the height of ground, about a half mile from the river [south side, right bank?], a road ran in the direction of Farmville; this was the road taken by the cavalry. Nearer the river the country was a succession of spurs and deep ravines.

Yours very truly,

W. H. PAINE.

## WILLIAMSBURG—FARMVILLE.

[It is extraordinary how exactly history often repeats itself. At pages LVII. and XCIX. mention is made that, during the battle of Prague, 6th May, 1757, the corps, or division, of Prince Moritz had to stand idle and see the wrecks of the Austrian army escape, in consequence of the want of three pontons. Just so the plans of Wellington were traversed before the battle of Toulouse, 27th March, 1814, at Portel on the Garonne, for the want of five pontons (Larpent, 458). Had the British column been provided with five more boats, the slaughter, fourteen days afterwards, experienced in carrying the French positions might have been avoided. These, however, were accidents irremediable at the moment. At Farmville, 7th April, 1865, any difficulty might have been obviated at once. Humphreys might have, after Cumberland Church, in justice, quoted the bitter remark of Hooker in regard to his abandonment at Williamsburg, 5th May, 1862: "History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence of more than thirty thousand of their comrades with arms in their hands. Nevertheless, it is true." (Rebellion Record, Vol. V., Doc. page 16, 1.)

This example does not stand alone. After the great French disaster at Oudenarde, Marshal Vendome wrote to Louis XIV.: "It was impossible for me to imagine that fifty battalions and about one hundred and eighty squadrons, comprising the best troops in this [the French] army, would be satisfied to look on and see us [the French right] fighting for six hours, they looking on exactly as, at the opera, the audience watches what is being acted upon the stage, from the upper boxes." Hooker, in his report, seemed simply quoting and applying the language of the French duke, writing one hundred and sixty years previous.

On the same page, XCIX., reference is made to Wading or Forging and Marching. Lieut.-Col. Townshend Wilson, in his "The Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France" (211), tells us how "in the dark and rainy night of the 25th October, 1708, Langeron's grenadiers, wading up to their waists through the Wash, burst into Leffingham and captured stronghold and strong garrison, all at the cost of eight grenadiers killed and twenty wounded." As to Marching, Berwick's Spanish infantry marched seven *long* leagues (say thirty miles) without water and in intense heat (*Ibid.* 141), and this same Spanish infantry marched forty-five *long* leagues (about one hundred and ninety miles) in eight days, in a rough country, destitute of roads and supplies. This was something terrible, considering the heavy firearms and

accoutrements, and inattention to every rule of hygiene in those days, when the "common soldier" was indeed regarded as "common," and of as little account as a serviceable brute beast. (*Ibid.* [1708] 271-2). Finally, in regard to Panics, at Sheriffmuir, Sunday, 13th November, 1715, the English centre, infantry and dragoons, fell into total rout at the onslaught of the opposing clans; and "the dastard leader" of the English army, General Witham, galloped to Sterling, ten miles off, "frantically proclaiming that 'all was lost'" (*Ibid.* 397). Any amount of similar examples might be brought forward, but the space accorded is now filled up; still numerous authorities, beaming with such illustrations, are easily accessible to the curious or critical on such subjects.

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#### ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

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- Passages des Rivières, et la Construction des Ponts Militaires à l'usage des Troupes de toutes Armes. Par C. A. Haillot, Capitaine [&c.] Plates. 8vo. Part III., page 524. Paris: 1835.
- Hand-Book of Field Fortifications, &c., &c. By Major W. W. Knollys, Ninty-third Sutherland Highlanders. Illustrated. 12mo. Page 273. Philadelphia [London]: 1873.
- General Theory of Bridge Construction. With practical Illustrations. By Herman Haupt, A. M., C. E. 16 plates. 8vo. Page 268. New York: 1856.
- Treatise on Bridge Architecture, in which the superior advantages of the flying pendent-lever bridge are fully proved. With an historical account and description of the different bridges erected in various parts of the world, from an ancient period down to the present time. By Thomas Pope, Architect, &c. Plates. 8vo. Part XXXII., pages 288. New York: 1811.
- Bridges and Draw-bridges. Ecole d'Application de l'Artillerie de Mechanique appliquée aux Machines. Plates. Folio. Pages 47. [Metz: no date.]
- Description of a System of Military Bridges, with India Rubber Pontons. Prepared for the use of the United States Army. By George W. Cullum, Captain United States Corps of Engineers. Plates. 8vo. Pages [143]. New York: 1849. [Professional Papers, No. 4, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.]
- Systems of Military Bridges in Use by the United States Army, those adopted by the Great European Powers, and such as are employed in British India. With directions for the preservation, destruction and reëstablishment of bridges. By

- Brigadier-General George W. Cullum, Lieutenant-Colonel, Corps of Engineers. 8 plates. 8vo. Part VI., Pages 226. New York: 1863.
- War Series. No. III. Information from Abroad. Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, by Lieutenant-Commander Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy. Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department: 1883. Washington Government Printing Office: 1885. XXIII.—“The Royal Engineers’ Ponton Troop.” Pages 253–258.

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## ERRATA.—TREMAIN’S WAR MEMORANDA.

PREPARED BY GEN. H. EDWIN TREMAIN.

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- Page 4, line 20.—For “1883,” read “1880–1.”
- Page 6, line 16.—For “around the left flank and Grant’s armies and thus get ahead of *him*,” read “around the left flank of Grant’s armies and thus get ahead of *them*.”
- Page 7, line 6.—Italicized portion should read, “*the old cavalry division* of the Army of the Potomac.”
- Page 9, lines 18, 19.—Expunge portion in brackets: [ ]
- Page 10, line 8.—Instead of “for and will,” read “and we will.”
- Page 17, line 15.—Gen. Tremain claims that this line was formed and Reade’s battery put in position under his personal direction, while Crook was rallying Gregg’s brigade.
- Page 20, line 4.—For “John J.,” read “John Irwin.”
- Page 36, line 3–6.—Gen. Tremain asks, “May not both statements be true?”
- Page 37, line 37.—For “formed across,” read “formed across this road.”
- Page 38, line 35.—For “Davies and Custer,” read “Devin and Custer.”
- Page 43, line 1.—For “in,” read “by.”
- Page 45, line 5.—For “they,” read “the.”
- Page 48, line 11.—For “reformed,” read “he rejoined.”
- Page 55, lines 44, 45.—(?) and (!?) signifies that the original MSS. was almost illegible.
- Page 63, lines 44, 45.—For “thorough-are,” read “thoroughfare.”
- Page 64, lines 29, 30.—Expunge portion in brackets: [ ]
- Page 65, line 10.—For “to,” read “with.”

## FARMVILLE, BRIDGING AND FORDING.

- Page lii, line 3.—For “battery,” read “bat or pack.”  
(*Typographical errors not noticed.*)



# Supplementary List of Publications.

Subsequent to August, 1884, and not hitherto Noticed.

BY

J. Watts de Peyster :

LL. D.

Master of Arts, Columbia College of New York, 1872.—Hon. Mem. Clarendon Hist. Soc., Edinburgh, Scotland ; of the New Brunswick Hist. Soc., St. John, Canada ; of the Hist. Soc. of Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, &c. ; Life Mem. Royal Hist. Soc. of Great Britain, London, Eng. ; Mem. Maatschappij Nederlandsche Letterkunde, Leyden, Holland.—First Hon. Mem. Third Army Corps (A. of the P.) Union ; Hon. Mem. Third Army Corps Gettysburg Battlefield Reunion and Member of the Honorary Committee ; Mem. Amer. Hist. Association, U. S. A. ; Associate Mem. Military Service Institution of the U. S., &c., &c.—Colonel N. Y. S. I., 1846, assigned for "meritorious conduct" to command of 22d Regimental District, M. F. S. N. Y., 1849 ; Brig.-General for "important service" [first appointment in N. Y. State to that rank, hitherto elective], 1851, M. F. S. N. Y. ; Adjutant General S. N. Y., 1855 ; Brevet Major General S. N. Y., for "meritorious services," by "Special Act" or "Concurrent Resolution," N. Y. State Legislature, April, 1866 [first and only General officer receiving such an honor (the highest) from S. N. Y., and the only officer *thus* brevetted (Major General) in the United States].

Articles published in the *United Service Magazine*, equal in matter to small 12mo. volumes : 1. The Condottieri of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, October, 1884 ; 2. The Thirty Years' War, November and December, 1884, and February and May, 1885 ; 3. Army Administrative Service, January, 1885 ; 4. Biographical Sketch, Rear-Admiral George Henry Preble, April, 1885 ; 5. Major-General Gershom Mott, U. S. V., and the Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, August, 1885 ; 6. Anthony Wayne, Third General-in-Chief of the United States Army (with portrait), March, 1886.

Biographical Sketch of Anthony Wayne [Prominent Men of the Revolutionary Period], *Magazine of American History*, February, 1886.

Literature of the Thirty Years' War, *Army and Navy Quarterly*, October, 1885.

Brief de Peyster and Watts Genealogical References, with partial List of Authorities, March, 1886.

The Massacres of St. Bartholomew outside of Paris, 24th August—4th September, 1572. January, 1885.

Gypsies: Information Translated and Gathered from Various Sources. New York: June, 1885.

Torstenson before Vienna ; or, the Swedes in Austria in 1645-1646. With a Biographical Sketch of Field-Marshal-Generalissimus Leonard Torstenson. November, 1885.

Francesca da Rimini (a literal translation of a famous episode in Dante's *Inferno*). December, 1885.

War Memoranda of Brig.-General H. Edwin Tremain, 1865. Edited by General de Peyster, 1886.

Not Subsequent to August, 1884.

La Royale : Last Twenty-four Hours of the Army of Northern Virginia (amended edition).—FARMVILLE (embracing a consideration of the engagement or battle at Cumberland Church or the Heights of Farmville, the last stand-up fight of the combined Second-Third Corps, representing the Army of the Potomac, with the Army of Northern Virginia, 7th April, 1865). FORDING and BRIDGING.

My Novel : The Baroness of Stern-Burgstall ; or, the Churme after the Storm. An historical and military romance of the turbulent period immediately succeeding the Treaty of Osnabruck or Munster, or Peace of Westphalia, autumn of 1648. 1865.

Also, a series of Military Lessons in Strategy and Tactics, and Biographical Sketches and Reviews, published in *The Leader* (N. Y.) in 1861, 1862 and 1863, equal in amount to a large volume—worth looking up, as containing the essence of many works written by the ablest military critics and historians ; also Biographical Sketches, Criticisms and Reviews in the *New York Citizen and Round Table* ; also in the *Volunteer and Soldier's Friend* ; also numerous Military Essays, Criticisms and Biographical Sketches in the *Army and Navy Journal*, 1863, 1864, and 1865, especially a series of articles on New American Tactics, which were translated and copied into foreign military journals, among these J. Correard's *Journal des Sciences Militaires des Armes de Terre et de Mer*. Paris : 1865-1866. A new set of tactics were published in France, founded on this idea.



Taken about 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANDREW H. HUMPHREYS.

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








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